Battles for Donetsk airport stories. Battle for Donetsk airport. Spartans versus cyborgs. The main myth. Strategic importance of Donetsk airport

On the night of January 13-14, the last successful assault on the Donetsk airport began for the VSN. Perhaps this was the most symbolic battle that took place during the war in Donbass. The successful defense of this facility by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the previous period made it a kind of ideological symbol of the Ukrainian army; representatives of the Ukrainian segment of the Internet prayed to its defenders, the so-called “cyborgs,” as if they were an icon. The fall of the airport, which seemed an unshakable stronghold, on the contrary, undermined the morale of Ukrainian society; in addition, it is worth noting that during these battles the most combat-ready formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were defeated.

By the beginning of 2015, the militia managed to quite tightly surround the Ukrainian Armed Forces formations defending new terminal Donetsk airport, however, it was impossible to talk about a complete blockade, since columns of Ukrainian armored vehicles periodically broke through to the facility, transporting weapons and ammunition, as well as rotating personnel. The breakthroughs cost the Ukrainian Armed Forces large losses, which led to the fact that the command, in exchange for a temporary cessation of shelling of Donetsk, agreed with the militia to carry out a rotation of personnel in December 2014. The new terminal and control tower of the airport rose above the terrain, which allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to effectively correct artillery fire on the terrain. It is worth noting that the previous assaults on the airport, in the fall-winter of 2014, were repulsed primarily thanks to the artillery support that the “cyborgs” received from Peski and Avdievka, which were actually the support plates in the defense of the facility. However, during the autumn battles, the militia managed to get as close as possible to the enemy, which significantly hampered artillery support from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is worth noting that the airport was defended by the most trained and motivated units of the Ukrainian army from the 80th airmobile, 93rd mechanized brigades. General leadership in the sector was carried out by the commander of the 93rd mechanized brigade Oleg Mikats; a key role in the defense of the new terminal itself was played by the unit of the 90th airmobile battalion of the 81st air assault brigade. In general, in the sector the Ukrainian side had a numerical superiority over the VSN.

The proximity of the airport to the city limits of Donetsk created favorable conditions for artillery strikes on residential areas of the city, which made the capture of the facility a priority for the VSN. In addition, the capture of the airport was necessary for moral reasons; repeated unsuccessful attempts to storm and constant shelling did not help raise the morale of the DPR population. The most trained units of the republic were brought in to storm the airport - the Sparta battalions under the command of A. Pavlov (Motorola), Somalia under the command of M. Tolstykh (Givi), the Vostok unit, as well as the formation of Russian volunteers from the Chechen Republic. Before the start of the assault, it was possible to form a powerful artillery fist to support it. Electronic intelligence means established control over radio communications of the Ukrainian side. Electronic warfare units were also prepared for the operation, and during the assault they were able to suppress the communication of the “cyborgs” defending the terminal with the command. The fighters of the assault groups carefully worked out interactions during the assault in advance.

The assault began on the evening of January 13, the first thing the attackers did was to bring down the control tower with tank shots, depriving the Ukrainians of their observation post. At the same time, the VSN artillery began counter-battery combat against previously reconnoitred targets. The most unexpected thing for the Ukrainian side was the use of a UR-77 demining installation, the so-called “Snake of Gorynych”, during the assault on the terminal. Subsequently, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will announce the use of a new type of MLRS “Cheburashka”, which does not exist in sight. Apparently, the experience of Geletey, who announced nuclear strike at the Lugansk airport, turned out to be contagious. This installation was used to destroy fortified enemy
positions during the storming of Grozny in the First Chechen War. Engineering ammunition equivalent to over 2 tons of TNT led to a partial collapse of the new terminal building, while VSN tanks fired at the firing points. Under the cover of fire, assault groups burst into the terminal and began clearing it. In close combat, grenades, overhead explosive charges, and Cheremukha tear gas were actively used. The first floor was captured relatively quickly, then, after the loss of the effect of surprise, the advance began slowly but surely. In fact, already on the first day of the assault, the “cyborgs” were driven into a mousetrap and their defeat was only a matter of time. With the help of electronic warfare, communications between Ukrainian units were paralyzed.

The outcome of the battle for the terminal was essentially decided not inside the building, but on the adjacent territory; the Ukrainian side immediately threw units supported by armored vehicles into battle. However, this time the VSN artillery outplayed its Ukrainian counterparts in all respects and most of the attacks failed even before direct contact with the enemy.

On January 14, Denis Pushilin announced full control over the airport, but these statements turned out to be premature. The fighting inside the terminal continued, the Ukrainian Armed Forces constantly threw new units into battle from the direction of Peskov and Avdeevka. Attempts to relieve the blockade were unsuccessful. Losses in armored vehicles in the summer of 2014 forced the Ukrainian command to send personnel to attack with the support of MT-LB lightly armored tractors, which were not intended for combat operations at all. Ukrainian soldiers and equipment found themselves in open space where they were shot from all types of weapons, including MLRS. Unable to get into the new terminal, the Ukrainian command took out its anger on the residents of Donetsk. It was during these days that the city was subjected to the most intense artillery shelling, which led to numerous casualties and destruction in the Kuibyshevsky district of the city. Even the Uragan MLRS were used during the shelling. Subsequently, these attacks will play a very cruel joke on the captured “cyborgs”.

On January 17, Right Sector units entered the battle, specially arriving in Sands to unblock the airport. The PS command announced that they managed to go 2 kilometers deeper into Donetsk, but this remained just boastful chatter. In total, up to an infantry battalion took part in the attack with the support of 15 tanks. In general, the advertised attack on the new terminal was not crowned with success - in general, it was naive to expect that with the forces of 15 tanks and an infantry battalion it would be possible to take an object that last days cleared by at least comparable forces.

On January 18, due to high losses, the Ukrainian command changed tactics, this time the strike group attacked from the direction of the village of Spartak and managed to achieve some successes, in particular, they managed to catch three VSN tanks that were without ammunition and destroy them. However, in general, the VSN command responded quite quickly to the sudden counterattack; a counter battle ensued in the area of ​​the Putilov Bridge, during which 1 Ukrainian tank was destroyed, 2 more were confirmed and captured. Several Ukrainian tank crews were captured. However, under the cover of tanks, a column of the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to break through to the terminal, transfer reinforcements and take out some of the wounded “cyborgs.” Despite the doom of their resistance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters continued to resist in the new terminal.

By January 20, significant losses forced the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to form combined units from various units and even types of troops. In particular, military personnel of the 160th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, as well as units from the 25th Transport Aviation Brigade, were thrown into battle as infantry. Units of the 25th Airborne Inspectorate Brigade were also sent as a “fire brigade” to the breakthrough, but again suffered significant losses. The shooting of a column of the 90th airmobile battalion "Zhitomir" became a symbol of the helplessness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the eve of the operation, the commander
Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Kuzminykh, who took part in hostilities from the very beginning of the ATO, was appointed to the battalion. Having received the task of breaking the blockade, the lieutenant colonel personally led the unit, which advanced to the new terminal with 3 (!) units of armored vehicles. It is worth noting that one vehicle out of three did not belong to the 90th battalion, but to the 57th motorized infantry brigade. The shortage of armored vehicles in the Armed Forces of Ukraine forced the command to confiscate equipment from some units in favor of others. In the fog, the column lost its orientation and went straight to the position of the Somalia battalion, where it was shot, one armored personnel carrier was damaged, but managed to escape, 2 armored vehicles were destroyed. A total of 9 people were killed, another 8, including the battalion commander, were captured. It was Lieutenant Colonel Kuzminykh and his subordinates that Givi fed the Ukrainian Armed Forces' chevrons in the presence of television cameras. In fact, this was the last attempt to break through to the still defending “cyborgs”.

On January 21, the third floor of the terminal was destroyed by overhead charges, which were placed by sappers who were part of the assault groups. In fact, the resistance of the “cyborgs” ceased. A dozen and a half fighters were captured. De facto, control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was still maintained only in the vicinity of the airport, which allowed the command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to still make statements that the airport was holding, although in reality the key points had already been lost, and the front was now passing in an arc - Peski-Opytnoye is part of the air defense system-Avdeevka, where in essence there was a struggle for positions from which attempts had previously been made to break through to the terminals. Data on losses leaked to the Svidomo press generally confirmed the data of the DPR that in recent days, in the battles for the airport and adjacent villages, the enemy had lost several hundred people killed, wounded and captured, and the hospitals of south-eastern Ukraine were now filled with wounded soldiers. In fact, the airport was taken on January 21, 2015, but the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine denied the obvious fact for another week, despite not even reporting by Evgeniy Poddubny’s film crew from the new terminal.

However, fighting continued in the vicinity of the airport. The Armed Forces of Ukraine continued to control part of the air defense, Peski and part of Avdeevka, where units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine got stuck in street battles. The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in rage threw more and more reserves into battle, trying to return the object, which had become a symbol of the military valor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, the attacks did not bring results; Ukrainian units, finding themselves in open space, came under heavy artillery fire, while suffering heavy losses in personnel and equipment. So on January 22 alone, the 25th Airborne Inspectorate Brigade, according to official data, lost 12 people killed. Large losses in personnel undermined the spirit of the Ukrainian troops, and it got to the point that even elite formations refused to go on the attack. The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in its usual manner, decided to take revenge on the civilian population, inflicting massive artillery strikes on residential areas. These days, the number of civilian deaths in Donetsk, Gorlovka and Dokuchaevsk exceeded 100 people. In fact, a war crime of enormous gravity was being committed before the eyes of the world community, but the leaders Western countries turned a blind eye to this, preferring these days to participate in the “I am Charlie” campaign.

On January 25, the Armed Forces of Ukraine formations retreated from the radar building, which in fact ended the battle for the airport. Until January 29, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine brazenly claimed to hold the airport, while denying massive losses. DPR units failed to capture Peski and Avdievka, intensive fighting in which they continued until the end of February, and continue to this day with less intensity. The location of Ukrainian Armed Forces artillery batteries in Piski and Avdeevka still maintains the threat of shelling of residential areas of Donetsk.

The Ukrainian side’s data on losses incurred in the battles for the airport look frankly ridiculous. According to official data, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost about 50 servicemen killed or captured during the fighting. In fact, there were more than 30 prisoners alone. The list of those killed contains the names of 130 military personnel, but these are also clearly underestimated figures. Among the wounded from the Ukrainian Armed Forces was even the head of the Right Sector, D. Yarosh, who received a shrapnel wound while attempting to unblock the airport. Unlike previous unsuccessful assaults, the sides actually changed places; if earlier the militias attacking the airport found themselves under heavy artillery fire in the open, now, after the capture of the terminal, Ukrainian Armed Forces units found themselves in their position. During the battles for the airport, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost at least 6 tanks, 13 infantry fighting vehicles, 7 armored personnel carriers, 5 BMDs, 9 MT-LBs, 2S9 Nona self-propelled guns, 2 BRDMs, as well as 2 units of engineering armored vehicles. Another 4 tanks, 2 armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD and MT-LB went to the VSN as trophies. Thanks to a more competent organization of combat operations, the losses of the VSN were several times lower. By the end of the day on January 20, the command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could save the lives of four dozen of its soldiers locked in the terminal by giving the order to withdraw. From time to time, individual armored vehicles managed to break through to the terminal, which indicates the possibility of hidden withdrawal of personnel at night. However, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine chose to sacrifice the lives of its soldiers in exchange for the myth of the impregnable fortress-DAP.

The victory of the DPR units at the airport was the result of qualitative growth in the organization of the republic’s armed forces. During the assault on DAP, yesterday's militias turned into well-organized mobile assault groups, reinforced by sappers. During the battles, overhead charges were cleverly used to make breaches and destroy the premises where the “cyborgs” were hiding. Thermal imagers were used in large quantities. During the battles, the interaction between assault groups and artillery, as well as tanks, which were effectively used to suppress enemy firing points, was well organized. Separately, it is worth mentioning the work of the artillerymen. “The God of War” is one of the key factors in the war in Donbass. The VSN artillerymen were able to outplay their opponents from the Armed Forces of Ukraine in all respects, competently conducted counter-battery combat and provided fire support to the assault groups. It was the barrage artillery fire that thwarted most of the attacks The Ukrainian Armed Forces largely decided the outcome of the confrontation, thereby leveling the enemy’s numerical superiority in the sector. In fact, those who stormed the Vostok, Sparta and Somalia airport were no longer irregular militia formations, they were rather elite assault units of regular troops. It must be admitted that such qualitative growth did not affect all formations of the VSN; the most trained units of the republic took part in the assault on the airport. The regular army was still far away, and the subsequent operation near Debaltsevo revealed many problems in the military development of the republics. However, the battles for the airport ended in complete victory for the DPR units. The facility, which had been a bone in the throat of the republic for many months, was occupied; in addition, during the fighting, the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were bled dry; the death of the cyborgs seriously demoralized Ukrainian society. The capture of the airport was perhaps the largest moral victory of the Ukrainian Armed Forces over the enemy. It was a kind of revenge for defeat during the first unsuccessful assault on May 26, 2014, when dozens of fighters died, including 35 volunteers from Russia. The myth of invincible "cyborgs" was dispelled.

SOLDIER'S TRUTH. "TERMINAL"

I don’t remember why, I didn’t include some episodes of that day in the general video about the clearing of the new terminal of the Donetsk airport on January 15, 2015. After all, some of them were quite significant for me. And not only for me. For example, when we were driving an armored vehicle into the lower floor of the old terminal, we, those who were sitting on the armor, namely the operator from some channel, Motorola and me, were almost smeared across this very armor by the interfloor ceiling. Probably, the events that followed somehow forced this episode out of my memory.


I’ll probably introduce some of the heroes of this issue of Soldatskaya Pravda.
"Motorola"

"Vokha"

"Sailor"

"Prapor"
This AKA, Prapor still took it and even crept up to aim somewhere. But a fighter came up and said:
- Uncle, this is my machine gun. Give it back please...
I had to return it)

I was very surprised to meet Mikhail Galustyan, who turned out to be a Spartan fighter with the call sign “Gnome”

But I still don’t know what call sign this citizen had

Voha, I think he probably knows him)

We went back with Gramm Phillips

That day I only suffered a slight scare and a scratched finger.

But the sniper who was with us was less fortunate

Well, and of course the mortar crew, whose actions cause shock and awe not only among their potential opponents)

Well, and the movie itself:

Here is more information about what happened in the footage of that day

Original taken from u_96 in Battles for Donetsk airport or “There is nothing left to defend!..” (c)


A view from Kyiv:

Yuri Butusov.

BATTLE FOR DONETSK AIRPORT. WHAT HAPPENED, REASONS AND RESULTS

So, the heroic defense of the new and old terminals of Donetsk airport ended after 242 days. There is nothing left to defend. The $200 million terminal remains in tattered ruins. The remaining wounded defenders were captured. According to Censor.Net, in the battles for the airport in the new terminal and in the vicinity of the airport on January 16-22, the death of 23 Ukrainian soldiers, including one Georgian citizen, was reliably confirmed - their bodies were taken to morgues. 16 servicemen were captured. The fate of at least 11 fighters has not been established - participants in the battle say that he could have remained under the rubble of the last fortifications of the new terminal. Volunteers are trying to organize the search for bodies. It is possible that the list of losses is not final.

What happened? Censor.Net analyzed the situation from the point of view of military tactics and the circumstances known to us.

Tactical situation

First of all, you need to understand what positions at the airport are. This is a completely open area where you can only take observation positions in individual buildings. These buildings cannot be held by large forces, since with the concentration of forces they become a convenient target for artillery and tanks, and large losses are inevitable. Therefore, initially the defense of the airport was a chain of separate observation posts that called for fire support if necessary. Our forces in the airport buildings never amounted to more than 100-120 fighters scattered across points. But most importantly, these observation posts adjusted artillery fire. It was the artillery that made it possible to confidently hold the airport observation posts. The second important factor was armored vehicles. The greatest threat to the airport defenders was the attacks of enemy tanks, which were aimed at direct fire. The tank is mobile, it is difficult to cover it with artillery. Therefore, 2 tanks and several infantry fighting vehicles for anti-tank defense were concentrated at the airport. After the enemy began to attack our armored vehicles in the new terminal with new anti-tank guided missiles, our command changed the support scheme. A tank unit was stationed in Sands, which always kept 3-4 tanks in constant readiness. To suppress enemy firing points and observation points, and to repel tank attacks, our tanks quickly moved out of Sand.
From the outskirts of Pesok to the new terminal is approximately 2 kilometers. This is the shortest way. But ours could also provide support from the base in Opytny - this is about 3 kilometers away. The distance is small. But the problem is that both the path from Peski and the path from Opytnyy were well controlled by the enemy. For direct fire from a tank, 2 kilometers is not a problem.
Thus, we held our position at the airport primarily due to the interaction of artillery and armored vehicles with the defenders of the airport buildings, and due to the ability to immediately provide support with reserves. But complicating factors were pressure from the flanks.

Autumn assaults

Beginning in September, the main losses of the airport defenders came from artillery shelling of our support forces in Peski, and from the columns that broke through to the new terminal.
Russian troops tried to attack the airport head-on, but the actions of the assault groups did not bring success to the enemy. The control tower and new terminal dominated the area, and our spotters immediately called in fire as small groups were cut down time after time by the terminal's defenders. It was impossible to hide in open areas; finding an assault group in open areas meant its destruction. The attacks stopped in October, as all the assault troops of the Russian mercenaries were gradually knocked out.
A big role was played by the fact that the defense in September-October was led by the officer of the 3rd special forces regiment, Colonel T., and the backbone of the defense were 30 professional special forces. The 3rd Regiment defended the airport from the very beginning, since May, and thoroughly knew the terrain and infrastructure of the airport, which gave great advantages over the enemy.
Since our units were not reinforced, we had to leave the buildings that stood near the new terminal - the hotel, the old terminal, and the new terminal became the advanced one.

It is more convenient to attack from Donetsk and the suburbs of Veseloye and Spartak airport than from Peski and Opytnoye. Enemy observation posts are equipped in high-rise buildings; it is possible to reach the attack line, hiding behind green spaces among private houses. Therefore, gradually our units began to abandon the individual buildings closest to Vesely - it was impossible to hold them, since the flanks were open. But it was then impossible to transfer additional infantry forces to the airport.
The Ukrainian command chose a more passive tactic of action - it was decided to abandon active operations and simply hold the wing of the new terminal, the control tower and a number of other observation points. Despite the fact that in November the reserves were restored and it became possible to strengthen our positions in the airport area, the ATO command did not take any measures. The political factor of “truces” and “ceasefire” constantly constrained the initiative of the Ukrainian command at the operational-tactical level, and constantly had a negative impact on tactics. It is obvious that the ATO command did not adequately assess the situation.
As a result, in October the enemy began to change tactics. The enemy began advancing on the flanks. Russian forward posts were deployed in the area of ​​the monastery near Pesok and in the village of Spartak. Russian troops began to reinforce these positions with tanks and anti-tank weapons. At the same time, in November, the enemy abandoned the assaults, and trench warfare began at the airport. The Russians occupied individual buildings, and instead of attacking, they began to try to infiltrate the buildings around the new terminal, and then into the new terminal itself, waging a war of snipers and spotters, short raids and shelling from tanks.
Many Ukrainian officers and analysts pointed out to the Ukrainian command the danger of the developing situation at the airport. It was obvious that a threatening situation was developing. It was possible to hold the airport only if we could strengthen our units in the new terminal and protect the new terminal from enemy penetration, and - most importantly, if the flank positions and buildings from which the enemy was conducting observation and direct fire on the columns that were moving forward were taken under control from Pesky and Experienced. But the Ukrainian command did not take any measures.

Muzhenko's intrigues and disorganization of battle management

The defense of the airport in September was carried out under the command of the commander of the operational command “South” and sector “B” Ruslan Khomchak. However, on September 15, the General Staff removed Khomchak from direct control and appointed General Dovgan, Khomchak’s deputy, as sector commander. At the same time, Khomchak’s headquarters, which was created from experienced personnel qualified officers back in peacetime, and controlled the situation in the DA from the very beginning of hostilities, continued to manage operations in the airport area. But in December, Muzhenko decided for some reason (why? obviously out of jealousy of Khomchak) to completely remove OK “Yug” from command and disband it. And at the beginning of January, all the officers who had led the battles at the airport since July were removed and were assigned to form new mobilized units. The General Staff formed the new headquarters of sector “B” as a combined team that does not have coherence and does not have so much experience.
But even this improvised headquarters... removed Muzhenko from command of operations at the Donetsk airport right before the start of the attack on January 17! This seems absurd, but it is true.
On January 16, Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko personally took over the leadership of the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Donetsk airport. Muzhenko removed the head of sector “B”, General Dovgan, from commanding troops in the airport area. The Chief of the General Staff did not issue a written order, but his decision can easily be confirmed by all participants in the events.
The headquarters of OK "Yug" controlled all actions for the defense of Donetsk airport from April to December 2014, and in these battles our troops were able to repel attacks even in difficult conditions in September-October. The removal of the most experienced senior officers of the OK "South" to control the artillery had especially serious consequences.
On January 18 I wrote https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/915147548525542?pnref=story :

“Petro Poroshenko, stop showing off, take Muzhenko from the airport, don’t interfere with the headquarters doing their job!
Since the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave the order to hold the airport, the leadership of the operation at the airport was personally taken over by... Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko. Other officials rushed there after him. What a circus this is... The Chief of the General Staff is an absolutely unnecessary person at the command post at this moment. The sector headquarters is working, the headquarters of two brigades are working - well, why are you bothering to command? Well, you’re superfluous there, you’re only getting in the way of managing the battle, you’re just asking unnecessary stupid questions. You don’t really know the people or the situation, you’ve never been to Sands, why, why, in the midst of a battle, confuse control and interfere with work?
And all for the sake of personally reporting to “First”!
And Pyotr Alekseevich does not see anything strange that the Chief of the General Staff, under whose command there are 220 thousand military personnel, and all the armed forces, carries out the tasks of the brigade commander - or rather, prevents the brigade commanders from completing their tasks. What can Muzhenko do there that the brigade commander of the 93rd Mikats, who has been fighting at the airport for SIX months without a break, has not thought through a hundred times already?
Mr. President, it was because of Muzhenko’s inaction that the situation at the airport became critical. It was the Chief of the General Staff, instead of adequately responding to the advance of Russian troops, who forbade the troops from any maneuvers. It was he who gave the order to go on rotation through the Motorola checkpoint. It was he who waited for two days for the next push to allow the troops to act.
The commander-in-chief again looks like a man who only needs PR, not results. The responsibilities of the National General Staff do not include solving tactical problems. But it includes solving operational issues - preparing mobilization, sending reserves, actions in the other four sectors of the front. But Muzhenko again blamed all these uninteresting strategic issues on someone else, and ran off to command not the army, but companies and batteries.
The person who, together with Nazarov and Pushnyakov, must be responsible by law for Il-76, for the Girkin corridor in Slavyansk, for sector “D”, Ilovaisk, for the 32nd checkpoint, must plow and fulfill his duties, and not give up everything , abandon the completely ill-considered mobilization, and again try to get in with a joyful report to “First”.
Petr Alekseevich, either put the fool in his place, or stop commenting on the situation at the airport - such “soviet” PR hinders the army and discredits the command in front of the officers. at least take him to Kyiv - so that he stops distracting him, at least help him with this.
I am very afraid that a man who curries favor with the president and tries to constantly report on his fictitious achievements is again bossing people around. Wonderful people who, with their heroism and skill, compensate for the complete inadequacy of the Chief of the General Staff.”

January assault. Repetition of the tragedy of the 32nd checkpoint

The battle for the new terminal was lost by the ATO command even before the assault began. We kept the new terminal completely surrounded only thanks to the heroism of the soldiers and commanders. I wrote about this on January 8 and warned about the threat:

https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/909950945711869
"...The ATO command did not plan or take any active actions. Even when the 79th and 95th brigades were transferred to the airport, and there were already quite enough forces in the Sand area, the order to expand the corridor was not received. The enemy held observation of a section of the road that our troops did not control (although there were plenty of forces in that area), and simply brazenly and boldly violated the terms of the peace agreements, moving to a position in our rear. This situation was even obvious by analogy with the 32nd block. post, but there was no reaction from the command.

Under the cover of a “truce,” the enemy, taking advantage of the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian command, achieved serious tactical success - they intercepted our communications, and if the situation escalates, the enemy received a serious tactical advantage, now our units at the airport are threatened with real complete encirclement.”

No action was taken.

After the enemy took control of the flanks, Russian troops entrenched themselves in the Peski area in the monastery, from where the road from the village to the terminal was clearly visible. And the enemy controlled the road from Opytnye from Spartak. Enemy units, taking advantage of the ceasefire, took positions in the wing of the new terminal and in the old terminal, and entrenched themselves. This made it possible to control the supply of reinforcements to the new terminal, and allowed the enemy to avoid risk when advancing to the attack line. Our artillery could not hit the enemy, who was in the same building as our units.

Unfortunately, the enemy’s tactics of destroying our 32nd checkpoint were completely repeated. During the “truce”, the enemy carried out envelopment from the flanks, and after carrying out the maneuver, provoked hostilities in an area convenient for him. The enemy then concentrated fire to destroy our observation posts. The complete destruction of the airport control tower was key. This tower provided the Ukrainian troops with an important tactical advantage - it allowed them to visually control the entire road from Peski to the new terminal. The destruction of the tower now gave an advantage to the Russian troops, who, during the truce, had set up an observation post in the monastery near Peski, and now its belfry became the highest-altitude object in this zone, allowing the enemy to control the situation.

As soon as the operation to encircle the new terminal was completed, on January 15 the enemy immediately provoked military clashes and began an attack on the new terminal.

Since the enemy took advantageous positions, it was impossible to hold the new terminal. It was no longer possible to think about whether it was worth carrying out the operation or not. It was necessary to act immediately - either immediately withdraw our units from the new terminal, or attack the enemy in the area of ​​​​the monastery near Peski and in Spartak in order to secure the flanks.

Alas, the actions of the ATO command and the General Staff, especially starting from January 16, when Muzhenko, for political reasons, took personal control of the battle, were a continuous series of mistakes and misunderstandings. Having a large group of forces in the airport area, which was not only not inferior, but even superior to the opposing enemy forces, Muzhenko did not take any serious measures to correct the threatening situation.

Having taken command personally and having completely removed the commander of sector “B” and all officers of OK “South” from control, the Chief of the General Staff simply did not have the opportunity to adequately assess the situation. Muzhenko did not even try to find out what the real capabilities of the specific units and units that he planned to throw into battle were.

Despite the long “truce,” the General Staff did not even prepare a plan for an attack on Spartak and the monastery. The attack on January 17 was a complete improvisation - and poorly prepared.

For some reason, Muzhenko did not involve trained reserves in offensive operations - the 1st and 13th battalions of the 95th brigade, the 79th brigade, and other proven units. The strike groups for the attack on January 17 were put together in a hurry, literally within 24 hours. The 2nd battalion-tactical group of the 93rd mechanized brigade, the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade, small units of the 81st, 80th, airmobile and 17th tank brigades, the 74th reconnaissance battalion, the 3rd regiment were involved special forces, engineering regiment. Most of the tactical reconnaissance tasks in Spartak and in the Peski area in the interests of the 93rd Brigade were carried out by Right Sector reconnaissance groups - this indicates the level of organization of military reconnaissance in the ground forces, which is completely dependent on the initiative of volunteers.

The Chief of the General Staff grossly violated the requirements of the “Manual on the operational work of military command and control bodies” because he did not issue written orders that would indicate the intent and plan of the operation. This made it impossible to establish effective coordination of troops.

And this is a crime for the suspect Muzhenko.

The most serious consequences were that Muzhenko had no idea about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

It should be noted here that since the General Staff is not seriously involved in combat training of troops, and is not involved in putting together strike units of constant readiness, the fighting qualities of different units are very different, and in the same brigade, and even in the same company, there can be subunits and groups of fighters with high combat effectiveness, and completely incapacitated. There are people who will complete a task at any cost, there are people who are poorly prepared and can complete tasks only if events develop favorably, and there are people who are not motivated and can disrupt the task. A commander who understands this, when setting a combat mission, personally determines the composition of the unit to which he entrusts combat work. To make sure everyone doesn't flinch.

Given the severity of the crisis, the General Staff was obliged to bring up large forces and the best strike units to relieve the airport blockade - for this Muzhenko had at least two weeks!

The entire brigade is in reserve at the General Staff, but it was not even redeployed to the airport from the rear.

Detail - the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade, which fought bravely at the airport, was formed from volunteers, motivated people, but got to the front only during a calm period, and did not have time to gain serious combat experience. In the 93rd mechanized brigade, a tank battalion, which had several excellent tank crews who were well familiar with the situation and had extensive combat experience, was sent to Kharkov for replenishment literally on the eve of the aggravation of the situation.

The officers told Censor.Net how the meeting took place, where Muzhenko set the task for the troops. Everything was very short. The NGSH pointed its finger at the map, which milestones need to be reached, and who should perform. He did not ask the opinions of the officers, he did not inquire about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

No attention was paid to the interaction of the units, nor to the procedure to be followed in the event of Russian troops interfering with our communications, which regularly happened at the airport - significant forces of Russian electronic warfare units are concentrated there.

So, on January 17, the task was set - one group had to take the monastery near Peski. And then, advance to the hotel on the airport grounds, and thus cut off the enemy from the new terminal. The second group is to make a deep bypass of the microdistrict where Donspetsstroy is located, and going out to the Volvo auto center, enter the suburbs of Donetsk in order to cut off the transfer of enemy reserves. The third is to hit the village of Spartak from Avdeevka, and go to the Putilov interchange - the main communication hub and gate to Donetsk airport for armored vehicles.

The concept of the operation contained deep errors; the plan simply did not take into account the real situation and the capabilities of the troops. Muzhenko doesn’t know the troops. He personally communicates only with those commanders whom he likes, but in general he has a very poor understanding of the real state of the armed forces. Therefore, having set the task of moving to the attack area, he did not inquire about how many fighters the commanders could actually gather for an attack, how many combat vehicles they actually had that could support the attack? And for the Ukrainian army with old equipment and large quantity hastily mobilized people are important issues. The answers to which the commander must know BEFORE the battle. The head of the General Staff had a lot of time to put together fully combat-ready groups near the airport, in view of the threatening actions of the enemy. But none of this was done.

First of all, Muzhenko did not create serious strike groups to carry out an operation with such broad goals. The attack on the monastery was carried out by a company-tactical group based on the 6th company of the 93rd brigade, which consisted entirely of volunteers, most of whom were former Donbass fighters. The company was reinforced by 8 tanks and 8 infantry fighting vehicles, which had never interacted with the company before and only became acquainted before the attack.

The same small forces were concentrated in other directions. Commanding 230 thousand military personnel, the Chief of the General Staff on all three directions of attack on January 17 concentrated a group for the relief of the blockade, which did not exceed 500 fighters hastily assembled from different units.

At the same time, these groups were again drawn from different units, had poorly trained and poorly motivated crews and units, and were not provided with intelligence data. The task was set completely inadequately.

Yes, there were problems with the armored vehicles on the day of the attack, yes, the technical condition leaves much to be desired. But wasn't this known before the operation began? Was there anything that prevented the General Staff from concentrating the required amount of military equipment and ensuring overwhelming superiority in forces?

Muzhenko’s biggest mistake was that he did not concentrate reserves to develop success, consolidate, and support shock units.

The most egregious thing in the activities of the Chief of the General Staff was that he once again completely ignored intelligence data. A drone of the SOS Army volunteer movement operated at the airport, but due to the fact that these volunteers criticized the General Staff for incompetence, reconnaissance data from the drone was simply not taken into account and was not used throughout the entire period of the battle.

However, there could be no grounds for such a superficial underestimation of the enemy. The Russian detachments at the airport had fully combat-ready units, including armored vehicles and artillery, electronic warfare and electronic warfare equipment. The Kremlin detachments were inferior to the Ukrainian group in numbers and the amount of military equipment, but they maneuvered freely and had significant firepower.

Russian units took the new terminal into the fire bag. At the same time, an attack began in the terminal itself - the enemy began to widely use sappers and undermine the walls in the terminal one after another. Massive fire and demolition charges destroyed the mines and barricades installed by our soldiers. And the enemy moved forward. Considering that the approaches to our wing of the airport were visually controlled and shot at, and enemy tanks were directly firing at our observation posts and firing points, and the delivery of reinforcements was difficult, the terminal defenders could not hold out for long. The walls have their strength - but people have withstood even more.

The attack on January 17 was risky. This was not an offensive - it was an attack at random, blindly. The fact is that the monastery was located in an open area. And to capture it, it would be convenient to act either at night or under the cover of a smoke screen. But even taking into account the urgency - anything can happen in war - large forces had to be concentrated to capture. The enemy did not concentrate large forces in the monastery itself, but it was used as a correction point, and it was supported by tanks, mortars, and other fire weapons.

Ukrainian artillery carried out preparations. However, our command forbade striking the monastery... for political reasons. Therefore, throughout the battle, the enemy could adjust the fire from the monastery with impunity.

6th company of floor volunteers to attack. The enemy put up fierce resistance. The soldiers advanced successfully, despite the fire, but unfortunately, after tanks and anti-tank weapons fired at our armored vehicles, our tanks abandoned the infantry and left the battle. The volunteers fought for 5 hours and reached the monastery. But to develop success, reserves were needed. And it was necessary to adjust artillery fire at the identified firing points, and there was a need for several tank crews who had combat experience and knew how to work with infantry.

However, Muzhenko did not provide for reserves. And the communication was jammed by Russian electronic warfare; no backup communication channels were provided. Therefore, after expending its ammunition, the 6th company had to retreat, losing 3 soldiers killed and more than 20 wounded. Attacks on the monastery by other units were also unsuccessful.

The maneuver of units of the 93rd brigade to the area of ​​the Volvo auto center initially could only be of a demonstrative nature. Muzhenko personally sent brigade commander of the 93rd Oleg Mikats to enter Donetsk with one incomplete battalion. But it was clearly impossible to capture the suburb along Stratonauts Street with such forces. And it didn't make sense. It was much more logical to entrust Mikatsu himself with the operation to capture the monastery and concentrate all available forces to clear the road from Peski to the new terminal from the enemy. Instead, Muzhenko dispersed his troops and was unable to complete a single task.

An interesting event of the day was the attack of Spartak. A small unit of the 17th Panzer and attached units attacked the village and very quickly became convinced that the enemy forces there were very insignificant. Ours passed through almost all of Spartak without resistance and were stopped, having successfully reached the goal of the operation - the Putilov interchange. A battle broke out in this area - at least one tank of the Russian mercenaries was destroyed, and ours also lost at least one vehicle. Our units stopped at the junction. After this, they were attacked by enemy reserves - up to 10-15 units of armored vehicles. Russian crews have a good level of training, but do not show much zeal. However, faced with an unfamiliar situation, without communication, and without receiving the help of reserves to consolidate at the line, our units left Spartak.

The General Staff attributed the failure of weak and uncoordinated attacks to the enemy's strong "fortified areas." But the analysis of military operations does not confirm this. Yes, there are separate shelters, yes, there are observation posts, yes, the Russians have organized a fire control scheme. But the key role in repelling weak attacks with small forces in different directions was played by simply redeployed small enemy reserves, which also did not show resilience in battle. However, enemy command at the tactical level demonstrates greater flexibility. Faced with a change in the situation and lacking communication, our units stop, stop maneuvering, and do not conduct independent reconnaissance. The enemy uses the stopping time to assess the situation, conduct additional reconnaissance, and concentrate his units for a strike in a convenient place.

At this time, the initiative of the Ukrainian units is completely constrained by the high command. If the Chief of the General Staff himself commands companies, then one cannot expect a quick reaction from him. Because it is not companies that fight, but brigades and formations. If Muzhenko had been involved in management at the operational level, and freed the initiative to tactical commanders, combat operations would have had a fundamentally different character.

The fact is that the enemy did not have sufficient forces and means to repel a coordinated attack on the monastery and Spartak.

And we could easily complete the combat mission. We were stopped simply by illiterate command, an illiterate assessment of the situation, an inability to react to changes in the situation, and an inability to manage available forces.

The attacks on January 17 distracted the enemy and provided a respite for the terminal, where fierce close-range fighting continued. The wounded and dead were evacuated, and reinforcements were brought in.

But the situation has not changed. And it became clear that if forces were not gathered to repeat the attack on the same directions, the terminal would be lost very quickly.

For the fate of the terminal, January 17 was as desperate and poorly thought out a rescue operation as the attempt to deliver the convoy on October 15 to the 32nd checkpoint.

During the last days of defense, thick fog appeared. This change in weather conditions was predicted by weather forecasters, but Muzhenko did not react to this forecast. The fog meant that either we or the enemy would use it for active actions. The fog made it difficult to adjust artillery fire using ATGMs, and now the maneuver of mechanized units in the airport area could be carried out more covertly. The concentration of well-coordinated and trained troops, equipped with thermal imagers and secure communications, could lead to the occupation of key positions around the airport in the event of an attack. But Muzhenko did not develop such an operation. It became clear that if we were passive, the enemy would take advantage of the fog. Because the fog allowed the enemy to approach the new terminal.

The coincidence with the 32nd checkpoint became even greater when our small unit was sent by order of Muzhenko in complete fog to the new terminal, but was not provided with thermal imagers or even a basic navigator. Having lost orientation in the dense fog, our soldiers drove deeper into
enemy positions. 7 soldiers were killed, 8 were captured.

Starting from January 17, the new terminal held up only thanks to the incredible heroism of the defenders and the enthusiasm of volunteers.

And thanks to Ukrainian artillery, which the enemy is truly afraid of.

After the failure of the relief blockade on January 17, Muzhenko was obliged to either evacuate the fighters from the new terminal or immediately organize a new attack. But instead, as always, when the General Staff drove our units into another cauldron, except for the order “Hold on!” Muzhenko made no decisions.

After the enemy blew up the last room at the airport and the fall of the last wall, in the early morning of January 22, the last small group of our fighters left the ruins of the terminal, in which there were no longer any walls left that could be defended. They could not carry 8 seriously wounded with them, and take away the bodies of the dead and those remaining under the rubble.

For Ukraine, the defense of the airport is of the same importance as the Battle of Valmy was for France in 1792. Different countries, different situations, different revolutions. But there is only one meaning - it is proof of the defense capability and vitality of the new free nation.
And all this is not in vain - not a single drop of blood. The war continues. And the fact that we left the ruins of the new terminal does not change anything at all in the military strategy. The fight continues, and for the sake of the memory of those who fought to the end in the new terminal, we will fight and we will win.
But we must finally work on the mistakes. Because in the spring the steppes of Donbass will be covered with greenery, opportunities for covert movement and maneuver will appear, and hostilities will continue.
We need to build the army - as a system, as an institution, as a mechanism. And when we build an army, the time for victories will come. I’m telling you this not as a journalist, but as an amateur military history- this has happened more than once.
War is a clash of systems. We have many magnificent people bringing victory closer at the front and in the rear, there are millions of us, and every day we fight for freedom more consistently and systematically.
The Ukrainian army has learned to fight - now it’s time for us to learn to win.
But it was soldiers, not generals, who learned to fight, and we pay for this science with a lot of blood and great grief. We must honor the memory of the heroes and never repeat the mistakes. We must make sure that we no longer have to give the lives of our best patriots and wonderful people for these lessons...

I ask all politicians, volunteers, citizens to unite in their demands to President Poroshenko and the Verkhovna Rada - to finally establish a competent system of military command, immediately remove those responsible for the losses of the generals - Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko, as well as other persons responsible for the operation, and immediately conduct an investigation. The tragedies of the new terminal of the Donetsk airport, the 32nd checkpoint, the 31st checkpoint occur only because no one has yet been convicted and the responsibility of the leadership of the General Staff and the ATO command for the death of the Il-76, for sector “D” has not been determined, Ilovaisk. We must force the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to either restore order and responsibility in the command of the ATO and the General Staff, or resign. Mediocrity and incompetence are the main problem of the army. And it is impossible, dear Yuri Biryukov, for volunteers to deal only with supply issues - because now we are losing lives not because of the lack of body armor, fuel and water, but because of the complete inadequacy of primitive bureaucrats for their positions, who bought themselves the shoulder straps of a colonel general with hypocrisy and deception.
The management structure, the entire useless feudal-bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, needs radical restructuring. Those people who spent 23 years making a career, and at the same time did not speak out against the collapse and sale of the army, are not able to think adequately and make decisions. Ordinary volunteers who have never encountered the army solve any issues a thousand times more effectively than the stupid and incompetent bureaucratic mafia in the defense department. We need to promote to command positions in the army those people who are not associated with the Muzhenko clan and who know how to act competently and competently. We need commanders who do not turn bronze and remain human and professional. And who are responsible for people's lives.

UPDATE: on the events of January 15-22 at the airport, Censor.Net is preparing a more detailed publication, we will write more, please clarify the details of the events from the participants in this operation, I will write in detail.

For a month now, the hottest battles have been taking place at the Donetsk airport. Mass heroism is shown by both sides - some protect, others build a road from corpses. The heroes are surrounded by a thick veil, built of lies, myths and populism. In memory of the fallen defenders, we decided to shed at least a little truth on the events and debunk the myths created in Moscow and Kyiv.

Donetsk Airport named after S.S. Prokofiev

The airfield in the city of Stalino was built on blood. The first bulldozers began to level the area under runway in 1933 - the hungriest year in the history of Ukraine. Even Russian historians who argue about Stalin’s guilt do not deny the very fact of the famine. First passenger aircraft We flew from Donetsk all the way to Starobelsk, a city in the Lugansk region, located 160 km from the airport.

In July 2011, for Euro 2012 it was built new strip, and in May 2012 - a new terminal that could handle 3,100 passengers in one hour. It was designed by the Croats and, as time has shown, they did their job well. It’s not for nothing that Kolesnikov (Minister of Transport) spent almost 7 billion hryvnia of state money, that is, 875 million dollars. The terminal is standing and can withstand hail. A lot was also stolen, but who will remember.


But even after the football championship, construction did not end. Donetsk oligarchs, like real feudal lords, cannot use a common terminal. For them, ordinary Donetsk residents are divided into two categories - servants and smerds. That's why they started building a VIP terminal. For the money of taxpayers, that is, us.

Sergei Prokofiev, after whom the airport is named, is a famous composer of the last century, born in the Donetsk region. A favorite of Stalin, his operas War and Peace and The Fiery Angel are perfectly suited to modern events.

Aerodrome

Can accommodate aircraft of any class. In 2013, it passed through 1,100,500 passengers. In addition to the charters of Akhmetov and company, a little more than a dozen airlines fly. The main directions are Kyiv and Moscow. Almost everything else is Turkish resorts. There is only one flight to Europe and beyond, to Munich. For the middle class of Donetsk feudal lords who have not yet bought a personal plane, there are also flights to Greece and the Emirates. The rest is just little things - Kutaisi, Surgut, Ashgabat, Israel. Also accepts cargo.

The first assault on Donetsk airport

After the capture of Slavyansk, a detachment of the 3rd special forces regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces arrived at the airport. The special forces were stationed in the old terminal, and the airport continued to receive and dispatch flights. In May, Khodakovsky’s detachment, called the “Vostok Battalion,” arrived in Donetsk. It included many people from the Caucasus - Chechnya, Dagestan and other places.

This is how it began...

On May 26, Khodakovsky, who, according to some sources, previously served in Alpha, held negotiations with the commander of our special forces. The conversation went something like this:

- Let's take the new terminal. So that there is no shooting and no unnecessary victims. You remain in the old terminal, you can report to your superiors that you did not give up your position. Who needs bloodshed? We will enter the working, new terminal, journalists from Russia will come and take pictures. The airport will continue to operate.

- Well, try it. We took the oath and are not going to become traitors, like some.

After this conversation, several KAMAZ trucks with militants moved towards the airport. They entered the new terminal, which contained passengers and airfield personnel. The special forces did not interfere with them so that there would be no casualties among the civilian population. The fighters first opened warning fire, which dispersed the civilians. At this time, the militants took up defensive positions and prepared to repel the attack. Then the battle began.

...and so it ended.

The militants managed to climb onto the roof and install portable air defense systems there. Ours used aviation, at least two Mi-24 helicopters and one Su-25 attack aircraft. Under the cover of smoke bombs, Khodakovsky’s militants undertook a maneuver later used by Strelkov in Slavyansk. The code name is “Set a Streak”.

They fled so quickly that at least one KAMAZ with wounded was fired upon by their own people - the militants thought that the special forces had decided to liberate all of Donetsk together with the airport. At that time, there were a lot of journalists in Donetsk, mostly Russian. They were called in to film the “bloodless surrender of Ukrainian special forces.” Most of them only knew that there would be some event at the airport that needed to be widely publicized, but they did not know the details.

Therefore, the defeat of the Vostok battalion was immortalized in thousands of photographs and videos. Such a wide response forced Khodakovsky to send a truck with a “cargo of 200” to Russia. They say that we send all the corpses of “volunteers” home so that they can be identified and buried at home.

Between May and September

After the assault, the airport stopped working for its intended purpose. The militants realized that they were too tough to compete with the special forces and no longer made any serious attempts to attack. Kirovograd residents easily coped with attacks carried out by militants from time to time.

Infographics General plan Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

1 - military unit A1428 air defense; 2 - Plant and base of the company that built the new terminal;

3 - military unit A1402, also air defense. The names of settlements and directions of roads are signed. All of them, except Gorlovka, are controlled by the Ukrainian Army.

Then another significant event followed - the embodiment of the age-old aspirations of lovers of the “Russian world”. The Metro supermarket, located as if on neutral territory, was completely looted. After this episode, support for the DPR sharply increased from local population. Dreams come true.

But the special forces had a hard time. At times there were problems with supply and removal of the wounded, and snipers worked against them.

Russian invasion and the situation at Donetsk airport

Fighting activity increased ahead of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on August 10 and went into full force on the morning of August 24. Offers to surrender and irregular shelling followed. The special forces responded with dense targeted fire and the most popular words from the Russian language. The Kirovograd group was reinforced by other troops.

Infographics detailed plan of Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

1 - Monastery; 2 - Metro Supermarket; 3 - Toyon/Lexus Auto Center; 4 - New terminal; 5 - Bus station; 6 - Oil depot; 7 - Cemetery of old aircraft; 8 - VIP terminal under construction; 9 - Hangars; 10 - Control tower (located outside the plan); 11 - Old terminal; 12 - Operating VIP terminal; 13 - Donbassaero Control Center; 14 - Hotel "Polet"; 15 - Headquarters civil aviation; 16 - Aviation repair center; 17 - Boiler room; 18 - Command and control tower.

Objects that are not related to the airport infrastructure are outlined in blue.

The DPR militia began shelling the airport with artillery on August 20. Until this date, fire was directed at Marinka and Avdeevka, the largest populated areas controlled by Ukrainian troops near Donetsk. After this date, the shelling did not stop.

First full-scale assault

The first serious assault on the airport took place on the night of September 1, simultaneously with the attack on Lugansk airport. In Lugansk, our military left the airfield, or rather, the ruins that remained of it. This object was behind enemy lines; there was no point in holding the buildings destroyed to the ground.

This is how they see it from Moscow

Regular Russian units, reinforced by DPR militants, went on the assault. Artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were in use. Tanks and other armored vehicles were used. But the defenders managed to repel this attempt, like all the others.

Other attempts

The DPR announced assault attempts on September 28, October 2, 3 and 6. After which they announced the capture of the airport. In fact, assault attempts were made every day from September 1st until October 7th, when this article is being written. There is some truth in the dates mentioned by the militants. It was on September 28 that the militants made their first assault attempt, in which the Russian military did not take part. At least as part of the assault squads.

Approximate front line

Tactics changed, more and more units were brought in, but the result was always the same - mountains of corpses. The attacker always suffers greater losses than the defender, especially if the positions are prepared, there is artillery support and reconnaissance is active.

Heroes of Donetsk airport

On both sides there is mass heroism. Every day there are killed and wounded, but no one is going to give up their plans. Those who believe that there are only heroes on one side, whatever it may be, should think about it. If you minimize the strength and heroism of your enemy, you minimize the cost of your victory or defeat.

Defenders

At first, the airport was defended only by special forces. In August they were reinforced by units of the 93rd OMBR, 17th TBR, DUK Right Sector. The Dnepr-1 battalion is stationed in Piski, some of its fighters are also at the airport. On October 3, a rotation was carried out, these units were replaced by 79 AB and other units of the already involved brigades, but many heroes refused the rotation.

3rd Special Forces Regiment

Elite part of the Ukrainian army. Near Kirovograd is located main center USSR special forces training. It is clear that the local unit, 10th Special Forces Brigade, was the best in the Union. Its history is covered with such unfading glory that Putin even tried to steal it. He attributed all the merits of the tenth separate brigade to his unit with an identical name, formed in a completely different way from people who had nothing to do with the Soviet brigade.

Let us cite just one fact that speaks of the fanatical devotion of these people to their work. The wife of one of the dead regiment officers is still paying off the loan. Her husband, back under Yanukovych, bought not a refrigerator, not a TV, but a high-quality parachute. The embezzlers gave him a meager salary and shabby, old equipment. But the hero spent these pennies on increasing the defense capability of his country! As soon as it is possible to speak out loud about some facts, we will devote a lengthy article to this glorious unit. It's the least we can do for these heroes.

Many special forces soldiers refuse to rotate. From time to time they go to Sands to wash themselves and return back.

Right sector

One of the fighters of the DUK “Right Sector” was given the call sign “Obezbashenny.” This word applies to any other fighter. These people could have joined the National Guard, served in the army, or chosen any volunteer battalion, but they consciously decided to become suicide bombers.

Have you heard of at least one captured representative of the Right Sector? Have you heard that a fighter from this corps was exchanged for a separatist? If not, then imagine what they do to them and whether they surrender alive even in the most hopeless situation.

There are Right Sector fighters at the airport itself and in Sands, but their main task is supply. Playing “Russian roulette” with five rounds in the cylinder of a revolver is much safer than driving an armored vehicle or jeep through an open, well-visited, and long-shot area.

93 Separate mechanized brigade

It is this formation that provides equipment and heavy weapons to the airport’s defenders. Brigade commander Oleg Mikhailovich Mikats leads the defense. The fighters fight shoulder to shoulder with the “Right Sector” and special forces.

17 Tank Brigade

The best Ukrainian tank crews at the start of the war served in two tank brigades. Therefore, companies and even platoons of these brigades were scattered along the entire front. Some of them ended up at the airport.

Against the background of a captured tank

79 Airmobile Brigade

Suffered heavy losses near Zelenopole and was sent for rearmament and replenishment. Then the famous Yuri “Wings of the Phoenix” Biryukov took over the brigade. Thanks to the brigade officers, Biryukov, other volunteers and even a little from the Ministry of Defense, it turned into the most equipped unit in the entire Ukrainian Army. The equipment and weapons of the paratroopers are ordinary, but the equipment... And the fighting spirit. The fighters believe that after Zelenopole they had an unpaid debt to the Russian army, and they are ready to fully repay it. With very high interest rates.

Battalion Dnepr-1

One of the first volunteer battalions formed after the start of the war. It is these fighters that Russian propaganda calls “Kolomoisky’s battalions.” Such a negative attitude on the part of the enemy indicates the high combat effectiveness and resilience of the unit. It was not officially entered into the airport; it is held by the village of Peski, but some fighters themselves asked to go to the airport.

Stormtroopers

First, Russia sent its special forces to the Donetsk airport, reinforcing it with DPR militants. Then she increased the number of special forces. Then she gave it regular army units. Then I added militants.

We assume that the Russian military fought heroically (if you look at the situation through the eyes of a Russian). But they failed to take the airport. We suffered quite heavy losses. During the next assaults, the number of soldiers of the regular army of the Russian Federation began to decrease, and the number of militants began to increase. Since September 28, we have not seen Russian soldiers, but Russian officers are still in command of the operation. It is possible that Russian special forces, marines and motorized riflemen are taking part, or they could be involved at any time. We have already written about Russian units fighting in Ukraine.

Almost all units of the regular army of the Russian Federation that were introduced into the territory of Ukraine passed through this meat grinder. Not every soldier went on the attack, but there were representatives from each unit. The artillerymen, of course, did not attack, they only supported with fire.

The same can be said about militant groups. Even Cossacks from the LPR were brought to Donetsk for this purpose. Therefore, there is no point in describing each division - name any, you won’t be mistaken, they took part. Why was this done? The answer is at the end of the article.

Russian television promoted the field “commanders” Givi and Motorola, but their role was greatly exaggerated. They are television stars who will receive all the laurels in case of victory, but not key figures or even commanders of any significant units. Next to them are military advisers from the Russian Federation, who make all the decisions.

Myths of Donetsk airport

It is worth noting that creating myths around is beneficial to all parties to the conflict. Lies come from all sides - both from Putin and Poroshenko. But none of them concerns those heroes who stand there to the death.

Myth No. 1 Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

Somewhere in mid-September, such a thing as Donetsk Airport. Prokofiev, simply ceased to exist. It cannot accept passengers - the terminals, along with the entire infrastructure, are almost destroyed. It cannot receive aircraft - navigation and radar equipment have been practically destroyed, as well as oil depots, repair and other facilities necessary for aviation.

Part aviation equipment is located far beyond the airfield, no one knows what’s wrong with it now. The condition of the runway is a big question. Restoring even minimal functionality of the airfield may take many months. The problem is that it is not safe to repair dilapidated objects. It's better to tear everything down and rebuild. It will be even cheaper this way.

Therefore, it would be more logical to use the phrase “territory former airport them. Prokofiev."

Myth No. 2 Donetsk airport has been taken

If someone tells you that they have taken over the airport, feel free to send them to Putin. The airport area is more than 400 hectares, 99% of which is completely open area. All this land is visible not only with the help of drones, but also with simple, stationary devices. The artillery of both sides has already targeted this area very well, so it is simply impossible to control it. Neither Ukraine nor the DPR. Everything that appears there immediately comes under dense and accurate artillery fire.

This is Lugansk airport

Under the airport there are many underground communications, ranging from a tunnel connecting anti-aircraft units to a bomb shelter and terminal basements. Dozens of buildings, large and small, allow you to hide from shelling.

We can only talk about control over specific buildings. The main stronghold of our forces is the new terminal. The artillery that the militants have can completely destroy all buildings on the territory of the airport, as was done in Lugansk. Ukrainian can do the same. But the parties are trying, if possible, to preserve at least something that could, albeit conditionally, be called a captured/protected airport.

But even if the militants seize all the buildings, it will not be possible to talk about complete control. Special forces can appear at any moment, right out of the ground. So, even if the terrorists knock our people out of the buildings, they will be a little scared to spend the night in these huge, empty, gigantic buildings.

The militant commanders will not dare to leave a garrison of several hundred people overnight (and less will not work - too large areas need to be kept under control). Ukrainian soldiers won’t even need to knock them out. Lovers of the Russian world woke up in the morning and were missing a dozen or two of their comrades. And even fewer bodies were found. And so every night. Do you think all these Givi and Motorolas are going to achieve such a Pyrrhic victory?

To take the Donetsk airport, you need to take all settlements located within a radius of 10 km from it.

Myth No. 3 The situation at Donetsk airport

If we talk about the situation at the Donetsk airport, then we need to call exact time and list all the objects in question. For example: “As of 16:21 07.10.2014, the Ukrainian military controls objects A, B, C and two floors of object D. Militants control the ground parts of objects D and E, and there are battles in objects Z, Z, I.” In five minutes, everything can change dramatically.

The main myth. Strategic importance of Donetsk airport

Both sides of the conflict call the airport a “strategic” facility. But that's not true. The famous volunteer Roman Donik said the best about the airport in his

Three years ago, on May 26, 2014, a grandiose battle for the Donetsk airport began, which became one of the most important in the fight of the newly created DPR militias against the Ukrainian Armed Forces and nationalist battalions. The airport, located in the suburbs, near the village of Spartak, was not just a key combat position - whoever owned it controlled the entire situation in the region. The battle for the airport continued with varying success for 242 days and ultimately ended in victory for the Donetsk militias, most of whom did not really have a professional military education. The victory was snatched out of nerves.

I had a chance to visit the Donetsk airport named after Sergei Prokofiev, built for the 2012 European Football Championship, in the last days of March 2014. There was bad weather due to thick fog, the flight was delayed for four hours, so there was more than enough opportunity to explore all the terminals. I was struck by the scale of the airport building and its splendor - a lot of money was invested here; according to experts, about $200 million was spent on its construction. Even for a million-plus city, such as this large regional center Ukraine, it was more than a grandiose structure. It's a 15-minute taxi ride from the center of Donetsk, very close. And when the first reports of fighting at the airport came, it seemed that the war was going on in the city itself. And then photos and video footage showed what the creation of man’s hands can be turned into by the hands of a man-destroyer.


Donetsk airport - on the one hand, it is a symbol of the struggle for independence, on the other, as unjustified vandalism. Now there is no point in even restoring these ruins. The question just pops into my head: “Why?” It can be applied to Slavyansk, Ilovaisk, Gorlovka, and a dozen other Donbass cities and towns that are still subject to senseless shelling by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After all, any military operation, both offensive and defensive, must have its own meaning. Is it trivial to write off shells? But not at the expense of the lives of peaceful people! Fighting for the Donetsk airport, which is no longer valuable not only because of the destroyed terminals, but also is not suitable for aircraft take-offs and landings, can also be considered madness. The last flight of a scheduled plane from here was carried out at 7.10 am on May 26, 2014, after which both the “take-off” itself and the airport building were empty, turning into an arena of fierce battles.

“Probably not a single battle of the war in Donbass caused as much emotion and pain among participants and observers as the fight for the Donetsk airport,” says historian Evgeniy Norin. - The siege of the airport by the Donbass militia lasted for more than eight months. Slavyansk stood and fell, Novorossiya survived the crazy summer of 2014, a truce was signed and called for, and the airport continued to remain an elusive target of attack. Its long retention showed how dangerous an enemy the Ukrainian army can really be under favorable conditions and adequate leadership, and the victory over the “cyborgs” became a truly hard-won success for the militia, indicating a serious qualitative growth of the troops of Novorossiya. At the airport, the Ukrainian army was represented by good strong units; on the other hand, it was ultimately the most combat-ready militia units that achieved success. In the war for Donbass there were larger, more dynamic battles, but, perhaps, none were more brutal and uncompromising.” As in any war, the battles for the Donetsk airport gave birth to their own heroes. It is likely that in Kyiv the names of those who died under its ruins were named and ranked with a certain rank of courage - the dead have no shame. On the part of the DPR militia fighters, such famous people even outside the Donbass as Mikhail Tolstykh and Arsen Pavlov, known by their call signs Givi and Motorola, found their glory here, confirmed in further battles. Then, in 2014-15, their names only appeared on the lips, during many other important military operations, but mostly during the knocking out of Ukrainian nationalists from the Donetsk airport.


The militiaman became one of the most skillful commanders of the DPR and a real living legend. It was Givi at the Donetsk airport. A native of Ilovaisk, Mikhail Tolstykh became one of the organizers of the “Ilovaisk cauldron” when, with his company, he held the city from daily attempts to break through for two weeks.

Who took the call sign Givi in ​​honor of his grandfather, who fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War (Givi’s Georgian roots are from his great-grandfather), there were legends. He did not duck under shots, carried out the most desperate and, at first glance, insane operations and invariably achieved military success. Journalists called this young colonel (Mikhail Tolstykh was 36 years old on the day of his death) the Georgian reincarnation of the famous general of the war of 1812, Peter Bagration.

was buried twice at the Donetsk airport - first according to rumors that were circulated by the media. But he died much later, after an explosion in the elevator of the building in which he lived in Donetsk with his family. They tried to destroy him not only physically, but also in the information space, which is why they circulated messages about injury and death. And then, in 2015, he and his fighters managed to literally dig out Ukrainian nationalists from the basements of the Donetsk airport and

Donetsk airport has become a key position for a number of reasons. Initially, the Ukrainian Armed Forces planned to use it as a landing site for military transport aircraft capable of transporting reinforcements to the area of ​​growing hostilities. But after May 26, 2014, not a single plane was able to land here. At first, the Ukrainian army transported reinforcements by helicopters, but they also subsequently stopped flying due to the threat of being shot down by militia MANPADS. The control tower was of some value, from the height of which it was possible to adjust artillery fire, but after it was recaptured by the militia, Ukrainian guns completely destroyed it.

Attempts to storm the airport continued throughout October and November with varying degrees of success,” says historian Evgeniy Norin. - The battles at that time unfolded quite chaotically. On the “three-dimensional” battlefield, opponents were mixed. The militias used their most seasoned units in battle - Motorola's "Sparta" and "Somalia" under the command of Givi. Gradually, although extremely slowly, they cleared the airport buildings of the enemy. All methods were used to annoy the enemy. Gradually, the Ukrainians lost ground. True, two circumstances did not contribute to optimism on the militia side of the front. Firstly, the main prizes remained in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: the control tower and the new terminal. Secondly, the initially irregular nature of the militia groups often manifested itself. The fighting qualities of the rebel groups turned out to be very uneven. While some units demonstrated high levels of morale and training, others could make woefully amateurish mistakes. Sometimes this led to great tragedies."

On January 21, 2015, the official Ukrainian media announced the failure of another attempt by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to seize Donetsk airport. The Ukrainian army and nationalist battalions retreated from the Donetsk airport with heavy losses. The next day, official Kyiv admitted that it had finally lost control over this territory. And in Donetsk itself there was a “parade” of captured Ukrainian soldiers from the airport, who were then handed over to the Ukrainian side along with the flags of their units and the coffins of the dead.

...Donetsk airport now looks like huge house Pavlova in Stalingrad (present-day Volgograd), which it was decided to leave in the form in which it remained after the war, as a monument to the fight against fascism. The airport will most likely be restored when the war against Ukrainian nationalism ends and Donbass can live a peaceful life, without daily shelling.

Yana Sedova Saturday, January 21, 2017, 11:00

After 242 days of defense, the last Ukrainian fighters left Donetsk airport on January 21, 2015 Photo: EPA/UPG

242 days. About a thousand fighters. Dozens of wounded and killed Ukrainian soldiers. Donetsk airport, DAP, became a symbol of resilience, and its defenders began to be called cyborgs for holding the line surrounded by the enemy for many months, in heat and cold, sometimes without water and food, relying on willpower and adrenaline.

During one of the trips to the ATO zone, the Apostrophe correspondent managed to look at the remains of the airport from Zenit, the extreme position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. From a shelter on one of the hills, the remains of a once beautiful airport could be seen behind the haze. The shell of the terminal with the tattered walls hanging on it was as ghostly as this haze. It seemed that at the first noticeable gust of wind the frame would begin to collapse like a house of cards.

The last defenders of the ATO forces left the DAP on January 21, 2015. Shortly before this, on January 13, the control tower, the “eyes” of Ukrainian military personnel, collapsed. After this, many servicemen who were in the DAP believe, holding the defense became pointless. But some remained there until the very end, and for some, the airport became a grave after the separatists blew up the ceilings in the new terminal. Others who survived the heat of battle still have difficulty coping with post-traumatic syndrome and refuse interviews for fear of falling back into binge drinking.

But there are also those who are ready to talk. They told "Apostrophe" about how the most protracted and brutal battle of this war began, how the runway was watered with "Grads", and shells bounced off the solid concrete like ping-pong balls, how they fought off attacks and tried to save their wounded comrades, how they literally crawled out of the destroyed terminal with broken legs, miraculously emerging from the rubble on the last day, when they had to retreat and leave the remains of the airport behind.

Story 1. From Donetsk - with love and celox

Small and thin Natalya is one of those Donetsk volunteers who rushed to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters in the DAP and carried cargo for them directly from Donetsk, when Russian soldiers were already walking on the streets of the city, and armed “persons of Caucasian nationality” were preparing to storm the terminals.

Natalya soon took her family away from Donetsk, but may return there, so for security reasons her last name is not indicated here. She ended up in the DAP when no one suspected that heavy fighting lay ahead, as a result of which the entire airport would turn into ruins. Now it’s hard to imagine that the Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers received help directly from Donetsk, and that it was carried by desperate volunteers through separatist checkpoints.

Volunteer Natalia

It seems that on May 3, I went with my child to the DAP (we held a flash mob - a performance of “Ode to Joy”), there were already military people there, but I didn’t really understand that these were no longer DAP employees, not border guards, but special forces who were guarding the airport. On May 3 everything was still intact. On one side of the city, for example, in Auchan, Russian soldiers were walking, and in Metro, near the DAP, they were buying our dumplings.

Then the old terminal was completely intact and empty. I was sure that hundreds of special forces were somewhere in the basements. But then we found out that in fact there are a little more than 20 soldiers in the DAP from the 3rd Special Forces Regiment (whose commander I met by phone, and we kept in touch), and in the new terminal there are several dozen soldiers of the 72nd Brigade.

We had a secret group in Donetsk, several dozen people. We started collecting funds for radios for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Then we were asked to help with water for the guys who were standing at the Zenit position; they were blocked, and it was only possible to get there from Donetsk through 2-3 checkpoints. I gathered several people I barely knew, and we went to Zenit. Once we met with the guys from DAP, who arrived through a mined field at Zenit, unloaded almost everything we brought - water, bread and a lot of fresh vegetables. At this meeting, my phone number was given to the soldiers from the airport. I remember that their relatives sent Kevlar helmets and various things to Donetsk by Nova Poshta.

In the 20th of May, bearded militants arrived in Donetsk, so they immediately decided that they had to go into battle - they were sent to the DAP, as to the nearest point where there were Ukrainian military personnel.

Dozens of foreign journalists worked in Donetsk, while my daughter was dancing in that area, I escorted the French and someone else closer to the DAP. On May 26 there was an attack on ours, they repulsed it without losses. Trucks with wounded and survivors were speeding away from the DAP at full speed. The Ukrainian Armed Forces called in aviation for reinforcements, and fighter jets flew over the city for three days. The separatists tried to shoot them down. There was a continuous roar.

Then the day was like a month, so I won’t say exactly how long we were transmitting parcels like this, but in the end the commander insisted that the anti-aircraft gunners bring us to the DAP, this was at the end of June - beginning of July. In general, we were definitely the first to get there (after the start of active hostilities): we were riding in an anti-aircraft gun, with machine guns and body armor, just like the military. We were accompanied by a car with the words "Airport" on it, and on the checkerboard there was a Darth Vader mask. It turned out that the military was joking: they found and put this mask on the car, but the driver did not notice and drove like that for several days.

From Donetsk we began to transmit (to the Ukrainian Armed Forces) all information about the movement of equipment. We rode around the city, closer to the waste heaps, and hooked a phone to the sun visor, which filmed everything. In general, we became strong friends. We watched as the commander, practically with one glance, placed his guys in positions. The military from Zenit also began to go to the DAP, where they were taught a lot, and both of these positions became a powerful cover for each other. We carried night vision devices, tactical goggles, batteries, celox, the first tablets with maps and sights, sleeping bags and sleeping mats, food, and once we even brought a Georgian who cooked barbecue for the military.

They carried the plates to the armor plates under the car seat, and wrapped the covers in hammocks. I hid my glasses in my sleeping bags. Then I went with a kind-looking uncle, his name was Konstantin. I met him during secret meetings related to the organization of rallies in Donetsk. I remembered him when I had to go on my first trip. And I was not mistaken - they always let us through and did not check us.

At the checkpoints in this direction there were then locals, we had a legend for them - in Opytny we either have a recreation center for fishermen, or we accept refugees there. A night vision device was once transported in a bag of chicken feed. It seemed like they were going to visit grandma. And soon we got a car with a double bottom. Our “fairy tales” passed. But then one day we were driving through Donetsk, we stopped, I went to the supermarket, and the separatists took the car.

Somehow no help was delivered - the day before the railway bridge was destroyed. But we didn’t know how much so we went to him so that we could pass through at least one less checkpoint. There, for the first time, a sniper started shooting at us. We put the car in reverse and sped away. That day we returned to the city, and the next day we went again, but in a completely different car.

Natalya (left) during a trip to Opytnoye and Peski (Donetsk region)

The problem of the first "Dapovites" was that they were in almost complete confinement in a closed space for about 4-5 months. The special forces somehow dealt with this, but the 72nd did much worse. When I first met them, I was afraid to even move. They were ready to shoot us as saboteurs. The guys were clearly going crazy.

I remember the refrigerators in which the bodies of two of our dead were stored until it was possible to take them out. I remember the plan for the parade in DAP on August 24, 2014. It never took place - the commander found out about the guys who had previously survived in the DAP who died at Saur-Mogila, and he was taken to the hospital. My heart couldn't stand it.

The beginning of September was very difficult, the guys said goodbye every day. We transferred a lot of medicine through the reconnaissance commander of the 93rd brigade. By the end of autumn and beginning of winter, we were at the airport several more times. Then they were already carrying warm boots, uniforms, sleeping bags, camping burners and cylinders.

The last time I was in DAP was at the beginning of December 2014, running, in a military vehicle, from which I only had time to look out for a couple of minutes and be horrified by the ruins. December 2014 was quite quiet, but in the old terminal there were separatists moving along the elevator shaft. They were already there and on the top floor.

For me, DAP is, first of all, the people who were there, many of whom became family. Some friends died there, one of them was a volunteer.

Airport like local residents, was our great hope. Every morning began with calls and news about him. The DAP defenders and I had a common dream - for the war to end and to be able to return home.

Story 2. Building the country that the dead dreamed of

Vitaly Gorkun fought as part of the 79th airmobile brigade. On September 25, 2014, he went on vacation for 10 days. At that time, the first company occupied the line in Sands - the soldiers spent the night in Sands and at about 5 am they began to enter the DAP. Two armored personnel carriers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were shot down, killing 13 people. On September 26, Vitaly’s birthday, his commander called him and said that his vacation was ending because they would be entering the DAP. Vitaly returned to the unit and already on October 2 his unit was at the airport. Apart from shell shock, he had no injuries - he was lucky.

Today Vitaly Gorkun is the head of the Mariupol Patrol Police.

Vitaly Gorkun (left)

I went with my platoon to the old terminal, we were there for 10 days, after which we left and began escorting, delivering ammunition and water to Sands.

On November 7, my company returned to the old terminal for another 10 days. Then our brigade was withdrawn from the ATO to the Zaporozhye region, closer to Mariupol. We had a lot of wounded; about 80 people remained from the battalion. At that time, the Shirokino operation had already begun. Near Mariupol we met New Year. After that, we were transferred to Nikolaev to restore combat effectiveness. When the terminal was blown up in January, we were put on alert and rushed to the airport.

There were two attempts to get us there by plane, but when that didn’t work out, we went by bus to Solntsevo and from there moved on to Vodyanoye.

What I remember most during my rotations at DAP was Putin’s birthday – October 7th. From October 4 to October 6, there were continuous battles for two days, infantry marched, tanks came out. When we first arrived, they immediately began to cover us, everything they had worked on us, and our armored personnel carriers burned down after they knocked out our tank. So on October 4 there were a lot of wounded, because the (enemy) tank rolled out and fired directly at us. And at dawn I realized how difficult it would be, because at night nothing was visible. In the first two days, we had two people in the 200s, and 17 people in the 300s; there was a moment when we thought that we were screwed here. But on October 6 we knocked out their tank.

Back in October, the airport was of strategic importance, but then there was no point in sitting and defending in one room, which was subjected to tank and artillery shelling every day.

Those lives that the DAP later took, I think, should have been saved and used elsewhere, to act more decisively, not in a targeted and local way, but in a front-line manner. Maybe try to close the ring along the border, although, of course, I’m not a general. Probably the generals were simply afraid to report on the real picture of what was happening around us. The DAP was surrounded, every convoy (AFU) that entered there was under fire.

It wasn’t so scary to sit there as to drive in and out, it’s three kilometers of road that is constantly under fire, and it was a lottery - whether you’ll get hit or not. And considering that in one armored personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle there were 12 people in the airborne squad, even if one grenade had hit, everyone would have burned alive, because no one would have been able to get out of there quickly.

I personally had four such raids - when they entered the DAP and left it. And the mechanics, drivers, machine gun gunners - they drove along this route every day or every other day. They took out ammunition and the wounded.

We got used to it psychologically, of course. During the war I realized that we get used to everything. In the cold, damp, without water, we sat for ten days - and there was nothing terrible, and we didn’t want to eat. We probably don’t know our capabilities ourselves. To say that there were professional military men there is no, we all gained the same experience. It’s one thing to learn war from books, and quite another to lead and give orders, as a result of which the guys could die. We studied shoulder to shoulder.

The war will end for us when we liberate our territories and build a high moor throughout the eastern cordon. How long this will last depends on how we ourselves treat the situation in the country.

Vitaly Gorkun (left), in the photo on the right - Vitaly at Donetsk airport

Now I head the Patrol Police in Mariupol. In war, you understood who the enemy was. And here we come across people who want changes, but, let’s say, they break the rules on the roads, and if you make a remark, they will say - it would be better if you went to war.

Some people think that the boys there are dying for territory, others think: let Poroshenko sell Roshen, then I will drive by the rules. I always say that everyone should start with themselves. It so happened that our generation experienced such events, but also a chance to build a normal society where money will not decide everything. Many are used to it, do not want to give up their comfort zone and are not ready to sacrifice it, but someone gave their life. If my hands give up, then I will betray all those who gave their lives. I had an acquaintance, Bogdan, who died. When I arrived at his home in the Lviv region, his mother said - you survived, boys, to build the country that Bogdan dreamed of. I will fight to the end now that I am back.

Story 3. Two Hour War

Alexey Sokolovsky volunteered for the Donbass battalion at the end of August 2014. He spent most of the time until January 2015 at the training ground in locality Cherkasskoye (Dnepropetrovsk region), was a reservist, and on November 5, 2014, signed a contract with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and went to serve as part of the 93rd separate mechanized brigade (OMBR).

For Sokolovsky, the war began and ended on January 17, 2015. In the first battle he received a mine-shrapnel wound. Last September, doctors gave up trying to repair the ankle joint and removed it completely. In the next five months, Alexey will have to spend time with the Ilizarov apparatus, which fixes the bones in the correct position. “Unfortunately, I’m still recovering,” he tells Apostrophe. His war only lasted a couple of hours. However, he says he has no regrets.

Alexey Sokolovsky

We arrived in the ATO zone on January 13, 2015. I was an assistant machine gunner for my cousin, Alexander. And on January 17, the assault on the monastery on the territory of the Donetsk airport began with the goal of breaking through a corridor for the withdrawal of fighters from the terminal. During this assault, two of our infantry fighting vehicles were lost in the fog, and communication was lost. There was heavy shelling, the vehicles stalled, the gun on one BMP was jammed, and the turret on another was jammed. Then we managed to start the cars, but after about thirty meters our group was hit by several 120-mm mines, and movement became impossible.

I was wounded by mine fragments in the abdomen and right shin. Then 26 people were wounded, 15 in our group alone; two died. All these guys started with the Donbass battalion in August-September 2014.

Brother Alexander also received severe mine-shrapnel wounds to his limbs that day.

We were there (in the DAP area) for about half an hour, it was my first and last fight. I remember when I was wounded and the cartridges ran out, I picked up a grenade. There were different thoughts, the main one was not to be captured. But, in the end, their own people arrived and pulled us out.

Alexey Sokolovsky

Yes, it turns out I didn’t have time to fight. But I don't regret it. During our offensive, more than 80 people were taken out of DAP. After being wounded, my brother ended up in Selidovo, then in the Dnieper and Odessa. I went to Krasnoarmeysk, then also to the Dnieper, and then to Kyiv.

When I hear about the DAP, I remember first of all our soldiers who died there. The war has actually lasted three years. I don’t have a question about whether it was worth dying there, but I constantly hear this question from others, for some reason from those who have not been there and never will be. I would go this route again. If there was an opportunity, I would go back, but it would be uncomfortable with the Ilizarov apparatus and on crutches, and they wouldn’t take me.

Whether it was worth the children dying there will be shown by the development of our country.

Story 4. Surviving cyborgs

Evgeniy Kovtun served in the 93rd Separate Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as an artillery fire spotter, and was in the DAP from January 6, 2015 to the 20th. With a group, leaving behind the destroyed terminal, he made his way to the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the night of January 21.

After the ceilings of the new terminal were blown up, Evgeniy found himself under the rubble, fortunately, his comrades were able to get him. He was lucky more than once later - under the cover of fog, the group made its way to the weather tower, which was controlled by the Ukrainian military. Eugene, exhausted due to wounds, insomnia, thirst and hunger, fell behind, but his comrade returned for him and led him to his own. Yevgeny Kovtun was among the last surviving “cyborgs” of the Donetsk airport. “I’m currently undergoing maintenance,” he jokes in a conversation with Apostrophe. Treatment for the wounds and concussions received will still take a lot of time.

Evgeniy Kovtun

We have been in Peski since the end of autumn, holding the defense there. We had a rotation: one company was in Peski, another was holding the defense in DAP, another company controlled nearby territories.

Our first day in DAP was quite calm, there was a so-called green corridor, a day of silence. Heavy fighting began on the 10th.

When I got to DAP, the only thing I thought about was how to keep warm. There was a small diesel burner, it served us for a couple of days. There was a small potbelly stove that provided some heat, but the separatists hit it with an RPG.

Before the ceilings were blown up, I was wounded, and the terminal explosion also added to it.

It was hard there all the time. I remember that on January 9, a paratrooper was seriously wounded, and we could not take him out, because this supposed truce with the green corridors meant that once a week, by agreement, equipment entered the airport, the guys went on rotation. And here the person needs to be urgently evacuated, and here new agreements are needed. And he died before our eyes. In the end, they allowed him to be taken to the enemy checkpoint, where an ambulance was waiting. But the fighter did not survive.

The guys fought, it was important for them to know that if something happened, they would be picked up, saved, and taken to the hospital. It is right for soldiers to believe in such things. And then it turned out that we couldn’t do anything. The medic could only maintain a seriously wounded man in this condition and fought for his life...

I remember the gas attacks. In this war, probably, no one has ever been smoked out like we were. Both those who were intact and the wounded. You couldn't go outside. During my stay in DAP there were gas attacks six times; they hounded us for hours as soon as the wind blew in a way that suited them. The temperature was minus, the air was almost still, and they could throw these action gas grenades one after another. We were choking, coughing, and our eyes were watering.

I am still undergoing treatment, and I had concussions, and on the 17th I was also wounded. Three ribs were broken, but I was still in fairly normal condition, all my body parts remained with me.

The first explosion was on January 19, he knocked down all the walls for us. After this there was a heavy attack, which we repulsed. We were already squeezed, surrounded. The next day they blew it up a second time, the floor was underneath us, and we actually fell to the floor below, we were buried in the upper floors. There were paratroopers, guys from the 90th Battalion, they helped get those who were overwhelmed, they got me too.

The command and I could not really communicate; there had been no communication for several days; they could not get through to us for the wounded.

We still had some ammunition left, so we decided in a group of about 13 people to make our way to our own. They asked if I would go. After the rubble, I no longer stood, I lay down. They helped me up, threw me over the parapet, I realized that if I fell, I wouldn’t get up. It took us a long time to get out, but we reached the weather tower. Our people had already evacuated us there.

A couple of people were left wounded and dead.

One of our group didn't make it. He and I are far behind. One fighter came back for me. The fog was heavy. He saved us. But the second one was never found; he was later taken prisoner. But then, fortunately, they released me. It was he who woke me up, helped me throw me over the parapet and told me that I had to leave.

Evgeniy Kovtun

When we got out to our people, the first thought was to drink. Before this there were severe Epiphany frosts, everything was frozen, all the water bottles. And even this ice then ended. We didn’t sleep for many days, without water, without food, so to already have liquid water was such a blessing. The guys brought us water every now and then, but we couldn’t get drunk.

And we urgently had to find a phone to tell our relatives that we were still alive, that we were fighting. The guys let us sleep for a couple of hours, then transferred us to Vodyanoye, where an ambulance was waiting.

We didn’t know then whether they would storm the tower. We only knew that the terminal had fallen early in the morning. A group went for the wounded, Rahman went, but this help never arrived, they were waiting for them, the rest were already captured (the cyborg Rahman was later exchanged - “Apostrophe”).

The situation that led to this was in itself deplorable. I would like it not to be us, but for us to take them that way. Since January 13, after the control tower fell, there was nothing to do there. But no one wanted to make a decision and understand that the era of the airport had to end, since it had lost its strategic importance. The tower fell and we went blind. We had weapons and ammunition back then; we would have come out, even with a fight, but we would not have lost the people who were blown up. And the rest would not have been taken prisoner.

But maybe the heroism of some is the shortcoming of others.

Yana Sedova

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