Small Summers Island. Sommers Island: photo, internal structure. How to get there? Landing on Sommers Island. Failed start of operation

(text by authors photo rep)
and here’s what fits into the psto:

Here are the rocks at the northeastern tip, on which the paratroopers tried to land in three-point excitement.

The stones in the surf are all perfectly rolled by storms and polished by ice. They are covered with a thin, almost invisible layer of blue-green algae, which live in dry form, waiting for storm waves to bring them life-giving moisture. But as soon as water gets on them, that’s it, amba - your legs move apart. It is almost impossible not to walk or get out of the water without outside help when there is excitement.

Slippery coastal stones played their evil role during the landing on the rocky south-eastern coast. It becomes clear why most of the Maxim heavy machine guns were sunk during the landing. And all the paratroopers were loaded with weapons and ammunition. In addition, they were fired at from mortars, cannons and machine guns by the entire Finnish garrison of the island of 93 people from land, and by Finnish gunboats from the sea.

Traces from shell explosions are still visible on the granite rocks.

That day there were waves of force three - this is a wave height of up to 0.75 m. With masks and fins, Zhenya and Sasha examine the underwater coastal part of the landing site. We are looking for items related to the landing in order to find out the landing site and clarify the history of the events that took place here.

Alexey compares our and Finnish data on losses in people and weapons. How many Maxim machine guns were captured by the Finns. Like two. This means that the remaining eight were sunk during the landing. And no wonder. The weight of the assembled Maxim is 70 kg, even if you remove the body of the machine gun from the machine, then individually each part still weighs more than 30 kg.

Zhenya surfaced and took out from under the water a six-kilogram bronze ring mount for the reversible gearbox. After some time I found the remains of an optical device and small parts from the engine. No traces of the paratroopers themselves have yet been found. What also hinders the search is light green algae, which, like a long-haired carpet, tightly covers the entire bottom near the coastal part. Fry and transparent shrimps scurry around. The water warmed up to 20-22 degrees. Then they found several more items: a bronze valve with a broken copper pipe, small fragments of an engine.

Torpedo boat G-5

Our historians have a discussion about how exactly the G-5 torpedo boat approached the shore. Alexey reads in the documents that during the withdrawal after the landing, the torpedo boat flew ashore, since the reverse clutch of the left engine was turned back, and the right engine was turned forward. We are trying to understand exactly what it looked like based on the crevice we saw where the boat was sunk. Could it have caught on a stone in the middle of the small bay in which Sasha and Zhenya were snorkeling? What was the wind like? Alexey immediately reads out that the sea is north and the swell is 3 points, which means there were problems approaching the shore.

And why are the remains of this boat lying in another part of the island? They came to the conclusion that after the war the Finns dragged the remains of the boats to a more convenient place for hauling them ashore and then cutting them up for recyclable materials.

The third day is Wednesday.

On Wednesday after breakfast, armed with Finnish war photographs, we set off to search for a mass grave.

We spent half a day locating the area using Finnish military photographs. They thought this way and that. We were guided by the configuration of the stones and the location of the Finnish pillars and the shed for boat accessories. Now of course they are not. Therefore, they looked for hollowed-out holes in the rocks for installing pillars. We identified the probable location and began digging holes in the pebbles using picks and shovels.From the plexiglass found on the third floor in the locator post, we make a special tablet, scratching the main contours of the photograph using the tip of a knife. To directly overlay the outline of a photograph onto the terrain through plexiglass. That's what we did after lunch. Alexey Mukhin, by this time had already hollowed out a hole about a meter deep in the scree of cobblestones. For the sake of digging a hole, he even refused to go to lunch and was mercilessly burned in the sun. The outline on the plexiglass made it possible to more accurately determine the possible location of the mass grave.

Placed poles in the place where the boathouse stood

and telephone poles.

It was decided to dig another hole in the stones nearby, one and a half meters away.

They worked like this: one person loosened the stones with a pick, after which the large stones were thrown out by hand, and the small things were thrown out with a shovel.

While shoveling stones in a big way, the red-hot shovel made such a noise that it was difficult to talk to each other. A group of war correspondents filmed the process in the heat, dripping with sweat. Volodya and Igor took turns carrying a heavy camera and a tripod on their shoulders. Igor joined us and, with a pickaxe and then with a shovel in his hands, helped us as best he could. The hard labor continued until the evening, and then Alexey came across a small phalanx bone from a human finger. A rotted steel cartridge case from a three-ruler gun was found nearby.

With tripled energy they began to tear off the lintel between the pits and after two hours the pits turned into a “trench for shooting from a horse while standing.” However, nothing more was found. It was clear that we were somewhere very close. But where? A mass burial cannot be small and it is difficult to lose it. More carefully examining the territory of the pebble isthmus littered by the border guards, they found four rotten soldiers' mugs with the inscription LMZ (Lysyevsky Metal Plant), the neck of a Soviet pre-war flask and several boots twisted and shriveled with time, suspiciously similar to sea boots from the war.

On the coastal part, under a pile of modern metal debris, pieces from a military boat were found.

High-speed screws made of steel. It looks like it was made during wartime. Two powerful steering shafts. Wooden body.

Next to him lay objects clearly associated with the landing: opened zinc from cartridges for a three-line rifle with heavy bullets mod. 1930 (there was a yellow stripe on the lid), a zinc lid for RGD-33 grenades and an insert in a zinc box with Kaveshnikov fuses for F-1 lemon grenades. We found two telecoils without a cable. It is unlikely that it was abandoned by post-war border guards, since all the items found were of pre-war production (except for one telephone coil produced in 1942). Stunned by the struggle with stones in the scorching sun, we wander “Home” to the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue to deepen and widen the hole in the morning.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time we noticed that next to the hole we had dug up there was a pile of bricks. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

An assumption arose that perhaps our soldiers or border guards used these bricks to decorate the burial site. With tripled energy we expand and deepen the hole. Nothing. No sign. Stupor ensues. It cannot be that the Finns would put up a cross and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. A meter away we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of test pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in the stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. The assumption arose that this was the desired place.

Maybe, mass grave They moved it, and ash and sawdust were poured into the hole so that they would not be blown away by the wind. But the finger bone remained on the surface and over time fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that there is a high probability that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of the sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941–1945 on the islands were transferred here Gulf of Finland: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoy and Maly Tyuters. But this remains to be verified in military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater examination of the supposed site of the death of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, which was delivering ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers. On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Right next to rocky shore deep crevices begin, 4-5 meters deep.

In them we were able to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, the remains of wooden casing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shell casings from a 45 mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a 20 mm casing. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the propeller shafts boats.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out of the cracks with an improvised pry bar. Storms and ice, even at depth, hammer them into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at depth by huge boulders several times larger. These autumn and winter storms are terrible. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged to the depths by storms.

The stone appears in archival photographs.

Actually, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - we need to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with more small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, lead-insulated wires. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not so. Damned algae and slight excitement are in the way.

We take his finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing in a sophisticated manner, holds his elbow with his hand. He had already crashed onto the rocks twice before he came out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

A total of 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one MO type, five G-5 type torpedo boats, one D-3 type torpedo boat and one Sh-4 type) and 3 G-5 type torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Under the water, some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out in a crevice.

And here is a mysterious object close up, similar to a receiver from Maxim, among the fry and Baltic shrimp.

Separate parts of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, raised from under the water.

Remains of propeller shafts, with a bronze bushing.

Next to him lay objects clearly associated with the landing: opened zinc from cartridges for a three-line rifle with heavy bullets mod. 1930 (there was a yellow stripe on the lid), a zinc lid for RGD-33 grenades and an insert in a zinc box with Kaveshnikov fuses for F-1 lemon grenades. We found two telecoils without a cable. It is unlikely that it was abandoned by post-war border guards, since all the items found were of pre-war production (except for one telephone coil produced in 1942). Stunned by the struggle with stones in the scorching sun, we wander “Home” to the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue to deepen and widen the hole in the morning.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time we noticed that next to the hole we had dug up there was a pile of bricks. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

An assumption arose that perhaps our soldiers or border guards used these bricks to decorate the burial site. With tripled energy we expand and deepen the hole. Nothing. No sign. Stupor ensues. It cannot be that the Finns would put up a cross and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. A meter away we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of test pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in the stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. The assumption arose that this was the desired place.

Perhaps the mass grave was moved, and ash and sawdust were poured into the hole so that they would not be blown away by the wind. But the finger bone remained on the surface and over time fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that there is a high probability that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of military sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941-1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters were transferred here. But this remains to be verified in military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater examination of the supposed site of the death of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, which was delivering ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers. On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Deep crevices 4-5 meters deep begin right next to the rocky shore.

In them we were able to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, remains of wooden casing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shell casings from a 45 mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a 20 mm casing. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the boat's propeller shafts ashore.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out of the cracks with an improvised pry bar. Storms and ice, even at depth, hammer them into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at depth by huge boulders several times larger. These autumn and winter storms are terrible. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged to the depths by storms.

The stone appears in archival photographs.

Actually, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - we need to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with more small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, lead-insulated wires. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not so. Damned algae and slight excitement are in the way.

We take his finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing in a sophisticated manner, holds his elbow with his hand. He had already crashed onto the rocks twice before he came out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

A total of 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one MO type, five G-5 type torpedo boats, one D-3 type torpedo boat and one Sh-4 type) and 3 G-5 type torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Under the water, some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out in a crevice.

Early in the morning, on the second day of our “cruise” through the “exotic” islands of the Gulf of Finland, we went to Sommers Island. Unlike Moshchny and Gogland, this island is small, rocky with a minimum of vegetation and many picturesque rocky bays.

There is also a lighthouse on the island, but it operates in automatic mode, that is, there is no keeper with it, and the Hydrographic Service, on whose ship we made our “cruise,” is in charge of maintaining and repairing the equipment. Next to the lighthouse there is a radio tower, built in 2005. It is equipped with expensive equipment for monitoring ships located throughout the entire water area of ​​the Gulf of Finland, performing border security functions. There are motion sensors on the tower that react to someone approaching it closer than 30 meters, and send an instant signal to control centers in St. Petersburg and Peterhof, as well as to border guards. In general, the enemy will not even cross the border Russian Federation under reliable protection!

Sommers Island went to Russia under the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, and in 1723 it was granted by Peter I to his jester Jan Lacoste. But after the death of the king, his jester could not prove his rights to the island (a ruble was attached to the letter of grant instead of a seal), and Sommers went to the treasury.

The lighthouse on the island was built back in 1808 and modernized in 1866. The lighthouse was destroyed during the Second World War and rebuilt in 1945.

There is also a recently abandoned border outpost on the island with a very decent training base




In December 1941, the Soviet garrison was evacuated from the island, and Sommers was soon occupied by the Finns. They fortified the island well, set up an observation post there, built a number of long-term firing points and a coastal battery for 75 and 45 mm guns. The pillboxes and gun yards have survived well to this day.



In the summer of 1942, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to recapture the island from the Finns by landing troops on it. The operation was prepared by the commander of the Kronstadt naval base captain 1st rank I. Levchenko (former vice admiral, demoted to captain for the failure of the landing operation in Kerch).

And so, from the maneuver base of the Baltic Fleet on the island of Lavensaari (Powerful) on the night of July 8, 1942, 4 patrol boats and 7 torpedo boats left. With air support, the landing force began landing on Sommers around one in the morning. But there was no way for the ships to come close to the island, -

The paratroopers began landing by swimming, the Finns opened fire on them, discovering the landing in the light of the white summer night. During the shelling, about 70 paratroopers drowned before reaching the island. The Finns sent reinforcements to the island garrison in the form of two gunboats and aviation. A naval and air battle ensued near the island. The paratroopers who swam to the shore stormed the steep cliffs of Sommers under fire from Finnish bunkers and batteries. The head of the operation, I. Levchenko, having received a message about the landing of troops on the island, refused to send a second echelon of troops until the island was completely captured. Instead of helping the paratroopers who reached the island, he sent reinforcements in the form of 4 torpedo boats, 5 patrol boats and the gunboat Kama. But this did not help the soldiers storming the Finnish fortifications - approaching Sommers, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ships entered into battle with a detachment of German minesweepers who came to the aid of the Finns. By evening, both sides brought reinforcements to the island in the form of ships with infantry on board. The ships and aircraft of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet immediately entered into battle with enemy ships and aircraft and did not in any way influence what was happening on the island. But still, 57 machine gunners managed to swim to the island. During the assault on the fortified rocks, 13 of them were immediately killed. The Germans also managed to land a couple of dozen soldiers on the island. Dozens of Soviet paratroopers died under fire from Finnish bunkers. The fighting on and around Sommers Island continued until noon on July 10th. The Soviet landing force was destroyed.

In two days, 7 Soviet torpedo boats and one “small hunter” were sunk, 10 torpedo and 10 patrol boats and one base minesweeper were damaged. The Finnish-German fleet had few losses, and data on manpower losses vary greatly. Of the landing force that reached Sommers, only one person survived. The operation of the Baltic Fleet ended in nothing - the island remained with the Finns and was liberated by Soviet sailors only in 1944

The bays around Sommers are littered with the bones of Soviet sailors and the wreckage of German, Finnish and Soviet equipment. Here is a haven for amateur divers military history. The artifacts they found from the last war replenished the collections of many military museums in the North-Western region of Russia.
We “stormed” the island along steep rocks, risking breaking our necks and having little idea how such an assault could be carried out under hurricane machine-gun and artillery fire from the enemy.

Honor and glory to the Soviet paratroopers who died a brave death on Sommers Island due to the stupidity and short-sightedness of the command of the Baltic Fleet!

To be continued...

Gulf of Finland, USSR

Death of the landing

Opponents

Finland

Germany

Commanders

G. I. Levchenko

Unknown

Strengths of the parties

277 people, 11 boats

201 people, 5 guns

359 killed, captured and drowned, 63 wounded, 8 boats sunk

21 killed, 69 wounded

Landing on Sommers Island July 8-10, 1942- tactical landing of the Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War.

Previous events

Sommers Island (Finnish: Someri) is a small rocky island (dimensions 950 by 400 meters) in the Gulf of Finland, which occupies an important position, allowing its owner to control sea communications between Leningrad and central part Baltic Sea. Until December 1941, there was a Soviet garrison on the island, which was removed during the evacuation Soviet troops from the Hanko Peninsula. It remained empty for some time, but in the spring of 1942, the Finnish command landed a garrison on the island (part of the 22nd separate coast guard company), equipped an observation post and a coastal battery. The island became an important point in the Finnish-German anti-submarine defense system in the Gulf of Finland. Its garrison was 92 people, armed with 5 guns (two of them 75-mm caliber, three 45-mm caliber), 7 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, 2 81-mm mortars, 7 heavy and 5 light machine guns. The Finnish command realistically assessed the possibility of a Soviet landing, so 4 strong defense points were equipped on the island, making up a single defensive system.

Preparing the operation

When the command of the Baltic Fleet in the summer campaign of 1942 began massively sending submarines from Leningrad to enemy communications, it was decided to correct the mistake and return the island to the control of Soviet troops. The author of the idea and plan of the operation was the commander of the Kronstadt naval base - the main base of the Baltic Fleet, Captain 1st Rank G. I. Levchenko (demoted from vice admiral in January 1942 for the surrender of Kerch).

A landing force was prepared to capture the island. The command of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V. A. Salamatin, the commander of the landing detachment was Captain 2nd Rank K. A. Shilov, the commander of the landing detachment (256 people, 10 heavy machine guns) was Major I. V. Pasko. The general management of the operation was carried out by G.I. Levchenko. The landing was planned in separate groups at four points. The starting point of the landing was the Soviet base on the island of Lavensaari.

Levchenko estimated the enemy forces at 70 people with 2-3 guns. The island's defense system and the approach routes for landing boats had not been explored.

Landing and fighting on July 8

On the night of July 8, the landing boats (4 patrol boats, 7 torpedo boats) headed for Sommers and at about 01:00 a.m. reached the designated area. From 00:40 to 01:00 on July 8, 12 DB-3 bombers from the 1st Guards Mine-Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, bombed the island in two waves from an altitude of 2300-4000 m (out of 120 dropped 100-kg bombs, 37 fell into the water), then two groups of 3 Il-2 attack aircraft attacked the island from low altitudes. Two Il-2s were damaged, the effectiveness of the strike turned out to be negligible, but the enemy prepared for defense.

In conditions of clear weather and “white nights,” the Finns noticed the approach of boats at a considerable distance - 20-30 cable lengths - and opened fire. The boats managed to approach the shore, but it turned out that due to large quantity They cannot approach the stones close to the coastal cliffs, and the depth near the shore was up to 5-10 meters. Some of the paratroopers drowned, were wet, and the radio station was out of order.

The Finns sank 1 torpedo boat TK-71, another one (TK-121) sat on the rocks, was abandoned by the crew and then destroyed by Finnish artillery. 3 torpedo boats and 2 “small hunter” boats were damaged by fire; among the crew members there were killed and wounded. In total, 164 paratroopers were landed, 7 wounded and 15 people from the boat, which was unable to approach the shore, were returned to the base. The rest were killed, and up to 70 more soldiers drowned during the landing. One group was not landed at the planned point.

Having received a message from the Sommers garrison, the Finnish command urgently sent the gunboats Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa and 5 patrol boats to him. Soviet torpedo boats engaged them in battle, losing one TK-113 boat sunk (the report on the sinking of the Finnish gunboat turned out to be unreliable, but is periodically indicated in Russian literature). The aviation of both sides was active, with the Finns damaging one torpedo boat, and the Soviet pilots damaging two boats and achieving a direct bomb hit on a gunboat.

Meanwhile, a fierce battle was going on on the island. The paratroopers captured one of the strong points, destroying all its guns and 23 of 26 defenders. However, Levchenko, having received a report on the landing on the island and a request to send a second echelon of troops, refused to send it until the island was completely captured. Instead, he sent the gunboat Kama, 4 torpedo boats, 5 patrol boats with the task of driving Finnish ships away from the island. The enemy also hastily sent additional forces - a detachment of German minesweepers. A naval battle broke out between the ships, and therefore the Soviet ships were unable to provide any support to the landing force. One Soviet torpedo boat (TK-22) was sunk.

At about 11:30, Finnish ships approached the island - the gunboat "Turunmaa" and 8 boats, which landed reinforcements for the garrison (109 people). The Soviet landing force found itself in a difficult situation.

Only by 16:40, reinforcements (57 machine gunners) were landed on the island from three Soviet torpedo boats. When landing under enemy fire, 13 of them died. 23 wounded were taken on board. During the retreat, Finnish coastal guns sank the torpedo boat TK-31.

By the evening of July 8, both main caliber guns on the gunboat Kama were out of action. The Soviet command brought into battle the patrol ship "Storm" and the base minesweepers T-205 "Gafel" and T-207 "Shpil". But the enemy also brought up the Finnish minelayers Riilahti and Routsinsalmi, the German floating battery SAT 28 (Ost), the floating base (tender) Nettelbeck, and the minesweeper M 37. The Germans delivered 10 people and several boxes of hand grenades to the island by boat.

Fighting on July 9

On the night of July 9, 3 torpedo boats, the patrol ship “Burya”, and the minesweeper T-207 were sent to attack enemy ships. The torpedo attack ended in vain; all three torpedo boats were damaged by the artillery of Finnish ships. Three patrol boats with reinforcements were sent to the island itself, of which Finnish artillery sank the patrol boat MO-306. No reinforcements were landed. The battle continued on the island.

Fighting on July 10

From the morning of July 10, the battle continued on the island; by noon it died down and never resumed. There were no rescued from the landing force (except for 23 wounded who were evacuated on the evening of July 8). Attempts to land reconnaissance groups on the island ended in vain. All day long there were naval battles and mutual air strikes on ships in the area of ​​the island; torpedo boats TK-83 and TK-123 were lost on the Soviet side. On the night of July 11, the operation was stopped, all Soviet ships were returned to base.

Losses of the parties

During the operation, 7 Soviet torpedo boats and 1 “small hunter” boat were sunk, the base minesweeper, 10 torpedo boats, 5 patrol boats, and 5 other boats were damaged. The gunboat "Kama" was out of action due to technical malfunctions. The Finnish command overestimated the number of sunk Soviet ships from 8 to 18. 4 Soviet aircraft were lost in air battles and during attacks on enemy ships.

No data on landing losses were published in Soviet publications. For the first time, information about losses was indicated in the work of E. N. Abramov - the total losses were 359 killed and 63 wounded. According to Finnish data, 128 Soviet soldiers died on the island and 149 were captured, about 200 more people allegedly drowned along with lost ships.

The Finnish-German fleet had no sunken ships (although Soviet pilots and boat crews reported “sunk” ships); damage to the M-18 minesweeper, the Hämeenmaa and Turunmaa gunboats, and several boats was recognized. By Finnish messages, the army lost 15 people killed and 45 wounded, the navy - 6 killed and 18 wounded. On the German ships participating in the battle, 6 crew members were wounded.

Results of the operation

The island remained in enemy hands. The Finns and Germans hastily laid strong minefields around it. Sommers remained in Finnish hands until Finland's withdrawal from the war in September 1944, representing a serious obstacle to the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

The operation ended in failure due to major errors in its planning and execution. Preparations were carried out in haste, although there was no need for urgency in the operation. The landing craft (tenders) and small boats available in the fleet were not used.

On June 28, a Moscow-Beijing video bridge took place in the capital, dedicated to the results of joint Russian-Chinese research within the framework of the complex expedition of the Russian Geographical Society "Gogland". Participants in the environmental watch, which took place from June 5 to June 15, 2017 on Sommers Island, spoke about the scientific results obtained and shared their impressions of the trip.

The object of study of the Gogland expedition since 2013 has been the Outer Islands of the Gulf of Finland, recognized as a real Terra Incognita of North-West Russia. Located within a radius of only 200 km from St. Petersburg, the islands at various times belonged to Sweden, Finland and Russia, but were never the subject of systematic scientific research. This has opened up unique perspectives for modern researchers in the fields of geography, geology, flora and fauna, and historical and cultural heritage.

At the press center of the Rossiya Segodnya MIA, the expedition was presented by the project coordinator, advisor to the editor-in-chief of the Rossiya Segodnya MIA Alexey Savitsky, head of the research group, geographer Anton Yurmanov, photographer, build editor of the Russian Geographical Society Nikolai Razuvaev and correspondent of the Rossiya Segodnya MIA today" Tatyana Zhirova. In Beijing, the Secretary General of the Geographical Society of China Zhang Guoyu, the head of international cooperation of the Secretariat of the Geographical Society of China Zhang Xuanzi, representatives of the Institute of Geography and natural resources Chinese Academy of Sciences Liu Xiaoqian and Zhu He and Peking University employee Wu Xutong.

– This year the expedition includes three islands: Bolshoi Tyuters, Gogland and Sommers. Now the shift is still ongoing Big Tyuters and Gogland. Our part on Sommers ended on June 15th. This year we chose an island that had not previously been involved in the expedition. It is uninhabited, there is no permanent population there,” say the participants of the press conference.

Sommers is a small island just under a kilometer long and 450 meters wide, part of the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland.

The head of the research team, Anton Yurmanov, noted that during the expedition, a comprehensive environmental survey of Sommers Island was carried out.

– Despite the small area, there are several types of natural complexes: forest communities, swamps, fresh water bodies, meadows,” says Anton.

According to the geographer, scientists have recorded about 150 species of higher plants, 25 species of birds, two species of mammals (northern leatherjacket and gray seal), two species of amphibians (common newt and gray toad), as well as a reptile, a water snake, on Sommers. In addition, the island is located in the zone of the East Atlantic migratory route, and bird concentrations are possible on it during the migration period.

Thus, according to scientists, there is every reason to create a specially protected natural area on Sommers.

In addition to studying the ecological situation, members of the expedition studied the military objects preserved here from the times of the Great Patriotic War, and also cleared Sommers of debris.

Concluding the teleconference, the representative of the Celestial Empire, Zhang Guoyu, noted that back in the 20th century, Russian and Chinese geographical societies implemented joint projects. And in 2014, a cooperation agreement was signed between the organizations, within the framework of which expeditions and exhibitions are held. Chinese geographers plan to invite colleagues from Russia to participate in joint expeditions, now on the territory of the Celestial Empire.

The expedition is carried out with the participation of the Expedition Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense, MIA "Russia Today" and the Leningradsky state university named after A.S. Pushkin with the support of the Administration Leningrad region, FGC "UES" and other organizations.

In July 1942, the command of the Baltic Fleet attempted to capture Sommers Island. The lack of necessary experience and lack of strength did not allow success then. For many years, the details of this landing were kept in the depths of the archive...

Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. The situation in the Baltic deteriorated again in the summer, when Soviet submarines began operating on enemy communications. However, their path from the Gulf of Finland ran past Sommers, a small rocky island*.

During the second half of 1941, there was a Soviet garrison on it, but then at the end of December the island was abandoned by our units and the Finns soon settled there. However, they were unable to sit for long on the windswept rocky piece of land and Sommers became a “no-man’s land.” But this did not last long: during the capture of Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuters, the island was occupied by units of the Finnish 22nd Coast Guard Company. The white nights allowed enemy posts to monitor the surface situation around the clock. And therefore, under the general leadership of the commander of the Main Fleet Base**, Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko developed a plan for his capture, approved by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko. By the beginning of the war, he had the rank of vice admiral and was deputy people's commissar of the Navy, and participated in organizing the defense of Nikolaev and Odessa. On October 22, 1941, by decision of Headquarters G.I. Levchenko was appointed commander of the Crimean troops. But the battles that unfolded there were unsuccessful for the Soviet units, and on the night of November 16, the troops of the 51st Army left Kerch. On November 19, the post of commander of the Crimean troops was eliminated, and on December 1, Levchenko was arrested by the NKVD. On January 24, 1942, he was expelled from the CPSU (b), and on January 29 he was sentenced to 10 years with deprivation of all awards. But unlike many commanders whose fates were tragic, the admiral’s request for clemency on January 31 was granted. On February 2, he was reinstated in the party (though with a severe reprimand). And although the former deputy people's commissar was demoted to captain 1st rank, deprived of all awards and ordered to be used in a lower job, his criminal record was cleared. In March 1942, he headed the Leningrad naval base. He was appointed commander of the Kronstadt naval base on June 25, 1942. So Gordey Ivanovich desperately needed success, as they say...

Unfortunately, a number of miscalculations were made when developing the operation plan. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. In fact, the Finns had a garrison of 92 people on Sommers with twelve guns (of which two 75-mm, which were superior in power to the guns of Soviet boats, three 45-mm and seven 20-mm anti-aircraft guns), two 81-mm mortars, seven heavy and five light machine guns. To capture the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in men, the landing party was noticeably inferior to it in firepower.

The reconnaissance also failed to reveal the enemy’s defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The peculiarities of the island's coast were not taken into account, which led to tragedy - during the landing, the well-armed and equipped soldiers who left the boats often drowned under the weight of the ammunition. The interaction with aviation was also not worked out, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and communication between the paratroopers (as well as the sailors) and the pilots was not provided for at all.

July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was led by captain 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the diagram.

By the end of July 7, all forces intended for the operation were fully prepared, and at 23:33 the landing of troops and the loading of ammunition and special equipment began on Lavensaari. At 00:11 on July 8, the landing on the boats was completed, and two minutes later the ships began to enter the roadstead. At 00:30, the landing groups moved towards Sommers. Their transition was ensured by patrols, and from 00:35 - by four fighters. By one o'clock in the morning the covering detachment reached the target area. At the same time, from 00:40 to 00:59, 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, attacked the island in two waves from an altitude of 2300-4000 m. They bombed not very accurately - out of 120 100-kg bombs dropped, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by 2 raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, attacking from low altitudes in groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by 20-mm Oerlikon fire.

The plan for landing on Sommers Island


At 01:20, the landing groups turned around and went to the landing sites. The sea was relatively calm (swell up to three points), and visibility was simply excellent (oh, those white nights). At a considerable distance - 20-30 cables - the Finns discovered Soviet boats and opened fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 m and began the landing, which was completed within just five minutes. But at the same time, torpedo boat No. 152 and the “hunter” MO-110 were damaged.

Group II also had a hard time. Approaching the shore under fire, the sailors and paratroopers became convinced that the boats could not get close to it. Some of them had to repeat this several times, trying to find convenient landing spots under fire. When unloading the radio station, it either got wet or the batteries drowned and it could not work. The commander of the landing party refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 04:04 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade. The losses were growing - the hull of torpedo boat No. 62 was damaged, and the superstructure of the MO-402, the commander was killed, and 4 crew members were injured.


"Moshki" on patrol


III group was met with particularly intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and on TKA No. 121 the engines with the clutches turned on in forward stalled, and when starting the engines, it sat down on the rocks while moving. An attempt to save him after the landing was unsuccessful and he remained on the rocks. Fortunately, we managed to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of MO-413 from this group apparently showed indecisiveness and landed the fighters later than the others, and he needed an additional order from V.A. Salamatina.

But group IV found itself in the most difficult situation. Her ships were unable to suppress enemy firing points, encountering strong resistance. The commander made the decision to land the fighters at the point intended for the III group. But when the boats with the landing force began to go around, from the west, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 fell behind. It had to land the paratroopers “anyhow.” During the departure, it was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and its crew, under incessant shelling, transferred to torpedo boat No. 152. Torpedo boat No. 131 also suffered - its commander was killed, 3 paratroopers were killed and 4 were wounded.

In total, of the 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers ended up on the island, another 7 were injured on board the torpedo boat, and the patrol boat MO-402 did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned during the landing. It was also not possible to deliver some of the machine guns to the shore (apparently a large number, since sailing with the Maxims was simply unthinkable).


Torpedo boat with landing force


The Finns' reaction to the actions of the Soviet fleet turned out to be very quick and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Sommers garrison, all available forces were sent to its aid: the gunboats Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa, as well as 5 patrol boats. The first to arrive at the battlefield was the Uusimaa, which managed to repel the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then the Hämeenmaa and patrol boats arrived. During the battle with Finnish gunboats, torpedo boat No. 113 (commander - senior lieutenant A.I. Shumratov), ​​which attacked the enemy together with boat No. 73, was killed. The sailors reported the sinking of one of the gunboats, but this information turned out to be unreliable.


Finnish gunboat "Uusimaa" (same type "Hämeenmaa")


During the battles at Sommers, messages that flocked to the headquarters of both sides contained, as a rule, greatly exaggerated information about the enemy’s losses, but for the Finns (who overestimated their successes by only two times!) this did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was sure that the enemy was suffering heavy damage and his ability to continue the fight was decreasing. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats received varying degrees of damage, not one of them was sunk.

At approximately 03.18, a prearranged signal was received from the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, which meant: “We have gained a foothold, please send a second echelon.” However, in response to Salamatin’s request, Levchenko responded half an hour late that the second echelon would be sent after occupying the island. And on Sommers there was a fierce battle. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Itapaya, all of whose guns were destroyed, and out of 26 defenders, only three managed to join their own. The rest were killed or wounded.

The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet aircraft carried out several attacks on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while fighters repelled raids by Finnish aircraft that carried out bombing attacks on support forces. During one of them, torpedo boat No. 33 from the covering detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat were also damaged.


Boat KM No. 911 puts up a smoke screen


Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, realizing that the battles were much more serious than planned, ordered the gunboat Kama to go to Sommers. Four torpedo boats and five patrol boats were sent to Lavensaari from Grafskaya and Battery Bays to reinforce the fighting forces.

In the morning hours of July 8, the activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats were running out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats, which provided great assistance to the island’s garrison, shot almost all of their ammunition. But the first of the German ships to take part in it, the minesweeper M 18, approached the battle site.


German minesweeper type M. “M 18” and “M 37” belonged to this type


At 08.48, the Soviet fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers, torpedo boat No. 22, which was trying to deliver ammunition to the paratroopers, caught fire and exploded from shell hits. By 11.30, the Finns, to help their garrison, managed to transfer a company on the gunboat "Turunmaa" and eight boats to consisting of 109 people. The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation; the Soviet landing force found itself in a difficult situation. Now the enemy side had not only firepower, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his gunboats supported their troops with fire from medium-caliber guns, while Soviet boats there were only small-caliber guns. The Kama sent to Sommers was escorted by minesweeper boats, the speed of which with the installed trawls was very low. And although the Soviet coastal battery from Lavensaari entered the battle in the afternoon, its fire was not adjusted and was unlikely to bring much benefit to the paratroopers. The approaching Kama was forced to direct almost all its firepower against the Finnish ships.

At 14.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, which was part of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin, ordered the landing of the reserve in the amount of 57 machine gunners, the loading of the radio station and food onto torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101. At about 16.00 they headed to Sommers and after about 45 minutes, under fire from Finnish ships, they approached his east coast and began disembarking soldiers and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that it happened during the day, everything was organized extremely poorly - again, as at night, the radio station was drowned, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, they managed to remove 23 wounded from the shore. It became known from them that there was a heavy battle on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy’s mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other soldiers on the shore. Already on the way out, torpedo boat No. 31 was hit and exploded.


Torpedo boat at the pier of Lavensaari island


It seems that the Soviet command was not preparing for serious battles for Sommerse and there were no units on Lavensaari that could be sent to help the landed units without the threat of weakening the defenses of the base itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing in a timely manner, and then it was too late - German and Finnish planes, ships, boats and guns of the island garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supplies, removal of the wounded, and then the evacuation of the surviving soldiers impossible.

By the evening of July 8, instead of the gunboat "Kama", on which both main-caliber guns were out of action, the patrol ship (according to the Western classification - destroyer) "Storm" and base minesweepers (specially built ships with strong artillery armament) entered the battle. -205 "Gaff" and T-207 "Shpiel". But their help was clearly too late. By this time, the Finnish minelayers "Riilahti" and "Routsinsalmi", and German ships - the floating battery "SAT 28" ("Ost"), the floating base (tender) "Nettelbeck" and the minesweeper "M 37", which replaced its brother, approached Sommers. M 18", which suffered greatly from Soviet air raids. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times, he approached the shore at 500 m. Its crew decided to demonstrate to the Finns their “brotherhood in arms”: a strike force of 10 people formed on the ship was sent ashore, as well as several boxes with hand grenades, which the garrison needed.


Soviet base minesweepers


On the night of July 9, the Soviet command made a last attempt to correct the situation. Torpedo boats launched by the patrol boat "Burya" together with the minesweeper T-207 were launched to attack the enemy ships. Three boats managed to fire one torpedo each, but they did not reach their targets, and two boats were hit. An attempt to deliver ammunition to the island on three patrol boats also ended in failure. When hit by a shell, it exploded and died along with everyone on board, including the commander of the landing detachment, Captain 2nd Rank K.A. Shilov, MO-306. And although firefights between enemy ships continued all day, the position of the landing force on the island became hopeless. True, in the morning the pilots reported that they had torpedoed two enemy ships five miles north of Sommers, but this message was not true and could not change the situation. On July 9 at 12.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector radiogram reported to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, and the commander of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, about the situation in the area of ​​the islands of Lavensaari and Sommers. The report said that there were no forces and means to continue the operation, and on Sommers itself there had been no hostilities since zero hours on July 9. At 19:20 G.I. Levchenko received a new message, which, in particular, said: “...No movement was detected on the island. If a landing force is detected, I will continue the capture operation.”


Soviet torpedo boats launch an attack


On the night of July 10, an attempt was made to deliver two scouts to Sommers, but the blockade of the island by enemy ships was too dense and Soviet boats were unable to approach it. Skirmishes between ships also did not bring results. The pilots again reported sunk and damaged ships, but this had no effect on the activity of the German-Finnish forces. In the afternoon, they again tried to organize a reconnaissance group landing on Sommers, but then postponed this operation for the night. At 01:00 on July 11, Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko, believing that the fighting on Sommers was over and trying to avoid new losses, decided to stop the operation.

In these battles, seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were lost. The base minesweeper was damaged, and the gunboat "Kama" was practically out of action due to technical faults - although one of the guns was able to be put into operation, the boat's steering failed and the steering was inactive for a long time and it had to be towed. On the first day of fighting alone, 10 torpedo, 5 patrol and 5 other types of boats were damaged.

But even this seemed not enough to the Finns, so they “included in the list of their victories” 8 ships and boats sunk by coastal artillery, the fleet reported 7 destroyed Soviet boats, and chalked up another gunboat (Volga) and 2 boats Finnish aviation. The Finns and Germans acknowledged damage to the minesweeper M 18, the gunboats Hämeenmaa and Turunmaa, and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army suffered 15 killed and 45 wounded, while the navy suffered 6 killed and 18 wounded. They estimated the Soviet losses in people as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and approximately another 200 people who drowned along with the lost ships. After the end of the fighting, the Finns covered Sommers with minefields and it remained under their control until Finland left the war in September 1944.

Although the operation to capture Sommers failed, it is unlikely that anyone today would dare to speak disrespectfully about the direct participants in the battles. Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the insecurity Soviet soldiers special landing means, passivity large ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ineffectiveness of the fire of coastal batteries, the Swiss historian J. Meister, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet Union, was forced to admit: “The Russian landing units, although not numerous enough, like the crews of torpedo boats, fought very bravely, but they were unable to save the situation in this improperly organized operation."

* The length of the island is about 950 m, the width is about 450 m.
** So from June 1942 the Kronstadt naval base began to be officially called