Losses and damage to Il-76 aircraft 1. December 25, 1979 - combat loss of an Il-76M aircraft, 128th Guards. vtap (Panevezys). Departure from Vostochny airport. The crew of V.V., flying as part of the IL-76 trio. Golovchin collided with a mountain while making his landing approach at Kabul airport. All

Losses and damage to Mi-10 helicopters 1. May 25, 1980 - combat damage to a Mi-10 helicopter, 1st Ve of the 181st Airborne Regiment (Kunduz). V. Tsabunin’s helicopter was hit by a random bullet. Having passed through the cockpit, she hit the flight engineer - trainee senior lieutenant Yu.A. Barakhvostov, who died.2. 20

Losses and damage to Mi-24 helicopters 1. January 21, 1980 - combat damage to the Mi-24 helicopter. While providing air support to a landing group in the Panjshir Gorge, the helicopter came under fire from a heavy machine gun. The crew managed to bring the helicopter to the base.

Losses and damage to the Mi-8 1. December 30, 1979 - combat damage to the Mi-8T helicopter, 181st airborne division (Kunduz). Firing from the ground during a reconnaissance flight. The crew managed to remove the damaged helicopter from the dangerous area. When heading to the base, after 11 minutes of flight, we had to make

Civilian losses and general losses of the German population in World War II It is very difficult to determine the losses of the German civilian population. For example, the death toll from the Allied bombing of Dresden in February 1945

Details of the battle on Russian cruisers. Damage and loss. The main points that influenced the leadership of the battle Having discovered the enemy at dawn to the north of him, Admiral Jessen had only two options: to go south into the Korea Strait with the risk of meeting new Japanese forces there or

Losses of the civilian population and general losses of the population of the USSR Regarding the losses of the Soviet civilian population in 1941–1945, how much reliable statistics absent. They can only be determined by estimation, first establishing the total irrecoverable losses

Appendix No. 1 Damage battleships 5th squadron in the Battle of Jutland [* From the book by K.P. Puzyrevsky. Damage to ships from artillery and the struggle for survivability. Leningrad. Sudpromgiz. 1940] "Warspite". He belonged to the fifth squadron of battleships and was the third in the column.

AN-12 IN AFGHANISTAN (END) Author: Victor Markovsky Articles from this series: New masters reigned in Kabul, but the situation was completely shaken. Discord in the opposition camp in a matter of days led to armed civil strife with the use of aviation, artillery and armored vehicles of yesterday's army units, which joined one or another Islamic formations. It could not be otherwise in a country that has been engulfed for a year civil war , where a whole generation has grown up, accustomed to military craft from an early age... Afghan aviation also found itself torn between “fighters for a just cause” of various persuasions (if only those had at least some kind of airfield on the controlled territory). The ownership of the aircraft and the aviators themselves was increasingly determined by personal relationships with the leaders of various formations of the new authorities, from time immemorial, revered family ties and habit of the locality. Transport aviation was in particular favor as a practical and useful thing for personal transportation and supplies - after all, why fight if not to get hold of a small fraction of previously unavailable benefits? The same General Dostum, whose main forces were located in the northern regions, from where getting to the center was not an easy task, ensured his presence in the capital almost exclusively by air. The new identification marks on the planes also differed to match the affiliation - in some places they were limited to eliminating the revolutionary red star that had not been adopted on the previous cockade, others went further and restored the “pre-revolutionary” signs with Arabic writing. Quite often on airplanes, new signs were adjacent to the previous designations of the “people's democratic” times, especially on the wings of transport aircraft, where it was inconvenient to repaint them due to their high location. The situation in the country continued to remain extremely unfavorable: warring factions continued to sort things out and seize power, periodically shelling the cities and bases of the other side. In the usual way, airfields were also hit, where the planes looked like a visible and vulnerable target. One of these airfields was Mazar-i-Sharif, which was under the control of the so-called troops. Northern Alliance, led by General Dostum and Ahmad Shah. Among other equipment, several An-12s were transported here, carrying out transportation in the interests of the alliance’s owners. When flying to Kabul, due to flare-ups every now and then, they tried not to linger there, flying overnight to neighboring India or Uzbekistan. The next fire raid on the Kabul airfield in the evening of February 16, 1993 came just when one of Dostum’s An-12BPs was there for loading. The plane was supposed to fly from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif, delivering there a detachment of tribal militias, members of their families and a couple of cars. The loading was interrupted by shell explosions near the parking lot. The crew commander, a 41-year-old graduate of the Frunze Aviation Technical School, decided to take off immediately, without waiting for the loading to complete and without wasting extra time on pre-launch checks of the aircraft's systems. In the rush and bustle, they didn’t even refuel it. More than a hundred people managed to crowd on board in a panic, most of whom were armed Dostum fighters. Without turning on the side lights, under incessant fire, the An-12 taxied to the runway and took off. Having escaped the fire and gained altitude, the plane headed for Mazar-i-Sharif. In the air, it turned out that of all the navigation and communications equipment on board, only the RSB-5 command radio station was working normally. However, the crew, accustomed to everything, had already adapted to doing without excesses, and this state of affairs was almost the norm. Heading north, the plane crossed the Hindu Kush mountain range and reached its target 40 minutes later. The airfield greeted them with complete darkness; neither the beacons nor radio communications worked, not to mention the lighting equipment that was completely non-functional. “Yakub” (call sign of Mazar-i-Sharif) stubbornly did not respond, and the plane circled over the city, not risking descending - mountains rose nearby, reaching a height of three kilometers. There was still fuel left in the tanks at the bottom, and it was impossible to see the runway. When the emergency signal came on in the cockpit, the crew could only hastily look for any somewhat suitable place to land. Afghan An-125P at the emergency landing site near Termez. Uzbekistan, February 16, 1993 During an emergency landing on plowing land, the plane broke the left landing gear and turned out the leftmost engine along with the engine mount, which hit the ground. The commander decided to turn to the nearest airfield on the map, which turned out to be Termez in Uzbekistan. Having learned about this, passengers with machine guns began to burst into the cabin, wanting to get home at all costs and demanding to land in the sands near Mazar-i-Sharif. Having fought them off and explained that a night landing in a rocky desert would inevitably end in disaster, the crew pulled the plane north. There was only 60 km to Termez, which lay right next to the border, and there should have been enough fuel, even just barely. Even without radio communication, the pilots managed to reach the city, which was illuminated and visible, but they could not find the airfield here either. None of the Afghans had flown to Termez before, they had no opportunity to warn about themselves, they were not expecting “guests” at the airfield, and the runway was not illuminated with lights and searchlights. On the third lap, the Afghans were lucky: they noticed a flashing light in the sky of an aircraft gaining altitude (it was a recently taken off An-26). Realizing that the airfield was somewhere nearby, they turned towards the lighthouse. Soon the pilots saw a concrete road ahead on the left and, using the last liters of kerosene, began to pull up to the landing glide path. The flaps and landing gear had already been extended when all four engines stopped at the same time - the fuel ran out. The propellers automatically feathered and the heavy machine went down steeply. There was no longer any height, but in a split second the commander made the only correct decision: to turn away from the rare lights along a course where he could run into lampposts or buildings and land on an unlit area, hoping that the ground hidden in the darkness would be level. Luck that day was on the side of the Afghans: the plane flew over a high railway embankment, almost knocked off its landing gear, miraculously did not crash into power line poles, only hitting one of them with its wing and cutting its console. Having wound broken wires around the protruding propeller blades and dragging several pulled out poles behind it, the An-12BP touched down on the plowed field. Digging into the plowing, he laid a hundred-meter rut, got stuck with the wheels right along the axles and, breaking the left main strut, touched the ground with his wing, turned around and froze. The cracked frames could not stand it, and the broken bogie lay next to the plane. The tip of the left wing was crushed (it was hit by a pole), the propeller blades furrowing the ground turned down the first engine along with the engine mount. None of the crew members or passengers were injured. Fortunately, due to the hasty takeoff, there was no time to load the vehicles on board: if they had broken off upon impact and flown forward like a ram, few would have survived in the cargo compartment. During a night landing, the transporter demolished the communication line, dragging wires and several poles with it. The An-12 curiously combines the identification marks of the previous “revolutionary” model on the wing and the new “Islamic” ones with Arabic script on the fin. Wreckage of the An-12 on the outskirts of the Kabul airfield. The suddenly interrupted roar of the plane in the night sky and the almost silent landing did not attract anyone’s attention. They didn’t even notice him at the airport, which was only half a kilometer away. Having got out of the plane, the commander went out onto the road, stopped a passing Moskvich and used it to get to the airfield. His good command of the Russian language almost failed the pilot: the security guards did not want to let him through the checkpoint for a long time, mistaking him for one of their pilots and advising him to “come in the morning, like everyone else, at the beginning of the working day.” Having sorted things out, representatives of the local government arrived at the landing site in the morning civil aviation, Air Force and competent authorities. Their eyes saw an An-12BP slumped onto the wing, with bearded men with machine guns wandering around it. As it turned out, there were eight crew members and 109 passengers on board. All passengers were immediately taken by bus to the border and sent to their territory. The crew was delayed while the incident was investigated and a few days later they were taken out by the owner of the northern provinces of Afghanistan, Colonel General Dostum, who had flown in to pick up his pilots. With the reign of the Taliban in Afghanistan, some of the aircraft managed to fly to unoccupied areas. Other pilots remained at their usual work, fortunately the radical Islamists, who were eradicating the excesses of civilization alien to the traditional way of life in the form of radios, televisions and other demonic inventions, also valued aviation and made an exception for such a useful thing. The Ariana airline, which had a pair of An-12s, was retained. However, the life of these vehicles in the service of the Taliban was short-lived and both of them were destroyed at Kabul airport in October 2001 by American bombing during Operation Enduring Freedom. Another An-12 was used by the Taliban militia and was destroyed in a crash at the Pakistani airfield of Quetta on January 13, 1998. After the expulsion of the Taliban, the Afghan aircraft fleet was replenished with several more An-12s, obtained in various ways from the republics of the former USSR.

The cargo An-12 that crashed at Dwyer airport in the Afghan Helmand province, with a crew, according to various sources, ranging from 9 to 11 people on board, including three citizens of Ukraine, according to the developer of the aircraft, State Enterprise Antonov (Kyiv), had fixed time services until October 2016, the Antonov State Enterprise told Interfax-Ukraine.

“According to the information available at the Antonov State Enterprise, the An-12B aircraft, tail number 4K-AZ25, serial number 3341209, was built at the Tashkent Aviation Production Association (TAPO) named after Chkalov on July 19, 1963. The aircraft had a flight life of up to October 2016,” the company’s press service clarified in a comment to the agency.

According to the developer, the last major overhaul of the transport ship was carried out in June 1991.

The An-12 cargo plane, according to preliminary data, owned by the Georgian Anham and chartered by the Azerbaijani Silk Way, crashed on May 18 during takeoff at Dwyer airport in the Afghan Helmand province at approximately 14:30 local time. Data on the composition of the crew on board and the number of deaths on board this moment vary.

According to information from the Ukrainian Embassy in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (concurrently), there was a crew of 11 people on board the plane, three of whom were citizens of Ukraine. As a result of the disaster, 9 people died, including two citizens of Ukraine. "Crew - 11 people (1 - citizen of Uzbekistan (captain), 3 - citizens of Ukraine, 7 - citizens of Azerbaijan). As a result of the disaster, 9 people died (2 citizens of Ukraine, 1 citizen of Uzbekistan, 6 citizens of Azerbaijan), 1 citizen of Ukraine was hospitalized (stable condition) in a hospital in Kandahar,” the Department of Consular Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine reported Thursday on its Facebook page.

According to the State Aviation Service of Azerbaijan, there were nine crew members on board the plane. As a result of the disaster, seven people died, among them one citizen of Ukraine, two Ukrainians survived. “According to available information, two citizens of Ukraine survived the crash - technicians Andrey Ganzha and Ramzi Aliev Ramzi, their condition is assessed as stable and satisfactory,” the State Aviation Service said in a statement.

According to updated information from the administration, as a result of the plane crash, crew commander Rashid Shaidanov (citizen of Uzbekistan), co-pilot Altay Abdullayev (citizen of Azerbaijan), navigator Nazim Asadullayev (citizen of Azerbaijan), flight mechanic Nadir Rzayev (citizen of Azerbaijan), radio operators Firdousi Shakhverdiev (citizen of Azerbaijan) were killed ), flight operators Azer Zulfiev (citizen of Azerbaijan), flight operator, technician Ruslan Zadnipryanets (citizen of Ukraine).

According to the State Aviation Service of Azerbaijan, the crashed An-12 was rented from the Silk Way company to carry out cargo transportation within Afghanistan. "It arrived in Dwyer from Bagran (Afghanistan) and was heading to Mary (Turkmenistan) for refueling. There was no cargo on board," the report said.

The State Civil Aviation Administration of Azerbaijan has created a commission to investigate this incident. On May 20, the consul of the Ukrainian Embassy in Tajikistan is sent to Kabul to provide consular escort to a Ukrainian citizen injured in an air incident.

An-12 (NATO codification Cub) is a Soviet military transport aircraft with a payload capacity of up to 20 tons, developed in the late 50s. last century at ASTC named after. Antonov (today State Enterprise "Antonov", Ukraine).

According to data from open sources, from 1957 to 1973, 1248 units were produced at facilities in Irkutsk, Voronezh and Tashkent, where serial assembly of the aircraft was carried out. An-12. In 1981 In China, mass production of the Chinese version - Shaanxi Y8, and later - the modernized Shaanxi Y9 began.

The main operator of the aircraft is the Russian Armed Forces; Chinese versions of the aircraft have been adopted by the PLA. Currently, about 150 units are in operation. An-12 in the Russian Federation, China, countries post-Soviet space, Africa.

Today in Ukraine a new transport An-178 with a carrying capacity of up to 18 tons is being created, which will replace the An-12 on the market.

Cargo planes have been deployed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the Soviet invasion in 1979. During the war, the Soviet Air Force lost 11 AN-12s.
Among other functions, these planes transported the bodies of the dead to their homeland (the so-called “cargo-200”). The first such flight from Bagram to Tashkent in January 1980 was made by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Voitov. By this time, 89 soldiers had already died beyond the southern border of the USSR.
The name "Black Tulip" has no generally accepted history of origin. According to one version, it was given in honor of a funeral home from Tashkent. It was here that galvanized wooden coffins, lined with red calico, were made for Afghanistan. At first, Russian soldiers transferred this name to local morgues that received “the bodies of deceased personnel,” and then to the planes that delivered them.
According to another assumption, the name goes back to the tradition of decorating obituaries in Afghan military newspapers - lists of the dead were usually framed with an ornament of black tulips. This version explains why black tulips began to be painted on the fuselage of the AN-12, so that the “airborne corpse carriers” would not be fired upon by the Mujahideen.
Note that in the jargon of participants in the Afghan war, the AN-12 was given the epithet “bellied,” which is associated not only with its purpose, but also with its characteristic shape.
Before loading the dead onto the plane, they were dressed in old-style military uniforms with breeches. However, as witnesses recalled, sometimes there were not enough clothes for everyone. The loading procedure itself ended with a rifle salvo in memory of the soldiers
At one time, the “black tulip” took out up to 18 coffins, which, as a rule, were accompanied by colleagues of the dead. The coffins were not initially sealed, since the cargo compartment of the AN-12 was not airtight. Sealing was carried out later, during an intermediate stop in Tashkent. It was fundamentally important for the Soviet command that not a single fighter was left lying between the Afghan stones. The route of each “black tulip” was drawn up with plantings at several points in the Soviet Union. In a particular city, the recipient of the “cargo-200” was the local military registration and enlistment office, which had already handed over the body to the relatives. At the very hard days During the conflict, several AN-12s flew to the north at once. In total, 15 thousand dead Soviet soldiers and officers were delivered to their homeland in this way.
Bard Alexander Rosenbaum in 1987 wrote the song “Monologue of the Black Tulip Pilot,” which was later performed in the famous film “Afghan Break.” The reason for its creation was the personal experience of the singer, who once witnessed the loading of an AN-12. The song is often performed at meetings of “Afghan” veterans.
Currently, “black tulips” are also called monuments to those killed in Afghanistan, erected in cities of the post-Soviet space, for example, in Yekaterinburg, Petrozavodsk, Norilsk and Khabarovsk.

In the history of the An-12, rich in various events, the Afghan war was destined to occupy a special place. Afghanistan has become an extensive chapter in the transport worker’s biography, full of combat episodes, hard work and inevitable losses. Almost every participant in the Afghan war in one way or another had to deal with military transport aviation and the results of the work of transport workers. As a result, the An-12 and the Afghan campaign turned out to be difficult to imagine without each other: the aircraft’s participation in the events there began even before the deployment Soviet troops and, dragging on for more than a decade, continued even after the departure of the Soviet Army.

In the widest possible way, BTA aircraft began to be involved in work in Afghanistan after the April Revolution that took place in the country, which took place on April 11, 1978 (or on the 7th of the month of Saur 1357 according to local lunar calendar- in the country, according to local chronology, it was the 14th century). The Afghan revolution had its own special character: in the absence of revolutionary strata in the semi-feudal country (according to the Marxist definition, only the proletariat free from private property can belong to such), it had to be carried out by the army, and one of the main characters was the former Air Force Commander-in-Chief Abdul Kadir, removed from office by the former government of Crown Prince Mohammed Daoud. Possessing considerable personal courage and stubbornness, the officer, finding himself out of work, headed the secret society United Front of Communists of Afghanistan, however, being a military man to the core, after the “overthrow of despotism” he transferred all power to local party members from the People’s Democratic Party, who were more experienced in political affairs. Party of Afghanistan" (PDPA), and he himself preferred to return to his usual business, taking the literally won post of Minister of Defense in the new government. The commander of the Air Force and Air Defense was Colonel Ghulam Sakhi, who was the head of the Bagram air base and contributed greatly to the overthrow of the previous regime by organizing strikes by his aviators on "stronghold of tyranny" in the capital.

The PDPA figures who came to power in the country, carried away by the ideas of reorganizing society, began radical transformations with the goal of quickly building socialism, which they thought would be achieved in five years. In fact, it turned out that carrying out a military coup was easier than governing a country with a bunch of economic, national and social problems. Faced with opposition from a population committed to tradition, way of life and religious foundations, the plans of the revolutionaries began to take on violent forms.
It has been known since ancient times that the road to hell was paved with good intentions: the imposed reforms ran into the rejection of the people, and the directive abolition of many commandments and foundations became for the Afghans a personal intervention, which has been intolerable here from time immemorial. The alienation of the people from power was suppressed by new violent measures: a few months after the Saur Revolution, public executions of “reactionaries” and clergy began, repressions and purges became widespread, capturing many of yesterday’s supporters. When the authorities began publishing lists of those executed in newspapers in September 1978, the first list already included 12 thousand names, increasingly prominent in society among party members, merchants, intellectuals and the military. Already in August 1978, among the others arrested was Defense Minister Abdul Kadir, who was immediately sentenced to death (he was spared this fate only after repeated appeals from the Soviet government, concerned about the excessively rampant revolutionary process).

Local discontent quickly escalated into armed uprisings; it could hardly have happened otherwise in a country not spoiled by blessings, where honor was considered the main dignity, devotion to tradition was in the blood and traditionally a fair portion of the population had , valued above wealth. Armed skirmishes and rebellions in the provinces began already in June 1978, and by winter they had already acquired a systematic character, covering the central regions. However, the government, just as accustomed to relying on force, tried to suppress them with the help of the army, making extensive use of aviation and artillery to strike unruly villages. Some deviation from the democratic goals of the revolution was considered all the more insignificant since the resistance of the dissatisfied was focal in nature, disunited and, for the time being, few in number, and the rebels themselves were seen as derogatory and backward with their grandfather’s guns and sabers.

The true scale of resistance and the intensity of events became evident just a few months later. In March 1979, an anti-government rebellion broke out in Herat, the third largest city in the country and the center of a large province of the same name, in which parts of the local military garrison along with commanders most actively joined. Only a few hundred people from the 17th Infantry Division remained on the side of the authorities, including 24 Soviet military advisers. They managed to retreat to the Herat airfield and gain a foothold, holding it in their hands. Since all the warehouses and supplies were in the hands of the rebels, the remnants of the garrison had to be supplied by air, delivering food, ammunition and reinforcements from the airfields of Kabul and Shindand on transport planes.
At the same time, the danger of the rebellion developing and spreading to new provinces could not be ruled out; it was even expected that a rebellious infantry division, numbering up to 5,000 bayonets, would advance to Kabul. The local rulers, stunned by what was happening, literally bombarded the Soviet government with requests for urgent help, both with weapons and troops. Not really trusting their own army, which turned out to be not so reliable and committed to the cause of the revolution, Kabul saw the only way out in the urgent involvement of units of the Soviet Army, which would assist in suppressing the Herat rebellion and defending the capital. In order for help to arrive faster, Soviet soldiers, again, should have been delivered by transport aircraft.

In the winter of 1979, Kandahar Airport looked like a peaceful place from which domestic and international flights flew. Very little time will pass, and the airport building will be covered with traces of bullets and shrapnel.

For the Soviet government, this turn of events had a very definite resonance: on the one hand, the anti-government armed uprising took place at the southernmost borders, less than a hundred kilometers from the border Kushka, on the other hand, the newly acquired ally, who had so loudly declared his commitment to the cause of socialism, signed his his complete helplessness, despite the very substantial assistance provided to him. In a telephone conversation with the Afghan leader Taraki on March 18, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin, in response to his complaints about the lack of weapons, specialists and officer personnel, asked: “It can be understood that in Afghanistan there are no well-trained military personnel or very few of them. Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where did they all go?

The entry of Soviet troops was then determined to be a completely unacceptable decision, on which both the leadership of the armed forces and the party leadership of the country agreed. L.I. Brezhnev, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, judiciously pointed out: “It is not right for us to be drawn into this war now.” However, the Afghan authorities were provided with assistance by all available measures and methods, first of all, urgent supplies of weapons and military equipment, as well as sending advisers up to the highest rank, who were involved not only in training the local military, but also in the direct development of operational plans and leadership in the fight against the opposition (their level and attention to the problem can be judged by the fact that to help the Afghan military leadership repeatedly was personally sent by the Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General I.G. Pavlovsky). To ensure the urgency of military supplies, the VTA was involved, especially since there was a direct government instruction in this regard, voiced to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in the words of A.N. Kosygina: “Give everything now and immediately.” A long-term marathon of transport aviation began, which lasted more than ten years without a break. For the most part, during planned deliveries, equipment, ammunition, etc. were supplied from warehouses and storage bases; often it had to be taken directly from units, and, if necessary, directly from factories. It turned out that transport aviation played a crucial role not only in deliveries and supplies - its presence was in one way or another projected into almost all events of the Afghan company, which makes it appropriate not only to list flights, cargo and destinations, but also to talk about the accompanying events of political and of a private nature.

The special role of the An-12 in flights in the Afghan direction was dictated by their very predominance in the military aviation service: by the end of 1979, aircraft of this type accounted for two-thirds of the total aircraft fleet - there were 376 An-12s in ten air regiments, while the newest Il-76s were more than half as many - 152, and An-22 - only 57 units. First of all, the crews of local air transport units located on the territory of the Turkestan Military District were involved in these tasks - the 194th military transport air regiment (mtap) in Fergana and the 111th separate mixed air regiment (osap) in Tashkent at the headquarters of the district, where An -12 was the most powerful technique. Their home airfields were the closest to the “destination”, and the cargo delivered to the Afghans was already at the recipient within a couple of hours. Thus, on March 18, An-12 flights were carried out from Tashkent to the airfields of Kabul, Bagram and Shindand; in the following days, mainly Il-76 and An-22 operated, transporting heavy equipment and armored vehicles, but on March 21, four An-12 arrived on flights from Tashkent to Bagram -12, and from Karshi - another 19 An-12 with cargo.
The problem with Herat, with military assistance provided, was eventually resolved by the forces of a battalion of Afghan commandos and tankers deployed to the city. The city remained in the hands of the rebels for five days; after a series of air strikes, the rebels dispersed and by the afternoon of March 20, Herat was again in the hands of the authorities. However, this did not completely solve the problems - the Herat story was only a “wake-up call”, indicating the growth of opposition forces. In the spring and summer of 1979, armed uprisings spread throughout Afghanistan - not a few days passed without reports of further outbreaks of rebellion, the capture of villages and cities, uprisings in garrisons and military units and their transition to the side of the counter-revolution. Having gained strength, opposition troops cut communications to Khost, blocking the center of the province and the garrison there. Given the general difficult situation on the roads, which were extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks, aviation remained the only means of supplying the garrisons, which also guaranteed prompt resolution of supply problems.

However, with an abundance of tasks, the Afghan transport aviation’s own forces were quite modest: by the summer of 1979, the government air force had nine An-26 aircraft and five piston Il-14 aircraft, as well as eight An-2. There were even fewer trained crews for them - six for the An-26, four for the Il-14 and nine for the An-2. All transport vehicles were assembled in the Kabul 373rd Transport Aviation Regiment (TAP), which also had one An-30 aerial photographic aircraft; the Afghans somehow received it for aerial photography of the area for cartographic purposes, but it was never used for its original purpose, mostly stood idle and took to the air exclusively for passenger and transport transportation.
Airplanes from civil airlines Ariana, which operated on foreign flights, and Bakhtar, which served local routes, were also involved in military transportation, but they did not solve the problem due to the limited fleet and the same not very responsible attitude to the matter.
On this score, Lieutenant Colonel Valery Petrov, who arrived in the 373rd Regiment as an adviser to the regiment commander, left colorful remarks in his diary: “Flight training is weak. The personnel preparation for flights is unsatisfactory. They only love the front side - I'm a pilot! Self-criticism - zero, conceit - great. Flight methodological work must be started from scratch. Uncollected, they say one thing to your face and do something else behind your back. They are extremely reluctant to work. I rate the condition of the entrusted equipment as a two plus.”

In terms of materiel, the chronic problems were the lack of preparation of equipment, violations of regulations and a frankly disregardful attitude towards the maintenance of machines. Most of the work was carried out carelessly, often ending up abandoned, unfinished, and all this with complete irresponsibility. It was commonplace to see planes haphazardly put into flight with malfunctions, tools and assemblies forgotten here and there, as well as frequent theft from the boards of batteries and other things needed for the household, which is why handing over the cars under guard guard was not so much intended as protection from attacks by the enemy, as much as from thefts by our own. One of the reasons for this was the rapidly developing dependency: with increasingly large-scale and practically free supplies of equipment and property from the Soviet Union, there was no need to worry about any thrifty attitude towards materiel. Evidence of this was the mass of aircraft that were written off without regret due to malfunction and abandoned at the slightest damage (in the 373rd flight, four planes in a row were crashed in a row during the year by the careless pilot Miradin alone).
Operating equipment, and even carrying out combat missions, was increasingly “entrusted” to Soviet specialists and advisers, whose number in the Afghan Armed Forces had to be increased more than fourfold by mid-1979, to 1000 people.

The issue of transport aviation remained very pressing, since air transportation, together with by car were the main means of communication in the country. Afghanistan was a fairly vast country, larger than France, and the distances, by local standards, were considerable. As an aside, it may be noted that the popular belief that there was no railway transport, not entirely true: formally there was one in the country, however, the entire length of the railway track was a little over five kilometers and it was a continuation of the Central Asian line railway, stretching from the border Kushka to warehouses in Turagundi, which served as a transshipment base for goods supplied by the Soviet side (however, there were no “Afghan railway workers” here either, and the locals were employed only as loaders).

The dominant role in transportation was occupied by motor vehicles, which were 80% privately owned. Given the general shortage of government-owned vehicles, the usual practice was to attract the owners of “burbuhays”, whom the state hired to transport goods, including military ones, fortunately, for a good baksheesh, they were ready to overcome any mountains and passes and make their way to the most remote points. Supplying military units and garrisons privately, as well as the presence of a private transport department under the government that dealt with solving government problems, was not entirely familiar to our advisers.
The established procedure for resolving transport issues was quite satisfactory in Peaceful time, however, with the worsening of the situation in the country, it turned out to be very vulnerable. There was no certainty that the cargo would reach its destination and would not be plundered by Dushman troops. Operating on the roads, they interfered with transportation, selected and destroyed food, fuel and other supplies sent, burned the cars of the recalcitrant, which is why intimidated drivers refused to take government orders and military cargo. Other garrisons sat for months without supplies, and the hungry and worn-out soldiers fled or went over to the enemy and the villages were taken over without a fight. Indicative figures were given by Soviet advisers to the Afghan military department: with the regular strength of the Afghan army being 110 thousand people, by June 1978 there were only 70 thousand military personnel, and by the end of 1979 their ranks were completely reduced to 40 thousand people, from Their staff number is 9 thousand people.

With the underdeveloped road network in Afghanistan, the role of air transport became very significant. There were 35 airfields in the country, even if most were not best quality, however, a dozen and a half of them were quite suitable for transport aircraft flights. The airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar and Shindand had very decent solid concrete runways and properly equipped parking areas. Jalalabad and Kunduz had asphalt strips, while at other “points” it was necessary to work from clay soil and gravel areas. Without the use of special construction and road equipment, the gravel was somehow rolled with a tank, sometimes secured by pouring liquid bitumen, and the runway was considered ready to receive aircraft. Although somewhat protective from dust, such a covering blurred in the heat and became covered with deep ruts from taxiing and taking off aircraft. The problems were added by the high mountains and complex approach patterns, sometimes one-way, with the possibility of approaching from a single direction. So, in Fayzabad, the landing approach had to be built along a mountain valley stretching towards the airfield, focusing on the bend of the river and performing a sharp right turn while descending in order to go around the mountain that blocked the runway. It was necessary to land on the first approach - the next mountain rose right behind the end of the runway, leaving no opportunity to go around if the calculation was inaccurate.

The provincial center of Lashkar Gah in the south of the country had its own airfield with a dirt runway, quite decent by local standards.

Valley of the Arghandab River near Kandahar. River beds, with limited other landmarks, served as a very reliable aid in solving navigational problems

The growing need for air transportation was also dictated by the fact that air transport provided more or less reliable delivery of goods and people directly to remote points, eliminating the risk of interception by the enemy on the roads. In some places, air transport became practically the only means of supplying blocked garrisons cut off by Dushman cordons. With the expansion of hostilities, the efficiency of solving problems by transport aircraft became invaluable, capable of delivering to the warring units without delay what they required, be it ammunition, provisions, fuel or replenishment of people - in war, as nowhere else, the saying “an egg is dear to Christ’s day” is applicable (although in eastern country The remark of one of the heroes of “White Sun of the Desert” sounded more appropriate: “The dagger is good for the one who has it, and woe to the one who does not have it at the right moment”).

There were plenty of tasks for government transport aviation: according to the records of Lieutenant Colonel V. Petrov about the work of the 373rd Tank, on just one day, July 1, 1980, the regiment’s forces, according to the plan, needed to deliver 453 people and 46,750 kg of cargo to various destinations, return flights picking up wounded and oncoming passengers. On one of the flights on the An-30, 64 people from local party members and military personnel arrived at once, heading to the capital for the PDPA plenum and crammed into the cargo cabin to capacity, despite the fact that the plane did not have passenger seats at all. The delivery of army cargo and military personnel was interspersed with commercial and passenger transportation, fortunately the local merchants, despite the revolution and war, had their own interests and knew how to get along with military pilots. The same V. Petrov stated: “Complete anarchy: whoever wants, flies, whoever they want, they take.”

When flying over the monotony of mountains stretching for hundreds of kilometers, one had to rely primarily on instruments and other means of instrumental navigation

Helicopter pilot A. Bondarev, who served in Ghazni, described such transportation “in the interests of the population” in the most picturesque way: “They loved to fly because buses and cars were regularly robbed by dushmans. It’s safer to travel by air, so a crowd of people wishing to fly away gathered at the airfield barrier. Working with their fists and elbows, using all their cunning, the Afghans rushed closer to the plane. Then a soldier from the airfield security fired a burst of fire over their heads. The crowd rolled away, crushing each other. Order was restored. The Afghan pilot picked up passengers and took them to board, having previously checked their belongings for ammunition, weapons and other forbidden things. What he found, he confiscated; the weapons many had were supposed to be handed over and were stored in the cockpit. The most annoying and those who strove not to pay were deprived of the right to fly and those, having received a kick, were removed from the airfield. Others rushed on board like mad. I’ve only seen this in movies about the twenties, how people storm a train: they climb over their heads, push each other away and hit each other, and push them out of the cabin. They took as many passengers as they could fit. If there were too many, the pilots adjusted the number to normal by eye, throwing out the extra ones along with their huge suitcases. There is a special conversation about suitcases, you need to see them. Afghan suitcases are made of galvanized iron and are closed with padlocks. And the dimensions are such that an Afghan himself can live in it or use it as a barn.”

Lieutenant General I. Vertelko, who arrived in Afghanistan on business with the Border Troops Department, where he was deputy chief, once had to take advantage of a passing Afghan An-26 to get from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif. The general described the flight very colorfully: “I had barely boarded the plane when the hatch slammed behind me and I felt like a small bug caught in the belly of a shark. Judging by the characteristic “aromas” and the slippery floor, I realized that animals had been transported here before me. When the plane was on course, the door to the pilot's cabin swung open, and a young Afghan pilot appeared on the threshold and began to say something, waving his arms. It seemed to me that the Afghan was demanding “magarych” for the service rendered. Reaching into the inner pocket of my jacket, I pulled out a pair of brand new, crisp, red coins that still smelled of paint. My “little red ones” disappeared in the hands of the Afghan, as if by magic, and he, putting his hands to his chest in a gesture of gratitude, uttered a single word: “Baksheesh?” “No,” I say, “a souvenir.” Although he probably didn’t care whether it was baksheesh or a souvenir, the main thing was money in his pocket. The door had barely closed behind this “gobsek” when another pilot appeared on the threshold. Having received “his” two chervonets, in broken Russian he invited me to go into the cabin, upon crossing the threshold of which I found myself under the gun of five pairs of brown attentive eyes. In order to somehow defuse the long pause, I open my small travel suitcase and begin to transfer the contents into the hands of the left pilot (the right one holds the steering wheel): several cans of canned food, a stick of cervelat, a bottle of Stolichnaya. I emptied my wallet of all the cash in there. It was a coincidence, but those who were not given the gift before also received two ducats. The pilots became cheerful and started talking at once, confusing Russian and Afghan words. It turned out that the one who speaks Russian well graduated from college in the Union.”

A pertinent question is why Afghan transport aviation, with such a demand for transportation, was limited to the operation of light aircraft and did not use the An-12 - machines that are common and popular not only in the Soviet Union, but also in a dozen and a half other countries? For the time being, there was no particular need for aircraft of this type, and local conditions were not conducive to the use of a sufficiently large four-engine aircraft. The main range of cargo for air transportation in the daily supply of the army did not require a large-capacity aircraft: the largest and heaviest were aircraft engines, which were units weighing up to 1.5-2 tons, other needs were also limited to a level of no more than 2-3 tons. The An-26 could cope with such tasks quite well (just as in our country the most popular truck for urban transportation is the Gazelle). In addition, the twin-engine vehicle was extremely unpretentious to the conditions of local airfields, thanks to its light weight and having the capabilities of short takeoff and landing, which was especially noticeable when operating in high mountains and from short strips (the 20-ton takeoff weight of the An-26 is still not 50 tons for the An-12!). Thanks to such advantages, the An-26 could fly from almost all local airfields that were not suitable for heavier aircraft.
The An-12 was also unprofitable in terms of range, which was excessive here, since most of the flights were carried out on the “short arm”. Afghanistan, despite the complexity of local conditions and the inaccessibility of many areas, was a “compact” country, where the remoteness of most settlements was a concept more related to location than to distance, which is why residents of many villages lying in the mountains near Kabul did not have There have never been any communications with the city or in the capital. Jalalabad, located in the east of the country, was separated from Kabul by only a hundred kilometers, and the longest routes were measured at distances of 450-550 km, covered by an airplane in an hour of flight. When tanks were needed to suppress the Herat rebellion, it took a little more than a day for the tank unit to march from Kandahar, which lay at the other end of the country. In such conditions, the An-12, capable of delivering a ten-ton cargo over three thousand kilometers, would constantly have to be driven half empty, and for the Afghans it seemed like the most suitable machine.
The situation began to change after the April events. The deeper the government and the army got involved in the fight against the opposition, trying to extinguish the growing armed uprisings, the more forces and resources were required for this. The suppression of rebellions, the organization of the fight against Dushman troops, the cleansing of the provinces and the supply of provincial centers and garrisons required means of support and delivery. Meanwhile, it was precisely these tasks, by definition, that military transport aviation answered, the main purpose of which, among other things, was the air transportation of troops, weapons, ammunition and materiel, ensuring the maneuver of units and formations, as well as the evacuation of the wounded and sick. In the specific Afghan situation, the range of tasks of transport workers was significantly expanded by the need to deliver national economic goods, since the small civil aviation was mainly engaged in passenger transportation.
Faced with problems, the Afghan authorities literally inundated the Soviet side with calls for help. The needs of Kabul were plentiful and numerous, from food and fuel support to increasingly large-scale supplies of weapons and ammunition, which were the true necessities of the revolutionary process.

With enviable persistence, the Afghan authorities also demanded that Soviet troops be sent to fight the rebels, but for the time being they were denied this. There were about 20 such requests to the Soviet government, but both government officials and military men demonstrated common sense, pointing out the unwiseness of getting involved in someone else’s turmoil. Explaining the inappropriateness of such a decision, politicians listed all the harmful consequences, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense pointed to “the lack of grounds for sending troops,” Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov spoke straightforwardly in military terms: “We will never send our troops there. We won’t establish order there with bombs and shells.” But in a matter of months the situation will change radically and irreparably...
So far, 1,500 trucks have been allocated to Afghan allies on an urgent basis to meet immediate transport needs; a corresponding instruction to the USSR State Planning Committee and Vneshtorg was given at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on May 24, 1979, along with a decision on the free supply of “special equipment” - weapons and ammunition that would be enough to equip an entire army. However, the Afghans’ request to “send helicopters and transport aircraft with Soviet crews to the DRA” was again denied. As it turned out, not for long: the deteriorating situation in the country spurred on the Kabul rulers, who insisted on a direct threat to the “cause of the April revolution” and openly speculated that “the Soviet Union could lose Afghanistan” (it is clear that in this case Afghanistan would immediately find itself in the clutches imperialists and their mercenaries). Under such pressure, the position of the Soviet government began to change. In view of the obvious weakness of the Afghan army, things were leaning towards the fact that the supply of weapons and supplies alone would not get by. The reason was the events around the blockaded Khost, to supply which at the end of May 1979, the chief military adviser L.N. Gorelov requested support from the Soviet VTA, temporarily transferring a squadron of An-12 to Afghanistan.

As soon as the voice of a representative of the Ministry of Defense joined the Afghans’ requests, it was decided to grant the request. At the same time, they decided to send an airborne battalion to protect the squadron in a turbulent situation.
Since the Afghans also experienced an acute shortage of helicopters and, especially, trained crews for them, they also decided to send a transport helicopter squadron to Kabul. The agreement to satisfy the requests of the Afghan allies had the obvious nature of a concession: Kabul’s insistence did not go unanswered, at the same time, the Soviet side “save face” by distancing itself from getting involved in Afghan civil strife and participating directly in hostilities; the transport workers sent are still not combat aircraft, and the airborne battalion was given exclusively security tasks (besides, the fighters had to be constantly on the territory of the base).
The implementation of the government order was delayed for two whole months due to completely subjective reasons. The equipment was immediately at hand: planes and helicopters were provided from the aviation units located on the territory of the Turkestan Military District, An-12 - from the Fergana 194th airborne regiment, and Mi-8 - from the 280th separate helicopter regiment stationed in Kagan near Bukhara . These units were located not far from the border and the equipment and crews could arrive at their destination literally on the same day. Difficulties arose with personnel: since it was necessary to keep secret the appearance of Soviet military units in Afghanistan, even of limited strength, in order to avoid international complications and accusations of intervention (the highly experienced A.N. Kosygin noted in this regard, “We will have huge disadvantages, a whole a bunch of countries will immediately oppose us, but there are no advantages for us here”). For these reasons, the planes had to look civilian, and the transport and combat helicopters, with their protective “military” coloring, had to be equipped with Afghan identification marks. It was decided to use the flight and technical personnel from among the people of the eastern type, natives of the republics Central Asia, so that they would look like Afghan aviators, since their flight uniforms were completely Soviet-style and in terms of their “clothing” ours looked completely our own. This idea was also proposed by the Afghans themselves - the leader of the country, Taraki, asked “to send Uzbeks and Tajiks in civilian clothes and no one will recognize them, since all these nationalities are in Afghanistan.”
Such precautions might seem like excessive reinsurance - not so long ago, during the Czechoslovak events, an entire army was sent to the “brotherly country”, not really caring about the impression made in the world. However, much has changed since then, the Soviet Union was proud of its achievements in the field of detente and its significance in international affairs, claiming the role of the leader of progressive forces, and the countries of the third world acquired a certain weight in the world and their opinion had to be taken into account.

This photo, unfortunately not of the best quality, shows an An-26 ambulance that arrived in Bagram to pick up the wounded. The aircraft carries the Red Cross emblem on a white field for better visibility

True, with the personnel of the aviation professions, things were completely unsatisfactory. There were literally only a few of them. Pilots were recruited through DOSAAF, and at the Syzran Flight School already in March 1979, a special set of accelerated training was organized for immigrants from Tajikistan. We also carried out organizational recruitment in the local civil aviation departments, Dushanbe, Tashkent and others, attracting those interested with an unprecedentedly high salary per thousand rubles and promotion to crew commanders after returning to the Civil Air Fleet. As a result of these measures, in the 280th helicopter regiment it was possible to form a non-standard 5th squadron, nicknamed “Tajik”. It was still not possible to fully staff it with “national” crews; six pilots remained “white”, from the Slavs, like the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Bukharin, for whose position they could not find a single Turkmen or Tajik. Senior Lieutenant Zafar Urazov, who had previously flown a Tu-16, became the navigator of the squadron. A good half of the personnel had nothing to do with aviation at all, being recruited for retraining from tank crews, signalmen and sappers, there was even a former submariner sporting a black naval uniform. In the end, due to delays in preparing the “national” group, the regular third squadron of the regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Belov went to Afghanistan instead. The helicopter squadron, numbering 12 Mi-8s, arrived at its deployment site in Bagram on August 21, 1979. To transport it, along with technical personnel and numerous aviation and technical equipment, it was necessary to carry out 24 An-12 flights and 4 Il-76 flights.
There were no such problems with the military transport squadron - the An-12s with their “Aeroflot” markings looked quite decent and departed for the mission site earlier than the others. The transport workers of the 194th regiment even managed to comply with the “national qualification” by finding Lieutenant Colonel Mamatov for the position of squadron commander, who was then replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Shamil Khazievich Ishmuratov. Major Rafael Girfanov was appointed his deputy. A separate military transport squadron, named the 200th Separate Transport Squadron (OTAE), arrived in Afghanistan on June 14, 1979. It included eight An-12 aircraft with Guards crews. Majors R. Girfanov, O. Kozhevnikov, Yu. Zaikina, Guards. captains A. Bezlepkin, N. Antamonov, N. Bredikhin, V. Goryachev and N. Kondrushin. The entire air group was subordinate to the chief military adviser in the DRA and had the goal of carrying out tasks at the request of the advisory apparatus in the interests of the Afghan state and military authorities.

This is how one of its participants, V. Goryachev, at that time the captain and commander of the An-12 crew, described that trip: “On June 14, our group (according to legend, it was a Civil Air Fleet detachment from Vnukovo airport) flew to Afghanistan, to the Bagram airfield . Airplanes with civilian registration numbers were selected for the group (most of the aircraft in the regiment had just such numbers). The guns on these vehicles were removed. All of them were equipped with underground tanks. From here, from the Bagram airfield, we transported personnel, weapons and other cargo in the interests of the Afghan army. In the summer we flew mainly to surrounded Khost (2 times a week). Usually they transported soldiers (both there and back), ammunition, flour, sugar, and other products. These flights were very important for Khost, which was blocked by rebels. This is evidenced by the fact that the An-12 is designed for a maximum of 90 paratroopers. In reality, at that time up to 150 Afghans were sometimes “crowded” onto the planes. And they often had to fly standing. And, nevertheless, the commander of the Khost garrison was very grateful for such flights. The possibility of changing personnel had a beneficial effect on both the physical condition and morale of his subordinates.

It was assumed that the stay of the crews of the “Ishmuratov group” in Afghanistan would last three months. But then the duration of our business trip was increased to six months. And then the deployment of troops began and for some time there was no point in changing us, and there was no possibility. We often had to fly to Mazar-i-Sharif, where ammunition was delivered by truck from Hairatan. We then transported them throughout Afghanistan. We also flew to Kabul, Shindand, and Kandahar. I had to visit Herat less often, and even less often - Kunduz. The detachment did not suffer any losses on both missions.”
There were reasons for placing transport workers at the Bagram military base instead of the capital's airfield. First of all, the same goals were pursued of masking the presence of the Soviet military, who arrived in a fairly large number - two squadrons and a battalion of paratroopers from the Fergana 345th separate parachute regiment to protect them numbered about a thousand people, whose appearance in international airport Kabul would inevitably attract attention and generate unwanted publicity. “Behind the fence” of the air force base, they were away from prying eyes, not to mention foreign observers and the ubiquitous journalists (more than 2,000 Western reporters were working in Kabul at that time, and they were, not without reason, suspected of intelligence activities). It seems that they really had no idea about the appearance of Soviet aviators and paratroopers in Afghanistan, since neither the press nor Western analysts noted their presence all these months.

There were also other considerations: at the beginning of August, the Kabul zone became a restless place - armed uprisings of the army took place in the capital garrison, and nearby in Paktika the opposition became so strong that it defeated the government units located there; There was also talk about the rebels' impending campaign against Kabul. Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov these days even reported on “the emerging danger of capturing the airfield near Kabul.” Well protected military base Bagram with a large garrison in this regard seemed to be a more reliable place. Over time, the aircraft of the military transport squadron were equipped with their own individual parking lot, located in the very center of the airfield, in close proximity to the runway.

As a result, it turned out that the first from the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan were the transport workers and the paratroopers who arrived to protect them. Although the patriotically minded domestic press has long been discussing the inappropriateness of comparing the Afghan campaign with the Vietnam War, citing numerous arguments that the fulfillment of international duty had nothing to do with the aggressive policy of imperialism, certain parallels in their history, as they say, suggest themselves. Several years before sending the army to Vietnam, the Americans were faced with the need to support their military advisers and special forces with helicopter units and transport aircraft necessary to support their activities, carry out supply and other tasks. The inexorable logic of war with the expansion of the scale of the conflict soon required the involvement of strike aircraft, and then strategic bombers.
In Afghanistan, events developed even more dynamically, and along with the entry of Soviet troops, in a matter of months, front-line aviation was activated, involving all its branches, from fighters and reconnaissance aircraft to strike forces of fighter-bombers and front-line bombers, which were immediately involved in combat work.

The transport squadron was involved in work literally from the first days. All assignments came through the Chief Military Adviser, whose apparatus was constantly increasing, and Soviet officers were already present in almost all units and formations of the Afghan army. Air transport provided more or less reliable supplies to remote areas and garrisons, since by this time, as the Soviet embassy informed, “about 70% of the Afghan territory, that is, almost the entire rural area, is under the control of detachments and other opposition formations (or outside the control of the government) " Another figure was also mentioned: as a result of the lack of security on the roads, which “the counter-revolution chose as one of its main targets,” the average daily export of goods supplied by the Soviet side from border points by the end of 1979 decreased by 10 times.

View of Bagram Air Base taken from a reconnaissance aircraft. A separate parking lot for transport workers is clearly visible in the very center of the airfield.

The transport workers had more than enough tasks: in just one week of work during the period of aggravation of the situation from August 24 to 30, 1979, 53 An-12 flights were carried out - twice as many as the Afghan Il-14s made. In terms of flight hours, the An-12 was second only to the ubiquitous An-26 during these months, the versatility of which made it possible to use them for communications with almost all airfields, while only ten of them were suitable for heavy An-12 flights.
Another trend was also gaining strength - the desire of the Afghans to shift the solution of problems to a stronger partner who appeared in time, evidence of which was the continuous and ever-increasing requests for the sending of Soviet troops or at least police forces that would take on the burden of the fight against the opposition. The same character traits were noted when working with the Afghan military by Soviet instructors, who paid attention to such behavioral features of the local contingent (such “portraits” were drawn up on the recommendation of military aviation medicine to optimize relations with national personnel): “Non-executive, attitude towards service decreases when faced with difficulties. In difficult situations, they are passive and constrained, fussy, the logic of thinking deteriorates, they are not independent and seek help. They may show obsequiousness to elders and those on whom they depend and offer gifts. They like to emphasize their position, but are not self-critical and not independent. They tend to speculate on things.” It is easy to see that this characteristic, which applied to the trained military personnel, fully described the activities of the “leadership group” that came to power in the country.

Meanwhile, “revolutionary Afghanistan” was increasingly turning into an ordinary despotism. Reprisals against dissatisfied people and yesterday's associates, a growing number of refugees to neighboring Iran and Pakistan, and ongoing riots in the provinces have become commonplace. Injustice and repression led to revolts of the Pashtun tribes, a warlike and independent people, people from whom traditionally formed the main state apparatus and army, and now for many years became the support of the armed resistance, the mass character of which is added by the fact that the Pashtuns made up the majority of the country's population (in those According to traditions, Pashtuns never paid taxes, retained the rights to own weapons, and a good third of men were constantly in tribal armed forces). In response, the authorities resorted to bombing rebellious villages and punitive military actions in the previously independent Pashtun territories.

The Boeing 727, purchased in the USA for the Afghan leader Amin, played an unseemly role in the president’s fate, giving the Soviet leadership a reason to suspect him of flirting with the Americans

After the change of power, the presidential Boeing 727 served in the Afghan airline Ariana, which operated on foreign routes.

The “revolutionary process” in Afghanistan was underway (readers probably remember the then popular song on our radio, “The revolution has a beginning, but the revolution has no end”). As a result of the aggravation of discord between recent comrades, in October 1979, the recent leader of the revolution, Hyr Mohammed, was eliminated Taraki. The General Secretary of the PDPA, who considered himself a global figure, no lower than Lenin or at least Mao Zedong, was not saved by his merits and self-esteem - yesterday’s associates strangled him with pillows, not sparing his family, who were thrown into prison.
The day before, Major Khalboev’s “Muslim battalion” was going to be transferred to Kabul to guard Taraki. The special forces were already sitting on the planes when the order to clear was received. The authorities still hoped to resolve the Afghan crisis through local means, relying on the “healthy forces” in the PDPA. However, literally a couple of days later, Taraki was deprived of all posts, accused of all mortal sins and imprisoned at the instigation of his closest party comrade - the head of government and Minister of War Amin. The paratroopers were again tasked with flying out to rescue the head of a friendly country, but Amin prudently ordered the Kabul airfield to be completely closed from September 15th. In response to an appeal to the Chief of the Afghan General Staff, General Yakub, about accepting the special aircraft with the landing group, he replied that Amin had given the command to shoot down any aircraft that arrived without his approval.

Having taken power into his own hands, Hafizullah Amin, a cruel and cunning figure, continued to praise Soviet-Afghan friendship and, not really trusting his own circle, again expressed wishes to send units of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan (as subsequent events showed, he succeeded in this - on your own head...). Insisting on sending Soviet troops, arguments were increasingly made that the unrest in the country was inspired by the foreign intervention of reactionary forces. Thus, the conflict acquired an ideological overtones, and a concession in it looked like a loss to the West, all the more unforgivable since it was about the loss of a friendly country from the immediate environment of the USSR, with the frightening prospect of the appearance there of the omnipresent Americans with their troops, missiles and military bases. This picture fit completely into the dominant scheme of the confrontation between socialism and aggressive imperialism, the expansion of which throughout the globe was a popular theme in domestic propaganda, political posters and cartoons.

Fuel was added to the fire by reports of Amin’s reported contacts with the Americans. Even Amin’s sudden refusal to use a Soviet-made personal plane was considered evidence of this, in exchange for which a Boeing 727 with a hired American crew was bought in the United States. The very appearance of American pilots and a technical group at the capital's airfield caused alarm - there was no doubt that secret service agents were hiding under their guise. Amin hastened to explain that this plane was received on account of previously frozen deposits in American banks, this is a temporary matter, the Boeing will soon be leased to India, and the Afghan leadership, as before, will use Soviet aircraft. One way or another, suspicions against Amin intensified and the decisions taken on his behalf most directly affected both himself and the activities of the Soviet transport squadron.

Changes at the top of Afghanistan soon affected the attitude towards the Afghan problem. In the position of the Soviet leadership, the recent almost unanimous reluctance to get involved in the local feuds was replaced by the need to take forceful action, promoting “people's power” and getting rid of odious figures in Kabul. People from L.I.’s circle Brezhnev pointed out that the sensitive General Secretary was deeply impressed by the death of Taraki. Having learned about the reprisal against Taraki, whom he favored, Brezhnev was extremely upset, demanding decisive measures against Amin, who had led him by the nose. Over the next couple of months, the entire military machine was put into action and a plan of measures was prepared to resolve the Afghan issue.
The transport base in Bagram unexpectedly found itself involved in the events of big politics. It was precisely this that was used during the beginning of the implementation of the plan for the transfer of individual Soviet units and special groups to Afghanistan, provided for in the event of that same “sharp escalation of the situation.”

Formally, they were sent in agreement with the requests of the Afghans themselves, with the goal of strengthening the security of particularly important facilities, including the air base itself, the Soviet embassy and the residence of the head of state, others arrived without much publicity and with tasks of a less obvious nature.
It was the base of transport workers that became the location of the special forces detachment, which was to play a leading role in the events that soon followed (by the way, Amin himself also managed to suggest that the Soviet side “could have military garrisons in those places in which it wishes”). In subsequent events, transport aviation played a role no less important than the well-known actions of paratroopers and special forces. The relocation of the “Muslim battalion” of GRU special forces under the command of Major Khabib Khalbaev was carried out on November 10-12, 1979, transferring it from Chirchik and Tashkent airfields by BTA aircraft. All heavy equipment, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, were transported on An-22 from the 12th military transport air division; personnel, as well as property and supplies, including living tents, dry rations and even firewood, were delivered to the An-12. All officers and soldiers were dressed in Afghan uniforms and did not differ in appearance from the Afghan military. Uniformity was broken only by the commander of the anti-aircraft "Shilok" company, Captain Pautov, a Ukrainian by nationality, although he was dark-haired and, as Colonel V. Kolesnik, who led the operation, noted with satisfaction, “he got lost in the crowd when he was silent.” Over the next few weeks, with the help of the same An-12, all support for the battalion was carried out and communication with the command remaining in the Union, which flew to Bagram more than once.
Having settled in place, the battalion began training in anticipation of the command to carry out the “main task,” which for the time being had not been specified. Two more units were transferred to Bagram on December 3 and 14, 1979. Together with them, on December 14, Babrak Karmal and several other future leaders of the country illegally arrived in Afghanistan. Karmal, who was to become the new head of the country, was transported on board an An-12 and secretly placed at the Bagram air base under the protection of the Soviet military. The newly-minted Afghan leader promised to attract at least 500 of his supporters to help the special forces, for which purpose they organized the delivery of weapons and ammunition to the base by transport aircraft. Only one came at his call...

The given historical excursion into the prelude of the Afghan war seems all the more justified since transport aviation, which played the leading roles, was most directly involved in all these events. With the decision to conduct a special operation, Colonel V. Kolesnik, responsible for it, took off from the Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow on the morning of December 18. The route flew through Baku and Termez; border Termez, instead of the usual Tashkent transshipment airfield, where the headquarters of the TurkVO was located, appeared on the route due to the fact that in this city since December 14, an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense settled in this city, formed to coordinate all actions for the introduction of troops into Afghanistan and headed by the first deputy chief General Staff Army General S.F. Akhromeev.
During the flight, equipment problems arose, which is why we had to look for another plane and cover the last part of the journey on a local An-12, which arrived in Bagram late in the evening. Two days earlier, by order of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the field command of the 40th Army formed to enter Afghanistan was formed and put on full combat readiness. It was based on formations and units stationed in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts, mainly cadres, i.e. having standard weapons and equipment, but minimally staffed (essentially, it was a peacetime logistics reserve, which, if necessary, was replenished to full strength by calling up reserve soldiers and officers). Naturally, the units and formations that became part of the army had a local “registration” from TurkVO and SAVO, and the personnel for their deployment were drawn from among local residents through conscription provided for by mobilization plans through military registration and enlistment offices. For this purpose, more than 50 thousand soldiers and officers were called up from the reserves.

This option was directly provided for by mobilization plans in case of wartime or aggravation of the situation, allowing for the rapid deployment of military formations. According to the plan, immediately after conscription of the necessary military specialties and their arrival at nearby assigned units, it was enough for them to receive uniforms, weapons and take places on the equipment in order to almost immediately be ready to carry out the assigned tasks.
Over time, a version began to circulate that soldiers of predominantly Central Asian nationalities were called upon with the intent to hide the fact of the entry of troops, “disguising” their appearance in neighboring country the whole army. For example, the book by American author Mark Urban, “The War in Afghanistan,” considered in the West to be a classic work on this topic, says: “The Soviets were confident that local conscription would keep preparations for combat operations secret.” Insight fails Western and domestic analysts: it is enough to note that the soldiers and officers, even of the “eastern conscription,” were dressed in Soviet military uniforms, which left no doubt about their affiliation, not to mention the TASS statement that followed a few days later about “providing military assistance to Afghanistan,” however, with an apologetic clause “about the repeated requests of the DRA government.” The formation of an army association based on units and formations of local military districts was the most reasonable and, obviously, the fastest and “economical” way to create an “expeditionary corps” of Soviet troops.

In total, from December 15 to December 31, 1979, in accordance with the directives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, 55 formations, units and institutions included in the regular complement of the 40th Army were mobilized and put on full combat readiness. Bringing the troops into full combat readiness had to be carried out in an extremely short time frame, dictated, according to the instructions of the General Staff, by “the heating up of the military-political situation and the acute struggle for the initiative.” During the mobilization, the “first echelon” were permanently ready units on combat duty: border guards, command and control agencies, communications, airborne and air force units, as well as all types of support. Invariably, a responsible role was assigned to the VTA, whose tasks included providing support and transporting troops.
The decision to send troops to Afghanistan was communicated to the leadership by the Minister of Defense at a meeting on December 24, 1979.

An-12BK parked at Bagram airfield

As you know, the decision to send troops to Afghanistan was communicated to the leadership by the Minister of Defense at a meeting on December 24, 1979. The next day, December 25, 1979, the verbal instruction was confirmed by a directive from the USSR Ministry of Defense. But the lively work of the VTA began in early December, when, according to the oral instructions of D.F. Ustinov, the mobilization of troops began, as well as the transfer of a number of units, primarily airborne units, to TurkVO. Airborne units, as the most mobile and combat-ready type of troops, had to play a leading role in the operation, occupying key facilities in the Afghan capital and central regions even before the arrival of the bulk of the troops. On December 10, it was ordered to put the Vitebsk 103rd Airborne Division on high alert, concentrating forces and assets at the loading airfields in Pskov and Vitebsk; on December 11, five VTA divisions and three separate regiments were ordered to be put on high alert. Thus, almost all of the forces available in the MTA were involved in the operation, including all five military transport associations that existed at that time - the 3rd Guards. Smolenskaya military unit in Vitebsk, 6th Guards. Zaporozhye Red Banner Regiment in Krivoy Rog, the 7th Red Banner Regiment in Melitopol, the 12th Mginsk Red Banner Regiment in Kalinin and the 18th Taganrog Red Banner Regiment in Panevezys, as well as three separate air regiments - the 194th in Fergana, the 708th in Kirovabad and 930th in Zavitinsk (all on An-12). When forming the air transport group, even aircraft from the Ivanovsky 610th instructor squadrons were used training center, from which they recruited 14 An-12s (almost all of them at the base) and three Il-76s (out of a dozen available).

In one of these formations, the 12th Regiment, all 57 An-22s in service were concentrated. The rest were partially re-equipped with the latest Il-76s, of which there were 152, but not all of them were properly mastered by personnel. The main forces of the VTA, which made up two-thirds of the aircraft fleet, were represented by the An-12.
In addition to the paratroopers, with the help air transport it was necessary to transfer control, communications and aviation support groups.

The activated military machine all this time needed mass transportation to transport thousands of people and units of military equipment. The efficiency of the missions required the involvement of many military aviation regiments, whose crews had to immediately engage in combat work. The involvement of a large number of aircraft in the operation and the sharply increased intensity of sorties were not without incident. During an intermediate landing at the border airfield of Kokaity on December 9, an An-12BK was damaged and failed. The crew of Captain A. Tikhov from the Krivoy Rog 363rd brigade carried out the task of transporting a Su-7 aircraft from a repair plant for the Afghan Air Force. Having violated the established landing pattern at the airfield, and in the approaching darkness of night, the pilots began to approach it from a straight line and touched a two-kilometer-high mountain that was directly ahead. The crew, as they say, was born in a shirt: having combed its belly along the top, touched it with the propeller of the leftmost engine and left some parts in place, the plane was still able to continue flying. Already during the descent, it became clear that the nose landing gear did not come out and was knocking oil out of the far right engine, which also had to be turned off. The landing was made on two main struts on an unpaved reserve runway. Neither the cargo nor the people on board were injured, but the vehicle was heavily damaged: the skin on the lower part of the fuselage was crushed and torn, the hydraulic system pipelines were torn, and two engines were out of order. Repair work on the car required such an amount of labor that it dragged on until the end of next year.

On the same day, December 9, while flying from Chirchik to Tashkent, another An-12AP crashed, on board of which, in addition to the crew, there were two specialists flying to investigate the breakdown. In Tashkent we had to pick up representatives of the flight safety service from army headquarters and proceed further to the scene of the incident. The entire flight to Tashkent, at most 30 km long, should have taken a matter of minutes, and the crew did not need to gain any decent altitude. After takeoff, which took place at night, the crew commander, Senior Lieutenant Yu.N. Grekov occupied a flight level of 500 m, contacted the Tashkent airfield and began to build an approach. The not very experienced pilot, who had just been commissioned and was flying with someone else’s crew, did not have sufficient skills to fly in mountainous areas. Having made a similar mistake and violating the exit pattern from the departure airfield, he hurried to set the altimeter to the landing airfield, which lay in the lowlands. Confident that there was altitude reserve, when maneuvering on descent, already in sight of Tashkent, the pilot took the plane directly to one of the peaks of the Chimgan ridge, which rose almost a kilometer high. When it collided with a mountain, the plane broke up and caught fire, killing everyone on board. The plane and crew belonged to the 37th brigade from the south of Ukraine. Together with the others, the day before he was transferred to the Afghan border, and trouble awaited him thousands of kilometers from his native land...

At the first stage of the entry of Soviet troops, the task was set to capture the airfields of Kabul and Bagram with taking control of administrative and other important facilities, carried out by airborne forces and special forces. As planned, at 15.00 Moscow time on December 25, 1979, the airlift of troops with ground landings began at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. Previously, at a meeting of Soviet advisers gathered at Kabul airport, instructions were given to prevent possible opposition and hostile actions against the arriving Soviet troops in the Afghan military units assigned to them (the East is a delicate matter, although the top of the Afghan government asked for their entry, not local speeches and armed attacks by army men not privy to big politics were excluded).

To prevent shelling of landing troops and landing aircraft at airfields, they decided not to limit themselves to explanations among the Afghan military, but to take radical measures - remove sights and locks from anti-aircraft installations and confiscate the keys to stored ammunition. Since relations with Afghan military personnel were, for the most part, normal and trusting, these actions were carried out without any special incidents. Among the military units of Bagram was a military aircraft repair plant with a fairly large staff of Afghan military personnel (by the way, it was located next to the parking lot of Soviet transport workers). Colonel V.V. was an adviser to his superior. Patsko, who said: “There were only two of us Soviets at this plant: me and the adviser to the chief engineer. And now we, through our advisory channels, receive information that our troops have entered Afghanistan and we are given the task of disarming the personnel of this plant!!!