What remains of Donetsk airport. The final assault on the airport. Between May and September

On the night of January 21 to January 22, 2015, after the terminals and flight control tower were completely destroyed, the defense of Donetsk airport by Ukrainian soldiers ended. Today we remember how the battle for the DAP took place, which was followed by millions.

First shot. May 26, 2014

4 days after the official start of the ATO, DPR militants for the first time raise the flag over the building of the airport named after. S. Prokofiev in Donetsk. Despite the fact that many airlines subsequently refused to fly to Donetsk, until the end of May, with short interruptions, DAP still receives planes.

May 25, 2014 becomes the last day when runway A civilian plane lands: on that day, militants from the Vostok battalion enter the airport.

The next day, one of the most successful special operations of Ukrainian forces in the entire history of the Russian-Ukrainian war begins. Soldiers of the 3rd Special Forces Regiment from Kropyvnytskyi (Kirovograd) are landed near the DAP, and with the support of attack aircraft, they capture the airport in a few hours.

According to the journalist Yuri Butusov, at 11 a.m., a Kropyvnytskyi special forces sniper saw one of the Chechen militants pointing an Igla MANPADS at one of the Ukrainian fighters flying over the new terminal. The fighter, having received permission from the command, makes an accurate shot, which becomes the first in the battle for the airport.

After this, the Ukrainian military successfully held the airport throughout the summer. In August, Russian-terrorist formations launched an active offensive throughout the anti-terrorist operation zone. The militants get large number Russian "Grads" and begin the first attacks on the airport.

"Cyborgs". September, 2014

On September 10, 2014, militants attacked the fortifications of Ukrainian fighters in the DAP with T-72 tanks and 240-mm Tulip mortars. The battle continues until late at night. The soldiers defending the DAP recapture 3 tanks and 2 armored personnel carriers from the terrorists.

After this, attacks on Ukrainian positions continued almost continuously throughout September. The terrorists are bringing up their “elite” units: “Kalmius”, “Sparta”, “Vostok”, constantly announcing that the airport will soon be under the control of the so-called. "DPR".

The heaviest attacks come from the southeast: terrorists place mortars, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns on the roofs of nearby high-rise buildings, they fire at the control room from anti-tank guns, and special forces from the Russian Federation try to attack. Ukrainian fighters repulse the attacks and remain at the airport. A legend is born about “cyborgs” - that’s what the militants themselves call them.

I don't fucking know who's protecting Donetsk airport, but we can’t knock them out for three months. We tried to storm them, they broke in on us, and we retreated. They began to cover with hail - they dive into the underground sewer collectors... I, he says, don’t know who is sitting there, but these are not people - these are cyborgs! – Sergey Sergeev, Facebook

The nickname “cyborgs” quickly became popular - a week later the President of Ukraine called the DAP defenders this way in his speech Petro Poroshenko.

Donetsk airport is becoming the hottest spot in the ATO zone: militants almost continuously attack the old and new terminal s. On September 30, the leaders of the criminals first announced the alleged seizure of DAP, then they spoke about it again on October 3 and 5.

In order to clear the airport, by and large, we need 20 hours, but then this will be a violation of peace agreements,” the leader of the so-called. "DPR" Alexander Zakharchenko.

Despite loud statements, during a month of brutal fighting the terrorists were able to advance only 500 meters; Above the control tower there is still the flag of Ukraine.

Over the next months, the enemy attacks without ceasing, regardless of whether a truce is in effect or a ceasefire agreement has been signed: not a day goes by without shelling or an attempted assault.

October 30 Russian actor Mikhail Porechenkov comes to occupied Donetsk to meet "Givi" And "Motorola". In the company of terrorists, the so-called. “DPR” he demonstratively, “on camera”, fires at the positions of the Ukrainian military at the airport from a large-caliber machine gun. After a criminal case was opened against Porechenkov in Ukraine, the actor stated that he fired blanks.

Final defense, December, 2014 - January, 2015

In December, Ukrainian fighters blow up the old terminal on orders from the command and retreat to the new one. One of the heaviest battles for DAP, on December 1, lasts 36 hours: Russian special forces try to storm the airport, but suffer heavy losses and retreat. “Cyborgs” lost 2 fighters in almost two days, 16 were wounded.

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the 16th special forces brigade of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, the 200th special forces brigade of the Southern Military District (Rostov), ​​a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 4th separate guards Kantemirovskaya tank brigade, battalion 22 took part in the attacks on the Donetsk airport 1st separate brigade of the GRU General Staff of the Russian Federation, assault company of the 106th Guards Airborne Division.

During the period of December 3-4, the defenders of the airport destroyed, according to various sources, from 27 to 32 soldiers of the Vympel special forces of the FSB of Russia - the people’s deputy reported this Andrey Teteruk, volunteer Konstantin Forester and head of the First Volunteer Mobile Hospital Evgeniy Nayshtetik. Moreover, over the previous 33 years of its existence, this unit officially lost 29 fighters.

On December 8, both terminals were practically destroyed, but Ukrainian soldiers continued to defend themselves. Despite heavy fire, the “cyborgs” hang the Ukrainian flag on the radio tower.

Towards the end of December, militants attack the airport less frequently, mostly shelling it with mortars and small arms and not going into open battle. People's Deputy Dmitry Tymchuk states that the main forces of terrorists have retreated from the Ukrainian borders, leaving a small cover.

At the beginning of January 2015, the enemy became active again: on the night of January 8, the positions of the ATO forces were fired at 8 times, on January 10 - 14 times.

The media report that the rotation of “cyborgs” passes through so-called checkpoints. "DPR", in which the vehicles of the Ukrainian military are searched by militants. After a wave of indignation among Ukrainians, Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak calls this situation a misunderstanding.

“The situation at Donetsk airport is quite difficult, and every entry of our units is accompanied by significant risks. Therefore, it was agreed that personnel entering the airport territory would be allowed to pass through the DPR checkpoint without hindrance. That misunderstanding that we all saw... After this, the necessary measures were taken. The last rotation, which took place a day and a half ago, took place without what we saw on television,” Stepan Poltorak, Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

The situation at the Donetsk airport is deteriorating: it is possible to evacuate the wounded and transport food and ammunition only at night - during the day the territory is under fire from the enemy.

On the morning of January 13, the militants put forward an ultimatum: the “cyborgs” must leave the airport by 17:00 or they will be destroyed. The Ukrainian military refuses and asks the command for reinforcements and artillery support.

On January 15, the attack on Ukrainian positions begins again: militants spend the entire day trying to push the fighters out of the new terminal, firing at it with mortars and Grad missiles. Reinforcements of Ukrainian paratroopers fight their way into the DAP, the “cyborgs” counterattack the terrorists and knock them out of the 2nd floor of the new terminal. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, two soldiers were killed in the battle for the airport on January 15. Volunteers talk about 6 more wounded, 2 of which are serious.

On January 16, DAP defenders reported that part of the terminal’s floors had been captured by pro-Russian militants who were releasing unknown gas. The fighting begins around 6 am and ends only the next day, around 3 am on January 17th.

On January 17, after a relative calm, a fierce battle begins at the Donetsk airport: the positions of the “cyborgs” are intensively fired from Grad missiles. Towards evening, help makes its way to them: they manage to take out 3 dead and 20 wounded.

The next morning, the Ukrainian military counterattacks and retakes all the territory marked along the demarcation line. After several hours of calm, the fighting continues, the ATO headquarters declares that “cyborgs” are trying to drive the terrorists out of the airport.

“At the Donetsk airport, units of the Armed Forces are taking active steps to clear the airport territory, which until now was controlled by militants. The enemy is suffering losses in manpower and equipment."

At night, volunteers and military personnel pick up the wounded and bring in reinforcements. The losses for January 18 were not announced at the ATO headquarters.

On January 19, militants blow up the floors between the floors of the terminal, leaving the defenders in a small square between the two floors. They're building barricades there Anatoly "Spartan" Svirid and machine gunner Igor "Sodium" Branovitsky They collect and melt ice, obtaining water for the seriously wounded. At 10 a.m. the gas attack began: the terrorists first blew smoke to determine the direction of the wind, then an unknown gas that spasms the respiratory tract. The fighters breathe through wet wipes, but this does not help much - the gas corrodes the eyes and causes vomiting.

After some time of respite, the assault begins: tanks are fired at with direct fire from the old cyborg terminal.

Since lunchtime on January 19, attacks have been going on almost continuously. On the morning of January 20, after a short lull, militants blew up the terminal for the second time, mining the floors above and below the position of the Ukrainian military.

Those who were lying on the edge remained on top, and those who were in the center - next to the “three hundredths” and “two hundredths” - all went under the rubble. We got whoever we could. There are nine people alive, - Yuri Sova, “cyborg”, 80th brigade.

On the night of the 20th to the 21st there was heavy fog in the DAP area. This allows those wounded who can move to get to the Ukrainian positions in Piski. Together with them, the intelligence chief of the 81st airborne assault brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine leaves the blockade Andrey "Rakhman" Grechanov together with the scout "Zinoviy". They take an armored personnel carrier from their own, several soldiers for help, and try to return to the DAP to take out the seriously wounded and killed. A grenade launcher hits the car. “Rahman,” after a severe concussion and with a burnt face, still evacuates 15 fighters from the airport.

By this time, the “cyborgs” have practically nothing with which to fight: only a few working machine guns and some cartridges remain. Therefore, Ukrainian fighters begin negotiations with the militants about hospitalization of the wounded. So some of the airport defenders are captured.

In the first hours, the prisoners are brutally beaten, after which the interrogation begins. The 39-year-old suffers the most Igor Branovitsky- He was a machine gunner. After interrogation, he is returned to his cell with multiple fractures and thrown onto the floor next to the rest of the prisoners. “Cyborg” was cynically shot by a Motorola militant, who.

During the 242 days of defense of Donetsk airport, Ukrainian fighters lost more than a hundred people. More than 500 soldiers were wounded, and 24 “cyborgs” were captured. At least the approximate number of deaths from militants and Russian military personnel is unknown.

During the presentation of Sergei Loiko’s book “Airport” in Kharkov, the audience gave the “cyborgs” a standing ovation.

Today 11:01 Today 9:35 Yesterday 17:24 Yesterday 16:24 March 6 March 6 March 6 March 6 March 6 March 6 March 6 March 5 March 5 March 5 March 5 March 5 March 5 March 5 March 4

For a month now, the hottest battles have been taking place at the Donetsk airport. Mass heroism is shown by both sides - some protect, others build a road from corpses. The heroes are surrounded by a thick veil, built of lies, myths and populism. In memory of the fallen defenders, we decided to shed at least a little truth on the events and debunk the myths created in Moscow and Kyiv.

Donetsk Airport named after S.S. Prokofiev

The airfield in the city of Stalino was built on blood. The first bulldozers began leveling the area for the runway in 1933 - the hungriest year in the history of Ukraine. Even Russian historians who argue about Stalin’s guilt do not deny the very fact of the famine. First passenger aircraft We flew from Donetsk all the way to Starobelsk, a city in the Lugansk region, located 160 km from the airport.

In July 2011, for Euro 2012 it was built new strip, and in May 2012 - a new terminal that could handle 3,100 passengers in one hour. It was designed by the Croats and, as time has shown, they did their job well. It’s not for nothing that Kolesnikov (Minister of Transport) spent almost 7 billion hryvnia of state money, that is, 875 million dollars. The terminal is standing and can withstand hail. A lot was also stolen, but who will remember.

But even after the football championship, construction did not end. Donetsk oligarchs, like real feudal lords, cannot use a common terminal. For them, ordinary Donetsk residents are divided into two categories - servants and smerds. That's why they started building a VIP terminal. For the money of taxpayers, that is, us.

Sergei Prokofiev, after whom the airport is named, is a famous composer of the last century, born in the Donetsk region. A favorite of Stalin, his operas War and Peace and The Fiery Angel are perfectly suited to modern events.

Aerodrome

Can accommodate aircraft of any class. In 2013, it passed through 1,100,500 passengers. In addition to the charters of Akhmetov and company, a little more than a dozen airlines fly. The main directions are Kyiv and Moscow. Almost everything else is Turkish resorts. There is only one flight to Europe and beyond, to Munich. For the middle class of Donetsk feudal lords who have not yet bought a personal plane, there are also flights to Greece and the Emirates. The rest is just little things - Kutaisi, Surgut, Ashgabat, Israel. Also accepts cargo.

The first assault on Donetsk airport

After the capture of Slavyansk, a detachment of the 3rd special forces regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces arrived at the airport. The special forces were stationed in the old terminal, and the airport continued to receive and dispatch flights. In May, Khodakovsky’s detachment, called the “Vostok Battalion,” arrived in Donetsk. It included many people from the Caucasus - Chechnya, Dagestan and other places.

This is how it began...

On May 26, Khodakovsky, who, according to some sources, previously served in Alpha, held negotiations with the commander of our special forces. The conversation went something like this:

- Let's take the new terminal. So that there is no shooting and no unnecessary victims. You remain in the old terminal, you can report to your superiors that you did not give up your position. Who needs bloodshed? We will enter the working, new terminal, journalists from Russia will come and take pictures. The airport will continue to operate.

- Well, try it. We took the oath and are not going to become traitors, like some.

After this conversation, several KAMAZ trucks with militants moved towards the airport. They entered the new terminal, which contained passengers and airfield personnel. The special forces did not interfere with them so that there would be no casualties among the civilian population. The fighters first opened warning fire, which dispersed the civilians. At this time, the militants took up defensive positions and prepared to repel the attack. Then the battle began.

...and so it ended.

The militants managed to climb onto the roof and install portable air defense systems there. Ours used aviation, at least two Mi-24 helicopters and one Su-25 attack aircraft. Under the cover of smoke bombs, Khodakovsky’s militants undertook a maneuver later used by Strelkov in Slavyansk. The code name is “Set a Streak”.

They fled so quickly that at least one KAMAZ with wounded was fired upon by their own people - the militants thought that the special forces had decided to liberate all of Donetsk together with the airport. At that time, there were a lot of journalists in Donetsk, mostly Russian. They were called in to film the “bloodless surrender of Ukrainian special forces.” Most of them only knew that there would be some event at the airport that needed to be widely publicized, but they did not know the details.

Therefore, the defeat of the Vostok battalion was immortalized in thousands of photographs and videos. Such a wide response forced Khodakovsky to send a truck with a “cargo of 200” to Russia. They say that we send all the corpses of “volunteers” home so that they can be identified and buried at home.

Between May and September

After the assault, the airport stopped working for its intended purpose. The militants realized that they were too tough to compete with the special forces and no longer made any serious attempts to attack. Kirovograd residents easily coped with attacks carried out by militants from time to time.

Infographics General plan Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

1 - military unit A1428 air defense; 2 - Plant and base of the company that built the new terminal;

3 - military unit A1402, also air defense. The names of settlements and directions of roads are signed. All of them, except Gorlovka, are controlled by the Ukrainian Army.

Then another significant event followed - the embodiment of the age-old aspirations of lovers of the “Russian world”. The Metro supermarket, located as if on neutral territory, was completely looted. After this episode, support for the DPR sharply increased from local population. Dreams come true.

But the special forces had a hard time. At times there were problems with supply and removal of the wounded, and snipers worked against them.

Russian invasion and the situation at Donetsk airport

Fighting activity increased ahead of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on August 10 and went into full force on the morning of August 24. Offers to surrender and irregular shelling followed. The special forces responded with dense targeted fire and the most popular words from the Russian language. The Kirovograd group was reinforced by other troops.

Infographics detailed plan of Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

1 - Monastery; 2 - Metro Supermarket; 3 - Toyon/Lexus Auto Center; 4 - New terminal; 5 - Bus station; 6 - Oil depot; 7 - Cemetery of old aircraft; 8 - VIP terminal under construction; 9 - Hangars; 10 - Control tower (located outside the plan); 11 - Old terminal; 12 - Operating VIP terminal; 13 - Donbassaero Control Center; 14 - Hotel "Polet"; 15 - Headquarters civil aviation; 16 - Aviation repair center; 17 - Boiler room; 18 - Command and control center.

Objects that are not related to the airport infrastructure are outlined in blue.

The DPR militia began shelling the airport with artillery on August 20. Until this date, fire was directed at Marinka and Avdiivka, the largest populated areas controlled by Ukrainian troops near Donetsk. After this date, the shelling did not stop.

First full-scale assault

The first serious assault on the airport took place on the night of September 1, simultaneously with the attack on Lugansk airport. In Lugansk, our military left the airfield, or rather, the ruins that remained of it. This object was behind enemy lines; there was no point in holding the buildings destroyed to the ground.

This is how they see it from Moscow

Regular Russian units, reinforced by DPR militants, went on the assault. Artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were working. Tanks and other armored vehicles were used. But the defenders managed to repel this attempt, like all the others.

Other attempts

The DPR announced assault attempts on September 28, October 2, 3 and 6. After which they announced the capture of the airport. In fact, assault attempts were made every day from September 1st until October 7th, when this article is being written. There is some truth in the dates mentioned by the militants. It was on September 28 that the militants made their first assault attempt, in which the Russian military did not take part. At least as part of the assault squads.

Approximate front line

Tactics changed, more and more units were brought in, but the result was always the same - mountains of corpses. The attacker always suffers greater losses than the defender, especially if the positions are prepared, there is artillery support and reconnaissance is active.

Heroes of Donetsk airport

On both sides there is mass heroism. Every day there are killed and wounded, but no one is going to give up their plans. Those who believe that there are only heroes on one side, whatever it may be, should think about it. If you minimize the strength and heroism of your enemy, you minimize the cost of your victory or defeat.

Defenders

At first, the airport was defended only by special forces. In August they were reinforced by units of the 93rd OMBR, 17th TBR, DUK Right Sector. The Dnepr-1 battalion is stationed in Piski, some of its fighters are also at the airport. On October 3, a rotation was carried out, these units were replaced by 79 AB and other units of the already involved brigades, but many heroes refused the rotation.

3rd Special Forces Regiment

Elite part of the Ukrainian army. Near Kirovograd is located main center USSR special forces training. It is clear that the local unit, 10th Special Forces Brigade, was the best in the Union. Its history is covered with such unfading glory that Putin even tried to steal it. He attributed all the merits of the tenth separate brigade to his unit with an identical name, formed in a completely different way from people who had nothing to do with the Soviet brigade.

Let us cite just one fact that speaks of the fanatical devotion of these people to their work. The wife of one of the dead regiment officers is still paying off the loan. Her husband, back under Yanukovych, bought not a refrigerator, not a TV, but a high-quality parachute. The embezzlers gave him a meager salary and shabby, old equipment. But the hero spent these pennies on increasing the defense capability of his country! As soon as it is possible to speak out loud about some facts, we will devote a lengthy article to this glorious unit. It's the least we can do for these heroes.

Many special forces soldiers refuse to rotate. From time to time they go to Sands to wash themselves and return back.

Right sector

One of the fighters of the DUK “Right Sector” was given the call sign “Obezbashenny.” This word applies to any other fighter. These people could have joined the National Guard, served in the army, or chosen any volunteer battalion, but they consciously decided to become suicide bombers.

Have you heard of at least one captured representative of the Right Sector? Have you heard that a fighter from this corps was exchanged for a separatist? If not, then imagine what they do to them and whether they surrender alive even in the most hopeless situation.

There are Right Sector fighters at the airport itself and in Sands, but their main task is supply. Playing “Russian roulette” with five rounds in the cylinder of a revolver is much safer than driving an armored vehicle or jeep through an open, well-visited, and long-shot area.

93 Separate mechanized brigade

It is this formation that provides equipment and heavy weapons to the airport’s defenders. Brigade commander Oleg Mikhailovich Mikats leads the defense. The fighters fight shoulder to shoulder with the “Right Sector” and special forces.

17 Tank Brigade

The best Ukrainian tank crews at the start of the war served in two tank brigades. Therefore, companies and even platoons of these brigades were scattered along the entire front. Some of them ended up at the airport.

Against the background of a captured tank

79 Airmobile Brigade

Suffered heavy losses near Zelenopole and was sent for rearmament and replenishment. Then the famous Yuri “Wings of the Phoenix” Biryukov took over the brigade. Thanks to the brigade officers, Biryukov, other volunteers and even a little from the Ministry of Defense, it turned into the most equipped unit in the entire Ukrainian Army. The equipment and weapons of the paratroopers are ordinary, but the equipment... And the fighting spirit. The fighters believe that after Zelenopole they had an unpaid debt to the Russian army, and they are ready to fully repay it. With very high interest rates.

Battalion Dnepr-1

One of the first volunteer battalions formed after the start of the war. It is these fighters that Russian propaganda calls “Kolomoisky’s battalions.” Such a negative attitude on the part of the enemy indicates the high combat effectiveness and resilience of the unit. It was not officially entered into the airport; it is held by the village of Peski, but some fighters themselves asked to go to the airport.

Stormtroopers

First, Russia sent its special forces to the Donetsk airport, reinforcing it with DPR militants. Then she increased the number of special forces. Then she gave it regular army units. Then I added militants.

We assume that the Russian military fought heroically (if you look at the situation through the eyes of a Russian). But they failed to take the airport. We suffered quite heavy losses. During the next assaults, the number of soldiers of the regular army of the Russian Federation began to decrease, and the number of militants began to increase. Since September 28, we have not seen Russian soldiers, but Russian officers are still in command of the operation. It is possible that Russian special forces, marines and motorized riflemen are taking part, or they could be involved at any moment. We have already written about Russian units fighting in Ukraine.

Almost all units of the regular army of the Russian Federation that were introduced into the territory of Ukraine passed through this meat grinder. Not every soldier went on the attack, but there were representatives from each unit. The artillerymen, of course, did not attack, they only supported with fire.

The same can be said about militant groups. Even Cossacks from the LPR were brought to Donetsk for this purpose. Therefore, there is no point in describing each division - name any, you won’t be mistaken, they took part. Why was this done? The answer is at the end of the article.

Myths of Donetsk airport

It is worth noting that creating myths around is beneficial to all parties to the conflict. Lies come from all sides - both from Putin and Poroshenko. But none of them concerns those heroes who stand there to the death.

Myth No. 1 Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

Somewhere in mid-September, such a thing as Donetsk Airport. Prokofiev, simply ceased to exist. It cannot accept passengers - the terminals, along with the entire infrastructure, are almost destroyed. It cannot receive aircraft - navigation and radar equipment has been practically destroyed, as well as oil depots, repair and other facilities necessary for aviation.

Part aviation equipment is located far beyond the airfield, no one knows what’s wrong with it now. The condition of the runway is a big question. Restoring even minimal functionality of the airfield may take many months. The problem is that it is not safe to repair dilapidated objects. It's better to tear everything down and rebuild. It will be even cheaper this way.

Therefore, it would be more logical to use the phrase “the territory of the former airport named after. Prokofiev."

Myth No. 2 Donetsk airport has been taken

If someone tells you that they have taken over the airport, feel free to send them to Putin. The airport area is more than 400 hectares, 99% of which is completely open area. All this land is visible not only with the help of drones, but also with simple, stationary devices. The artillery of both sides has already targeted this area very well, so it is simply impossible to control it. Neither Ukraine nor the DPR. Everything that appears there immediately comes under dense and accurate artillery fire.

This is Lugansk airport

Under the airport there are many underground communications, ranging from a tunnel connecting anti-aircraft units to a bomb shelter and terminal basements. Dozens of buildings, large and small, allow you to hide from shelling.

We can only talk about control over specific buildings. The main stronghold of our forces is the new terminal. The artillery that the militants have can completely destroy all buildings on the territory of the airport, as was done in Lugansk. Ukrainian can do the same. But the parties are trying, if possible, to preserve at least something that could, at least conditionally, be called a captured/protected airport.

But even if the militants seize all the buildings, it will not be possible to talk about complete control. Special forces can appear at any moment, right out of the ground. So, even if the terrorists knock our people out of the buildings, they will be a little scared to spend the night in these huge, empty, gigantic buildings.

The militant commanders will not dare to leave a garrison of several hundred people overnight (and less will not work - too large areas need to be kept under control). Ukrainian soldiers won’t even need to knock them out. Lovers of the Russian world woke up in the morning and were missing a dozen or two of their comrades. And even fewer bodies were found. And so every night. Do you think all these Givi and Motorolas are going to achieve such a Pyrrhic victory?

To take the Donetsk airport, you need to occupy all settlements located within a radius of 10 km from it.

Myth No. 3 The situation at Donetsk airport

If we talk about the situation at the Donetsk airport, then we need to call exact time and list all the objects in question. For example: “As of 16:21 07.10.2014, the Ukrainian military controls objects A, B, C and two floors of object D. Militants control the ground parts of objects D and E, and fighting is taking place in objects Z, Z, and I.” In five minutes, everything can change dramatically.

The main myth. Strategic importance of Donetsk airport

Both sides of the conflict call the airport a “strategic” facility. But that's not true. The famous volunteer Roman Donik said the best about the airport in his

The history of the battles for the Donetsk airport was marked by the operation that DPR forces carried out on the 20th of January 2015. Then, the already strengthened militia army was able to deliver a fairly significant blow to the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which were located around the cities of Novorossiya; the main blow was dealt by the soldiers of the Sparta and Somalia battalions.

The shelling of the control tower by Somali tanks after many months yielded results - it collapsed, depriving the Ukrainian military of the support of snipers and artillery spotters. The DPR tanks that made their way into the airport destroyed the fortifications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the Sparta strike group began clearing the new terminal. Having driven the “cyborgs” into a trap, the militia occupied the upper floors and basement of the new terminal. The Ukrainian forces were locked on the first floor, but they refused to surrender and responded to all offers of peace with fire.

Then the militia decided to do something differently: they planted explosives in the basement under the defense site and blew it up. Two explosions, on January 19 and 20, put an end to the assault on the DAP. Most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters died under the rubble, and on the afternoon of January 21, the surviving Ukrainian military were forced to surrender to the militia.

As a result of a months-long siege, the Donetsk airport turned into ruins, filled with explosives - mines and tripwires. The shelling of the territory did not stop for a long time.

* An organization prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

January 24, 2016

Battle for Donetsk airport. Unknown details of the most tragic special operation of the ATO

Battle for Donetsk airport. Unknown details of the most tragic special operation of the ATO.

“We hung over them like the sword of Damocles over their heads.”

That's how he remembers last days defense of Donetsk airport, brigade commander of the 81st brigade Evgeniy Moisyuk. It was his team that was the last to leave the DAP at the end of January, when only fragments of drywall and broken glass remained from the airport building. The airport is very close to Donetsk itself, so fighting is still going on there.

“We still remain that sword,” says Moysyuk.

A year has passed since the events of last winter. The 242-day defense of the DAP remains one of the most tragic and heroic events of the ATO. However, even a year later, many questions remain regarding the last days of the airport.

“Ukrainian Pravda” tried to recreate the honest history of the last months of the defense of the airport, talking with the participants in those events and the Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko.

A plan with many unknowns

Militants seized the Donetsk airport building on the night of May 25 and 26. However, just two days later, the Ukrainian military liberated the airport and took up defensive positions. Since then, the Ukrainian Armed Forces held the territory of the DAP for 242 days, until the buildings located on its territory were completely destroyed as a result of lengthy battles. The last month of defending the airport was especially grueling.

Under New Year the situation around the DAP worsened - despite the ceasefire, the militants did not give up their attempts to drive the ATO forces out of the airport. They blocked the road to the terminal, making it difficult to deliver provisions and ammunition. On January 13, as a result of shelling, the control tower, which was depicted on numerous motivators and posters as a symbol of the confrontation between the Ukrainian military, collapsed.

Two days later, militant leader Alexander Zakharchenko boorishly poked his finger in the chest of a Ukrainian colonel and boasted that his thugs would take the airport in 30 minutes. Zakharchenko’s words turned out to be a bluff - the militants were unable to oust the Ukrainian military either after 30 minutes or after 24 hours. They managed to capture part of the DAP and block the fighters of the 81st brigade in the terminal only on January 18.

The ATO headquarters was forced to act in response. On the same day, a special operation unfolded around the DAP, which was developed to save the situation and the soldiers who were surrounded. If the special operation had been carried out, the terminal and the entire airport would have been behind our forces. The front line would move beyond the village of Spartak, which is almost in Donetsk, and below the airport terminals.

But almost nothing of what was planned worked out. Yes, the militants suffered constant losses. Yes, we managed to destroy the Putilovsky Bridge at the entrance to Donetsk. Yes, we took control of the village of Peski. And only on January 26, finally, the Dutovskaya mine.

But the Ukrainian forces were unable to implement other maneuvers - because of the fog, they lost their course, arrived at the place on time, and if they attacked successfully, they could not resist and retreated. Several unsuccessful attempts to advance forced the headquarters to abandon offensive operations.

Meanwhile, a bunch of brave “cyborgs” held the remains of the cardboard terminal - the enemy’s armor-piercing bullet pierced four walls at a time, due to constant shelling, the airport was virtually cut off from supplies of food and water, delivering any cargo to the territory was a risk to life. The militants also could not capture the rest of the airport - after many unsuccessful attempts to storm it, they simply decided to destroy it.

On January 19, militants blew up the building for the first time. According to the testimony of Ukrainian fighters, even then all the ceilings of the terminal fell into the basement, and the wave swept away all the barricades and shelters.

The fighters were expecting an attack by the militants, but it did not come. The tragic crown of the history of the defense of the DAP was the second super-powerful explosion, which on January 20 buried dozens of “cyborgs” under the rubble. According to the testimony of the fighters with whom the UP spoke, the militants used anti-ship mines to destroy the terminal completely.

The scout of the eighty-first brigade, Andrei Grechany, was among those who pulled the guys out from under the rubble, and when it got dark, he and another soldier went on foot to Peski to get transport to take out the wounded. Not everyone was saved.

Relatives of the fighters watched videos of the militants from the captured terminal in search of their relatives - among the prisoners and dead.

For several weeks after this, the bodies of “cyborgs” were pulled out from under the rubble. At least four of them blew themselves up with grenades to avoid surrendering alive. Their names are still unknown. On the day the terminal was blown up, at a distance of 800 meters to 2 kilometers from it, our sappers carried out a secret operation. There were 5 powerful explosions on the runway that put it out of action. This took about 7.5 tons of TNT.

Commander of the 1st battalion of the 79th brigade, full holder of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. The first losses among his guys occurred on September 26. In December, he handed over the airport to the 81st brigade, which held it until the last minutes.

The most important question that concerns me regarding the DAP is “Why was Donetsk airport not initially considered as a defense springboard?”

After the first battle on May 26, 2014, no one improved the engineering barriers there. Only in November we began to strengthen it - we brought sand in bags. It would have been possible to strengthen the DAP earlier, dig in in places, and bring concrete blocks. And in November, neither them nor the crane could be delivered.

It's hard to defend a glass building. Plasterboard crumbled, bullets flew through, columns ricocheted. We brought in sand until our dump truck was hit. For the militants, the DAP was a training ground; they trained there. And we defended every piece of land at the airport. This is why he was important to us. I think if there were no Donetsk airport, we would not be in Avdeevka, Kramatorsk and Slavyansk now.

I had to take over the defense in the fall. Nobody appointed me. When “Reduta” (commander of the 3rd Kirovograd special forces regiment, who led the defense of the airport since May 26, 2014 - UP) was wounded on October 4, I was already giving the commands - there were more of my people in the DAP, I was responsible for them.

Before the departure of “Redut” and his group, Donetsk airport was defended by about 200 people. There were 100 of mine. I couldn’t cover that volume. Started everything from scratch. They gave me artillery under my leadership, the 93rd brigade helped. DUK “Right Sector” was located in the old, new terminal, at a height. Representatives of Dnepr carried out aerial reconnaissance of the Donetsk airport.

We could not have done it without the volunteers who were in Donetsk itself. The 93rd Brigade connected me with the guys. Donetsk volunteers shared information about the militants, where and from where they were shooting. And we adjusted... I myself was three kilometers from the Donetsk airport in Tonenkoye. A small room with a radio station through which I kept in touch with the terminals. I lost the most people at the Donetsk airport - 15 soldiers from my unit.

The militants did not allow us to take the wounded. Once we agreed with Givi that we would pick up the wounded: “Now an armored personnel carrier with a red cross will arrive. We will take the wounded and dead.” “Yes, yes, yes, okay, we’ll let it pass,” he replied. We had a radio station tuned to their frequencies - we listened to them. And so he says to his people: “Now the dill will enter an armored personnel carrier with a red cross. So - he shouldn't come out. You have to destroy him completely.” He told us one thing, the same thing to the coordination center, and here on the radio station the third. In general, we sent not an armored personnel carrier, but a tank. He poured well where they were shooting at him.

During my time, they took control of Opytnoye and Vodyanoye - this was very important for control over the Donetsk airport. Could you have taken more? Let's look at things realistically. You won't be able to eat the whole cake - you won't be able to handle it. Just a piece or two that you can handle. For us it was a piece of Donetsk airport. We were replaced in December by the 81st Brigade, which held the terminal until the last days.

The commander of the 81st brigade, Colonel Yevgeny Moysyuk, took over all control. He had a lot of mobilized and few contract soldiers. Therefore, he selected the best. They prepared, they knew where they were going. I told them that they needed generators, warm clothes, and surveillance devices. At minus 20, you can’t stand on concrete at all, so the boards were brought in.”

Brigade commander of the 81st brigade, colonel, awarded the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, III and II degrees. Since the end of November, he has been in charge of the defense of Donetsk airport. His fighters held the terminal until the last. “At some stage, the enemy realized that he would not be able to take the airport by storm, so they began to destroy it. At first we tried to expand control and neutralize the militants' direct fire at the terminal. On January 15, they tried to unblock the airport - to take the monastery near the terminals (from which militants fired at the ATO forces - UP) and recapture part of the territory. If we had taken it, we would have been able to easily provide the personnel at the airport with everything they needed.

During one of these attempts, I had to personally go there with the personnel of my 90th battalion and the 2nd battalion of the 93rd brigade, which did not know me. This was a combined detachment. I am a strange commander for them - they were unsure and hesitated. I had to say: “Who else do you need? I am an Airborne Colonel, brigade commander, performing the maximum task of a company commander and going with you. Who else should you invite - the president?”

Enemy tanks were hitting the terminal almost every hour, so we had to act as quickly as possible. There was no time to prepare. The bravest went there. But we didn't succeed. The enemy was able to restore fire from heavy machine guns. There were objective and subjective reasons. The detachment was consolidated.

After the first bombing of the terminal, we tried again to unblock the fighters and capture additional structures in order to expand the zone of influence. The unit that went to the terminal was led by a very brave man - the commander of the 90th battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Kuzminykh. But because of the fog, they made a mistake and, along with some of the soldiers, were captured.

The militants realized that they could not take the terminal, so they decided to wipe it off the face of the earth. After being released from captivity, “Rahman” said that the separatists brought very powerful anti-ship mines (their charge can be equivalent to from 400 kg to 1 ton of TNT - UP).

These mines were dropped from the top floor, which was controlled by the enemy. It's on our fighters' heads. One did not detonate, they threw the second one, then both worked. At this time, I and other commanders were at the control center - in the basement in Vodyanoy (at least 6 km from the terminal - UP) and we were shaken violently there. Imagine how those who were in the terminal felt. The details of these explosions are still not fully known. But this clearly indicated that they would no longer storm it, but decided to destroy it.

Imagine a rectangular terminal building. It was crumbling from the shelling; they calmly climbed up those ruins. And ours are inside.

There is a brave soldier from the 90th Baht, call sign “North”, with a very strong will. He was the right hand of the deceased Hero of Ukraine Ivan Ivanovich Zubkov. So he says that before this explosion there was relative peace in the terminal for two days. At that time we were attacking Spartak, Peski, advancing... Those one and a half to two days (18, 19 and the morning of January 20 - UP), while we were pressing from all sides, it was quiet in the terminal, they were able to rest, organize a defense system in a new way .

And although our attacks failed, the enemy decided that they could lose the airport. That's why I think they blew up the terminal. After the explosion, we had to take out the wounded and get people out. A group led by the head of intelligence, Andrei Grechany with the call sign “Rakhman” (who, after the explosion, came on foot from the terminal for help. He rescued at least 20 fighters from the rubble - UP) went to the DAP in three MTLBs.

On the way back, “Rahman’s” car was hit, it overturned, and the driver died. “Rahman” had burns to his eyes, he was practically taken out of there, he didn’t see anything. Thus ended the last attempt to evacuate people from the terminal. Was it worth keeping the airport at all? Yes. Certainly.

For the enemy, it is like the sword of Damocles, which constantly hangs over him. DAP is almost Donetsk. When our tankers broke through to the Putilovsky Bridge, there was such a panic: “That’s it, dill is already in Donetsk!” We are still like that sword to them. That is why they are afraid of us and are constantly shelling our positions.

I arrived at the command post, from where we led the defense of the airport, on November 30. Then the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade was under my command and began to carry out tasks in the DAP. They were subsequently joined by the 3rd Battalion of the 80th Brigade (now the 122nd Battalion of the 81st Brigade).

Formally, the 93rd Brigade was responsible for the defense of the airport. But since there were more of our personnel, everything was directly supervised by the battalion commanders whose personnel were there.”

He was part of the group that blew up the airport runway. For the operation he received the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, III degree. I was called to the airport area in December. Together with the colonel, I had to calculate how to damage the runway of the Donetsk airport in case the appropriate command was received.

The main goal is to cause such damage that even a military aircraft cannot land there. Why even? Because they need a very short distance to take off and land. For a month I scouted the situation in the DAP area, as I had to suggest how the task could be accomplished. I was in Peski, Vodyanoye, Tonenkoye, on a weather tower, on a high-rise building, on a tractor camp, where our guys stood. I went to places only for reconnaissance, sometimes I had to crawl on my bellies, sometimes I had to dash to the runway.

Then he took pieces of paper, made sketches, wrote down data, and made calculations. For this they gave me the call sign “Artist”. In the end, we decided to divide the strip into five segments, in each of which to carry out an explosion. The situation at the airport was heating up. The operation was scheduled for January 20. Up to 25 people were supposed to work on the takeoff, including five officers from the Mine Action Center and the Central Engineering Support Directorate.

Other fighters are from the 91st Engineer Regiment. The operation began early in the morning. However, at first we couldn’t even get onto the runway because of heavy fire from Grads - we had explosives in our cars. The operation was resumed almost overnight. Every leader must somehow support the guys. I cannot show that I myself am panicking and afraid. Getting into the car, he said: “Don’t worry. I promise you that you will come out alive and healthy. I brought you here, I will take you away from here.”

We had five cars, each with a trailer with explosives. The power of each device is 1.5 tons of TNT equivalent. We left in two ways - three groups in ZILs from Peski. And our two are perpendicular to the strip - from the side of the weather tower. We went to MTLB because more militants were concentrated in these places.

We were covered by tanks from the weather tower, supported from the terminal, and fired at the enemy from all possible points. Otherwise, we would not have been able to leave. We were accompanied by a brigade with two armored personnel carriers.

Eventually, we made it so that the strip could no longer function. The devices detonated 20-25 minutes later, when we had already reached Vodyanoye. After the explosions there was such silence, not a single shot for 5 minutes... and imagine, the blast wave could be heard 3 kilometers away.

Everyone was figuring out what happened, from which side what exploded. No one - neither ours nor the militants - could believe that someone was doing something on the strip. After all, our operation was secret and lasted about an hour and a half. Was I scared? Yes. Because there is only one life. I knew where I was going. Understand, if something had gone wrong, then all that would be left of us all would be ashes, there wouldn’t even be anything left for DNA analysis. So they would consider us missing.”

Responsible for overall coordination and management of the DAP operation in January 2015.

Why did you have to plan a special operation in the DAP?

In January the situation was more or less stable - a truce. But at that time it was difficult to hold the airport; it was completely destroyed. On January 15, Russian units and mercenaries violated this regime and began to storm the new terminal where our military were located. In order to hold it, it was necessary either to create the appropriate conditions - to go out on the flanks, unblock and take control of the entire DAP and the areas that are adjacent to it. Or take the defenders out of what's left of the terminal.

Was there a plan “B” or any other proposals for conducting the operation?

The option was considered: go on line railway behind the airport towards Donetsk. Then we would be doomed to lead fighting in urban conditions - both when conducting active offensive operations in order to reach the corresponding line, and when holding the line. We did not have enough forces and means to conduct combat operations in the city, to capture and hold such a site, so we abandoned this option.

I arrived at the command post of the 81st brigade in Vodyanoye on January 17th. I was going to stay there for a couple of days, but everything dragged on for 10 days. I was responsible for the issue of general coordination and general management. Already on the morning of January 18, we began active actions. Direct control of the Airborne Forces units was carried out by Colonel, and now Major General Mikhail Zabrodsky, the sector “B” group was led by General Igor Dovgan. The group included the 93rd brigade, led by Colonel, now Major General Oleg Mikats, part of the already transferred 30th brigade, led by Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Sobko.

The commanders developed the basic elements of the operation plan. We listened to them and decided to go to the line, take control of Veseloye, Zhabovo, Spartak and thus control the entire territory around the airport. On the afternoon of January 18, the attempt was unsuccessful, so it was decided to withdraw the defenders from the remains of the terminal. We also planned to use army attack aircraft, but, unfortunately, weather conditions from January 18 to January 27 this opportunity was not given.

Why didn't you take into account the fog factor? There are forecasts from weather forecasters.

No one planned the operation three or four weeks before. A ceasefire was in effect. But the militants suddenly began to storm the DAP - we decided to respond adequately and also begin active operations. They acted according to the fact, in the conditions and weather that existed. We made appropriate decisions.

We did not have time to wait until it became sunny in 10 days - there was a difficult situation in the airport building: problems with rotation, with strengthening forces in the terminal, with their provision... To navigate in the fog, a map, a compass - a simple device and GPS were needed. Of course, not everyone had them. Was it possible to use them in a short-lived battle?

But it turned out that most of the planned operations could not be carried out.

A little different. We inflicted serious losses on the enemy and stopped their advance. But a number of tasks could not be completed. There were several reasons for this. The first is the lack of the required amount of forces and resources. There was also a shortage of combat mine clearing vehicles - there were only two of them. One of them was blown up. Although the other one worked, its crew, having survived 8 explosions, was no longer able to adequately respond to changes in the situation due to the resulting concussion. We have now decided that for each BIS we need to have at least three trained crews. The machine can still withstand it, but people cannot.

What happened in Spartak, why didn’t you manage to take it?

The tanks completed the task - they went through all this locality to the Putilovsky Bridge, actually entered Donetsk. They destroyed two militant tanks and an ammunition depot there. But they broke through high speed. The militants cut off the paratroopers with fire, and they stopped in front of Spartak. Not seeing any infantry behind them, the tanks returned to their original position. And then in Spartak we lost two tanks. Almost all of the people survived.

Was there any contact with the landing force that was left behind?

There was a connection, but there was no longer an opportunity...

What was happening in the new terminal building at that time?

The two groups performed different tasks. A unit of the 90th battalion was supposed to enter the airport building through the runway. Due to dense fog - visibility 50-100 meters - the unit, together with battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Kuzminykh, passed the airport building. They found themselves on the other side of the terminal and came under heavy fire. They were surrounded and taken prisoner. The other part of the forces and resources retreated back. Now it is difficult to explain how everything happened. But from what we heard on the radio, the situation was very difficult. Another group - the 79th brigade - entered through the weather tower. She, too, was stopped by enemy fire. It was difficult to navigate due to the fog and they retreated to their previous positions.

After that, did you still try to storm the militants’ positions, or were you already planning a retreat?

We planned several events, including access to the monastery in order to slightly expand the territory under our control. Sometimes we encountered the fact that the fighters refused to go. There was a case when the 81st brigade commander, Colonel Evgeny Moysyuk, came out and said: “I’m going, who’s with me?” Then about 30-40 people agreed. But, unfortunately, this attempt failed. On January 21-22, militants blew up the terminal twice.

The second floor completely collapsed, then many guys were covered with stones, some of our soldiers were captured. We tried to get the defenders out of the terminal. The group of “Rahman” (he pulled out at least 20 fighters from the rubble - UP) - the head of reconnaissance of the 81st brigade - tried to remove people and take out the wounded in three MTLBs.

(The car of “Rahman” himself then overturned. The militants began to fire at it, the driver died, and the car itself caught fire. “Rahman” barely managed to get out - UP). After this, at night we sent a group of four soldiers from the 81st brigade, who were supposed to determine whether anyone was alive in the terminal.

How did these fighters get to the terminal?

They crawled on their bellies to the terminal through the runway on the Opytny side. According to Colonel Moysyuk’s report, they illuminated the building’s territory with flashlights and shouted, but none of our soldiers responded. They didn't find anyone alive there. Perhaps the guys were there, but they were afraid because they didn’t understand who came in - us or the enemy... Then, unfortunately, our group went out and didn’t bring anyone out.

They say that some soldiers, in order not to surrender, blew themselves up in the terminal. This is true?

There was such a fact. After an unsuccessful attempt to get people out of the terminal, some of them were captured, while others did not surrender. Four guys, one of them is an officer. I received an SMS from them to one of our fighters that “we are in the terminal and will not surrender alive.” And then there was information from intercepting the militants’ communications that four defenders of the terminal blew themselves up with grenades. Unfortunately, we don't know their names yet. Perhaps they are among the missing. It is our responsibility to establish their names. These are truly heroes.

The soldiers say that after Vodyanoy you were at the “Kater” stronghold, which was very close to Spartak, and there were even reports that you were killed there. This is true?

“Boat”, or “Zenith” is the position of the former radar company. There were concrete underground shelters, so it was more or less safe there. Although the AN/TPQ station (a mobile system for determining the number of artillery and rocket attacks - ed.), which we had on the “Katera”, recorded 600-700 shell explosions every day. Everyone who was at that strong point was a little stunned.

One day, it seems, January 25, there was an attack on the “Kater”. Then we recorded more than 1000 ruptures, and then the station that detected them refused to count them. The militants went on the offensive and tried to break through to the Avdeevka area between “Kater” and Opytny. All this is also in poor visibility conditions. We lost our bearings, slipped past the “Boat”, and a strong battle ensued. They suffered heavy losses. You come out onto a white field covered with snow, and on it there are only black spots - the bodies of militants and traces of explosions. About 30 people were found between “Kater” and Opytny, and about 20-25 dead were also found on the side of the Dutovka mine.

What kind of story is this when militant websites told you that you were killed in Avdiivka?

I found out about this a few days later. I also wondered why people looked at me strangely. I thought maybe I hadn’t shaved, but everyone there was like that. And then in Kyiv they showed me a printout from the Internet that Muzhenko was killed in Avdeevka. I was at the strong point on the “Katera” from the night of the 18th (January - A.) until the 26th inclusive. This information apparently appeared after the Grad hit our positions. It was evening. I went outside to our command post. I heard a volley, and then saw a wall of fire moving towards me. At such moments, the instinct of self-preservation is triggered. I just saw it out of the corner of my eye - and you’re already flying for cover.

After the battle, were Russian passports found?

Trophies were captured: a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle, an armored personnel carrier, an MT-12 (anti-tank gun - UP). There were prisoners. There were dead: Ukrainians who acted on the side of the militants. But there were also many Russians, including career military personnel. Then we found documents from them that testified to the presence of Russians in Donbass.

Was anyone held accountable for refusing to go on a mission, or did they arrive too late? Is there any responsibility for this?

I wouldn’t say that anyone categorically said: “No, I refuse, I won’t go.” I don't know such facts. In general, there is criminal liability for failure to comply with combat orders. If the order is carried out, but the goal is not achieved, there is a justification. Then the purely moral responsibility of man remains. I think this is the most difficult thing - moral responsibility for a comrade - the readiness to protect, help your own, pull them out. Volunteers were recruited to complete the tasks. We understood that you couldn’t send people there “under the radar,” that is, by order. And if you send it, then with what motivation will they perform this task?

Then there were volunteers.

Was holding the airport with such forces a political or tactical task?

The political issue was generally holding the line of defense. And the airport itself had strategic importance, so we kept him from April 2014 to January 2015. It was a definite springboard for further active actions, so that they could enter Donetsk. If it had not been defended back in May, our line of defense would have been located to the west, it would have been possible to send cargo to Donetsk by plane and support bandit groups throughout the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

Why then was the airport, made of plasterboard, not strengthened? Didn’t they import reinforced concrete blocks or make a fortress out of it?

All the time from May 26, when we recaptured the airport from the militants, until mid-July, the DAP was practically surrounded. We delivered food and people, for example, the mechanized company of the 72nd brigade there by air. There was no direct access to the airport. Then in the summer we unblocked it and liberated most of the territory of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions, including the release of the airport. But we assumed that we would go forward, because the DAP had to remain in the rear.

When a truce was declared in September, the militants did not remain on a certain line, but moved forward in violation of the Minsk agreements. Unfortunately, we did not have the strength and means to repel them - then the 79th and 95th brigades in the south carried out a raid. Only after this, in September, we were able to strengthen the group at the airport and stabilize the line around the airport. After that, we could only deliver food and ammunition to the GAP and carry out rotations. But we could not deliver a column with material resources or concrete blocks. They were carrying bags of construction material.

You are accused of the fact that during the January operation there were no written orders, everything was oral. This is true?

There were orders. There is a certain procedure. If I am one on one with another commander, anyone from the command sets the task orally, it is always confirmed by a written document. Regardless of whether it was completed successfully or not. Even if the command was given without witnesses. This way, the senior commander develops trust, and the senior commander trusts his subordinate. This is the main point in the relationship between commanders and military personnel.

And all these insinuations are aimed at undermining trust in their superiors, their commanders, unbalancing the control system, so that the soldier does not follow the orders of the platoon commander, company commander, the company commander is the commander of the regiment, brigade, and so on to the very top. Then the army is left without control.

How often did you communicate with the president during decisions regarding the airport? Who convinced whom?

Nobody convinced anyone. Such a definition is unacceptable for a military structure. The President knew that I would be there. I contacted him periodically and reported to him almost every day. During the attack, I tried to report an objective, complete picture. There were no attempts to embellish anything, not to say or not to say anything.

How did you coordinate the decision to leave the terminals with the president?

He reported that the situation had developed in such a way that there were no other options. That it is necessary to reach a certain line. The President accepted my report. In general, we now regard the attack on the DAP as a diversionary strike. The militants wanted us to gather all our forces and resources in the airport area. Their first task was to pull all the forces and resources to the Airport in order to begin the operation on Debaltsevo.

Second: if successful, they wanted to reach the corresponding borders - Avdeevka, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Kurakhovo, and take control of the infrastructure facilities that provide Donetsk.

And on the 26th, when the operation was suspended and we realized that the tension had subsided, we transferred our reserves to the Artemovsk area. It was on time. In mid-February, we had to almost completely expose the direction of the Crimean isthmus, where we had only two motorized infantry battalions with light weapons. This is how the operation at the Donetsk airport ended.

Do you consider yourself responsible for the fact that you were not able to fully carry out your intended operation?

I am responsible for all the decisions I made. Regardless of whether they had a successful ending or, unfortunately, not. I didn’t give up any of my decisions. And “experts” who give various assessments and forecasts cannot be objective.

In order to evaluate decisions, their expediency, objectivity, and situational conditions, you must be in that place at that time and bear the same responsibility. It is necessary to take into account psychological factors, moral ones, the availability of forces and means, weather conditions, and the situation, in order to evaluate all this, it must be seen, felt and understood.

Original taken from u_96 in Battles for Donetsk airport or “There is nothing left to defend!..” (c)

A view from Kyiv:

Yuri Butusov.

BATTLE FOR DONETSK AIRPORT. WHAT HAPPENED, REASONS AND RESULTS

So, the heroic defense of the new and old terminals of Donetsk airport ended after 242 days. There is nothing left to defend. The $200 million terminal remains in tattered ruins. The remaining wounded defenders were captured. According to Censor.Net, in the battles for the airport in the new terminal and in the vicinity of the airport on January 16-22, the death of 23 Ukrainian soldiers, including one Georgian citizen, was reliably confirmed - their bodies were taken to morgues. 16 servicemen were captured. The fate of at least 11 fighters has not been established - participants in the battle say that he could have remained under the rubble of the last fortifications of the new terminal. Volunteers are trying to organize the search for bodies. It is possible that the list of losses is not final.

What happened? Censor.Net analyzed the situation from the point of view of military tactics and the circumstances known to us.

Tactical situation

First of all, you need to understand what positions at the airport are. This is a completely open area where you can only take observation positions in individual buildings. These buildings cannot be held by large forces, since with the concentration of forces they become a convenient target for artillery and tanks, and large losses are inevitable. Therefore, initially the defense of the airport was a chain of separate observation posts that called for fire support if necessary. Our forces in the airport buildings never amounted to more than 100-120 fighters scattered across points. But most importantly, these observation posts adjusted artillery fire. It was the artillery that made it possible to confidently hold the airport observation posts. The second important factor was armored vehicles. A great threat to the airport defenders was posed by attacks from enemy tanks, which struck with precise direct fire. The tank is mobile, it is difficult to cover it with artillery. Therefore, 2 tanks and several infantry fighting vehicles for anti-tank defense were concentrated at the airport. After the enemy began to attack our armored vehicles in the new terminal with new anti-tank guided missiles, our command changed the support scheme. A tank unit was stationed in Sands, which always kept 3-4 tanks in constant readiness. To suppress enemy firing points and observation points, and to repel tank attacks, our tanks quickly moved out of Sand.
From the outskirts of Pesok to the new terminal is approximately 2 kilometers. This is the shortest way. But ours could also provide support from the base in Opytny - this is about 3 kilometers away. The distance is small. But the problem is that both the path from Peski and the path from Opytnyy were well controlled by the enemy. For direct fire from a tank, 2 kilometers is not a problem.
Thus, we held our position at the airport primarily due to the interaction of artillery and armored vehicles with the defenders of the airport buildings, and due to the ability to immediately provide support with reserves. But complicating factors were pressure from the flanks.

Autumn assaults

Beginning in September, the main losses of the airport defenders came from artillery shelling of our support forces in Peski, and from the columns that broke through to the new terminal.
Russian troops tried to attack the airport head-on, but the actions of the assault groups did not bring success to the enemy. The control tower and new terminal dominated the area, and our spotters immediately called in fire as small groups were cut down time after time by the terminal's defenders. It was impossible to hide in open areas; finding an assault group in open areas meant its destruction. The attacks stopped in October, as all the assault troops of the Russian mercenaries were gradually knocked out.
A big role was played by the fact that the defense in September-October was led by the officer of the 3rd special forces regiment, Colonel T., and the backbone of the defense were 30 professional special forces. The 3rd Regiment defended the airport from the very beginning, since May, and thoroughly knew the terrain and infrastructure of the airport, which gave great advantages over the enemy.
Since our units were not reinforced, we had to leave the buildings that stood near the new terminal - the hotel, the old terminal, and the new terminal became the advanced one.

It is more convenient to attack from Donetsk and the suburbs of Veseloe and Spartak airport than from Peski and Opytnoye. Enemy observation posts are equipped in high-rise buildings; it is possible to reach the attack line, hiding behind green spaces among private houses. Therefore, gradually our units began to abandon the individual buildings closest to Vesely - it was impossible to hold them, since the flanks were open. But it was then impossible to transfer additional infantry forces to the airport.
The Ukrainian command chose a more passive tactic of action - it was decided to abandon active operations and simply hold the wing of the new terminal, the control tower and a number of other observation points. Despite the fact that in November the reserves were restored and it became possible to strengthen our positions in the airport area, the ATO command did not take any measures. The political factor of “truces” and “ceasefire” constantly constrained the initiative of the Ukrainian command at the operational-tactical level, and constantly had a negative impact on tactics. It is obvious that the ATO command did not adequately assess the situation.
As a result, in October the enemy began to change tactics. The enemy began advancing on the flanks. Russian forward posts were deployed in the area of ​​the monastery near Pesok and in the village of Spartak. Russian troops began to reinforce these positions with tanks and anti-tank weapons. At the same time, in November, the enemy abandoned the assaults, and trench warfare began at the airport. The Russians occupied individual buildings, and instead of attacking, they began to try to infiltrate the buildings around the new terminal, and then into the new terminal itself, waging a war of snipers and spotters, short raids and shelling from tanks.
Many Ukrainian officers and analysts pointed out to the Ukrainian command the danger of the developing situation at the airport. It was obvious that a threatening situation was developing. It was possible to hold the airport only if we could strengthen our units in the new terminal and protect the new terminal from enemy penetration, and - most importantly, if the flank positions and buildings from which the enemy was conducting observation and direct fire on the columns that were moving forward were taken under control from Pesky and Experienced. But the Ukrainian command did not take any measures.

Muzhenko's intrigues and disorganization of battle management

The defense of the airport in September was carried out under the command of the commander of the operational command “South” and sector “B” Ruslan Khomchak. However, on September 15, the General Staff removed Khomchak from direct control and appointed General Dovgan, Khomchak’s deputy, as sector commander. At the same time, Khomchak’s headquarters, which was created from experienced personnel qualified officers back in peacetime, and controlled the situation in the DA from the very beginning of hostilities, continued to manage operations in the airport area. But in December, Muzhenko decided for some reason (why? apparently out of jealousy of Khomchak) to completely remove OK “Yug” from command and disband it. And at the beginning of January, all the officers who had led the battles at the airport since July were removed and were assigned to form new mobilized units. The General Staff formed the new headquarters of sector “B” as a combined team that does not have coherence and does not have so much experience.
But even this improvised headquarters... removed Muzhenko from command of operations at the Donetsk airport right before the start of the attack on January 17! This seems absurd, but it is true.
On January 16, Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko personally took over the leadership of the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Donetsk airport. Muzhenko removed the head of sector “B”, General Dovgan, from commanding troops in the airport area. The Chief of the General Staff did not issue a written order, but his decision can easily be confirmed by all participants in the events.
The headquarters of OK "Yug" controlled all actions for the defense of Donetsk airport from April to December 2014, and in these battles our troops were able to repel attacks even in difficult conditions in September-October. The removal of the most experienced senior officers of the OK "South" to control the artillery had especially serious consequences.
On January 18 I wrote https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/915147548525542?pnref=story :

“Petro Poroshenko, stop showing off, take Muzhenko from the airport, don’t interfere with the headquarters doing their job!
Since the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave the order to hold the airport, the leadership of the operation at the airport was personally taken over by... Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko. Other officials rushed there after him. What a circus this is... The Chief of the General Staff is an absolutely unnecessary person at the command post at this moment. The sector headquarters is working, the headquarters of two brigades are working - well, why are you bothering to command? Well, you’re superfluous there, you’re only getting in the way of managing the battle, you’re just asking unnecessary stupid questions. You don’t really know the people or the situation, you’ve never been to Sands, why, why, in the midst of a battle, confuse control and interfere with work?
And all for the sake of personally reporting to “First”!
And Pyotr Alekseevich does not see anything strange that the Chief of the General Staff, under whose command there are 220 thousand military personnel, and all the armed forces, carries out the tasks of the brigade commander - or rather, prevents the brigade commanders from completing their tasks. What can Muzhenko do there that the brigade commander of the 93rd Mikats, who has been fighting at the airport for SIX months without a break, has not thought through a hundred times already?
Mr. President, it was because of Muzhenko’s inaction that the situation at the airport became critical. It was the Chief of the General Staff, instead of adequately responding to the advance of Russian troops, who forbade the troops from any maneuvers. It was he who gave the order to go on rotation through the Motorola checkpoint. It was he who waited for two days for the next push to allow the troops to act.
The commander-in-chief again looks like a man who only needs PR, not results. The responsibilities of the National General Staff do not include solving tactical problems. But it includes solving operational issues - preparing mobilization, sending reserves, actions in the other four sectors of the front. But Muzhenko again blamed all these uninteresting strategic issues on someone else, and ran off to command not the army, but companies and batteries.
The person who, together with Nazarov and Pushnyakov, must be responsible by law for Il-76, for the Girkin corridor in Slavyansk, for sector “D”, Ilovaisk, for the 32nd checkpoint, must plow and fulfill his duties, and not give up everything , abandon the completely ill-considered mobilization, and again try to get in with a joyful report to “First”.
Petr Alekseevich, either put the fool in his place, or stop commenting on the situation at the airport - such “soviet” PR hinders the army and discredits the command in front of the officers. at least take him to Kyiv - so that he stops distracting him, at least help him with this.
I am very afraid that a man who curries favor with the president and tries to constantly report on his fictitious achievements is again bossing people around. Wonderful people who, with their heroism and skill, compensate for the complete inadequacy of the Chief of the General Staff.”

January assault. Repetition of the tragedy of the 32nd checkpoint

The battle for the new terminal was lost by the ATO command even before the assault began. We kept the new terminal completely surrounded only thanks to the heroism of the soldiers and commanders. I wrote about this on January 8 and warned about the threat:

https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/909950945711869
"...The ATO command did not plan or take any active actions. Even when the 79th and 95th brigades were transferred to the airport, and there were already quite enough forces in the Sand area, the order to expand the corridor was not received. The enemy held observation of a section of the road that our troops did not control (although there were plenty of forces in that area), and simply brazenly and boldly violated the terms of the peace agreements, moving to a position in our rear. This situation was even obvious by analogy with the 32nd block. post, but there was no reaction from the command.

Under the cover of a “truce,” the enemy, taking advantage of the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian command, achieved serious tactical success - they intercepted our communications, and if the situation escalates, the enemy received a serious tactical advantage, now our units at the airport are threatened with real complete encirclement.”

No action was taken.

After the enemy took control of the flanks, Russian troops entrenched themselves in the Peski area in the monastery, from where the road from the village to the terminal was clearly visible. And the enemy controlled the road from Opytnye from Spartak. Enemy units, taking advantage of the ceasefire, took positions in the wing of the new terminal and in the old terminal, and entrenched themselves. This made it possible to control the supply of reinforcements to the new terminal, and allowed the enemy to avoid risk when advancing to the attack line. Our artillery could not hit the enemy, who was in the same building as our units.

Unfortunately, the enemy’s tactics of destroying our 32nd checkpoint were completely repeated. During the “truce”, the enemy carried out envelopment from the flanks, and after carrying out the maneuver, provoked hostilities in an area convenient for him. The enemy then concentrated fire to destroy our observation posts. The complete destruction of the airport control tower was key. This tower provided the Ukrainian troops with an important tactical advantage - it allowed them to visually control the entire road from Peski to the new terminal. The destruction of the tower now gave an advantage to the Russian troops, who, during the truce, had set up an observation post in the monastery near Peski, and now its belfry became the highest-altitude object in this zone, allowing the enemy to control the situation.

As soon as the operation to encircle the new terminal was completed, on January 15 the enemy immediately provoked military clashes and began an attack on the new terminal.

Since the enemy took advantageous positions, it was impossible to hold the new terminal. It was no longer possible to think about whether it was worth carrying out the operation or not. It was necessary to act immediately - either immediately withdraw our units from the new terminal, or attack the enemy in the area of ​​​​the monastery near Peski and in Spartak in order to secure the flanks.

Alas, the actions of the ATO command and the General Staff, especially starting from January 16, when Muzhenko, for political reasons, took personal control of the battle, were a continuous series of mistakes and misunderstandings. Having a large group of forces in the airport area, which was not only not inferior, but even superior to the opposing enemy forces, Muzhenko did not take any serious measures to correct the threatening situation.

Having taken command personally and having completely removed the commander of sector “B” and all officers of OK “South” from control, the Chief of the General Staff simply did not have the opportunity to adequately assess the situation. Muzhenko did not even try to find out what the real capabilities of the specific units and units that he planned to throw into battle were.

Despite the long “truce,” the General Staff did not even prepare a plan for an attack on Spartak and the monastery. The attack on January 17 was a complete improvisation - and poorly prepared.

For some reason, Muzhenko did not involve trained reserves in offensive operations - the 1st and 13th battalions of the 95th brigade, the 79th brigade, and other proven units. The strike groups for the attack on January 17 were put together in a hurry, literally within 24 hours. The 2nd battalion-tactical group of the 93rd mechanized brigade, the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade, small units of the 81st, 80th, airmobile and 17th tank brigades, the 74th reconnaissance battalion, the 3rd regiment were involved special forces, engineering regiment. Most of the tactical reconnaissance tasks in Spartak and in the Peski area in the interests of the 93rd Brigade were carried out by Right Sector reconnaissance groups - this indicates the level of organization of military reconnaissance in the ground forces, which is completely dependent on the initiative of volunteers.

The Chief of the General Staff grossly violated the requirements of the “Manual on the operational work of military command and control bodies” because he did not issue written orders that would indicate the intent and plan of the operation. This made it impossible to establish effective coordination of troops.

And this is a crime for the suspect Muzhenko.

The most serious consequences were that Muzhenko had no idea about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

It should be noted here that since the General Staff is not seriously involved in combat training of troops, and is not involved in putting together strike units of constant readiness, the fighting qualities of different units are very different, and in the same brigade, and even in the same company, there can be subunits and groups of fighters with high combat effectiveness, and completely incapacitated. There are people who will complete a task at any cost, there are people who are poorly prepared and can complete tasks only if events develop favorably, and there are people who are not motivated and can disrupt the task. A commander who understands this, when setting a combat mission, personally determines the composition of the unit to which he entrusts combat work. To make sure everyone doesn't flinch.

Considering the severity of the crisis, the General Staff was obliged to bring up large forces and the best strike units to relieve the airport blockade - for this Muzhenko had at least two weeks!

The entire brigade is in reserve at the General Staff, but it was not even redeployed to the airport from the rear.

Detail - the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade, which fought bravely at the airport, was formed from volunteers, motivated people, but only got to the front during a period of calm, and did not have time to gain serious combat experience. In the 93rd mechanized brigade, a tank battalion, which had several excellent tank crews who were well familiar with the situation and had extensive combat experience, was sent to Kharkov for replenishment literally on the eve of the aggravation of the situation.

The officers told Censor.Net how the meeting took place, where Muzhenko set the task for the troops. Everything was very short. The NGSH pointed its finger at the map, which milestones need to be reached, and who should perform. He did not ask the opinions of the officers, he did not inquire about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

No attention was paid to the interaction of the units, nor to the procedure to be followed in the event of Russian troops interfering with our communications, which regularly happened at the airport - significant forces of Russian electronic warfare units are concentrated there.

So, on January 17, the task was set - one group had to take the monastery near Peski. And then, advance to the hotel on the airport grounds, and thus cut off the enemy from the new terminal. The second group is to make a deep bypass of the microdistrict where Donspetsstroy is located, and going out to the Volvo auto center, enter the suburbs of Donetsk in order to cut off the transfer of enemy reserves. The third is to hit the village of Spartak from Avdeevka, and go to the Putilov interchange - the main communication hub and the gate to the Donetsk airport for armored vehicles.

The concept of the operation contained deep errors; the plan simply did not take into account the real situation and the capabilities of the troops. Muzhenko doesn’t know the troops. He personally communicates only with those commanders whom he likes, but in general he has a very poor understanding of the real state of the armed forces. Therefore, having set the task of moving to the attack area, he did not inquire about how many fighters the commanders could actually gather for an attack, how many combat vehicles they actually had that could support the attack? And for the Ukrainian army with old equipment and large quantity hastily mobilized people are important issues. The answers to which the commander must know BEFORE the battle. The head of the General Staff had a lot of time to put together fully combat-ready groups near the airport, in view of the threatening actions of the enemy. But none of this was done.

First of all, Muzhenko did not create serious strike groups to carry out an operation with such broad goals. The attack on the monastery was carried out by a company-tactical group based on the 6th company of the 93rd brigade, which consisted entirely of volunteers, most of whom were former Donbass fighters. The company was reinforced by 8 tanks and 8 infantry fighting vehicles, which had never interacted with the company before and only became acquainted before the attack.

The same small forces were concentrated in other directions. Commanding 230 thousand military personnel, the Chief of the General Staff on all three directions of attack on January 17 concentrated a group for the relief of the blockade, which did not exceed 500 fighters hastily assembled from different units.

At the same time, these groups were again drawn from different units, had poorly trained and poorly motivated crews and units, and were not provided with intelligence data. The task was set completely inadequately.

Yes, there were problems with the armored vehicles on the day of the attack, yes, the technical condition leaves much to be desired. But wasn't this known before the operation began? Was there anything that prevented the General Staff from concentrating the required amount of military equipment and ensuring overwhelming superiority in forces?

Muzhenko’s biggest mistake was that he did not concentrate reserves to develop success, consolidate, and support shock units.

The most egregious thing in the activities of the Chief of the General Staff was that he once again completely ignored intelligence data. A drone of the SOS Army volunteer movement operated at the airport, but due to the fact that these volunteers criticized the General Staff for incompetence, reconnaissance data from the drone was simply not taken into account and was not used throughout the entire period of the battle.

However, there could be no grounds for such a superficial underestimation of the enemy. The Russian detachments at the airport had fully combat-ready units, including armored vehicles and artillery, electronic warfare and electronic warfare equipment. The Kremlin detachments were inferior to the Ukrainian group in numbers and the amount of military equipment, but they maneuvered freely and had significant firepower.

Russian units took the new terminal into the fire bag. At the same time, an attack began in the terminal itself - the enemy began to widely use sappers and undermine the walls in the terminal one after another. Massive fire and demolition charges destroyed the mines and barricades installed by our soldiers. And the enemy moved forward. Considering that the approaches to our wing of the airport were visually controlled and shot at, and enemy tanks were directly firing at our observation posts and firing points, and the delivery of reinforcements was difficult, the defenders of the terminal could not hold out for long. The walls have their strength - but people have withstood even more.

The attack on January 17 was risky. This was not an offensive - it was an attack at random, blindly. The fact is that the monastery was located in an open area. And to capture it, it would be convenient to act either at night or under the cover of a smoke screen. But even taking into account the urgency - anything can happen in war - large forces had to be concentrated to capture. The enemy did not concentrate large forces in the monastery itself, but it was used as a correction point, and it was supported by tanks, mortars, and other fire weapons.

Ukrainian artillery carried out preparations. However, our command forbade striking the monastery... for political reasons. Therefore, throughout the battle, the enemy could adjust the fire from the monastery with impunity.

6th company of floor volunteers to attack. The enemy put up fierce resistance. The soldiers advanced successfully, despite the fire, but unfortunately, after tanks and anti-tank weapons fired at our armored vehicles, our tanks abandoned the infantry and left the battle. The volunteers fought for 5 hours and reached the monastery. But to develop success, reserves were needed. And it was necessary to adjust artillery fire at the identified firing points, and there was a need for several tank crews who had combat experience and knew how to work with infantry.

However, Muzhenko did not provide for reserves. And the communication was jammed by Russian electronic warfare; no backup communication channels were provided. Therefore, after expending its ammunition, the 6th company had to retreat, losing 3 soldiers killed and more than 20 wounded. Attacks on the monastery by other units were also unsuccessful.

The maneuver of units of the 93rd brigade to the area of ​​the Volvo auto center initially could only be of a demonstrative nature. Muzhenko personally sent brigade commander of the 93rd Oleg Mikats to enter Donetsk with one incomplete battalion. But it was clearly impossible to capture the suburb along Stratonauts Street with such forces. And it didn't make sense. It was much more logical to entrust Mikatsu himself with the operation to capture the monastery and concentrate all available forces to clear the road from Peski to the new terminal from the enemy. Instead, Muzhenko dispersed his troops and was unable to complete a single task.

An interesting event of the day was the attack of Spartak. A small unit of the 17th Panzer and attached units attacked the village and very quickly became convinced that the enemy forces there were very insignificant. Ours passed through almost all of Spartak without resistance and were stopped, having successfully reached the goal of the operation - the Putilov interchange. A battle broke out in this area - at least one tank of the Russian mercenaries was destroyed, and ours also lost at least one vehicle. Our units stopped at the junction. After this, they were attacked by enemy reserves - up to 10-15 units of armored vehicles. Russian crews have a good level of training, but do not show much zeal. However, faced with an unfamiliar situation, without communication, and without receiving the help of reserves to secure a position at the line, our units left Spartak.

The General Staff attributed the failure of weak and uncoordinated attacks to the enemy's strong "fortified areas". But the analysis of military operations does not confirm this. Yes, there are separate shelters, yes, there are observation posts, yes, the Russians have organized a fire control scheme. But the key role in repelling weak attacks with small forces in different directions was played by simply redeployed small enemy reserves, which also did not show resilience in battle. However, enemy command at the tactical level demonstrates greater flexibility. Faced with a change in the situation and lacking communication, our units stop, stop maneuvering, and do not conduct independent reconnaissance. The enemy uses the stopping time to assess the situation, conduct additional reconnaissance, and concentrate his units for a strike in a convenient place.

At this time, the initiative of the Ukrainian units is completely constrained by the high command. If the Chief of the General Staff himself commands companies, then one cannot expect a quick reaction from him. Because it is not companies that fight, but brigades and formations. If Muzhenko had been involved in management at the operational level and freed the initiative to tactical commanders, combat operations would have had a fundamentally different character.

The fact is that the enemy did not have sufficient forces and means to repel a coordinated attack on the monastery and Spartak.

And we could easily complete the combat mission. We were stopped simply by illiterate command, an illiterate assessment of the situation, an inability to react to changes in the situation, and an inability to manage available forces.

The attacks on January 17 distracted the enemy and provided a respite for the terminal, where fierce close-range fighting continued. The wounded and dead were evacuated, and reinforcements were brought in.

But the situation has not changed. And it became clear that if forces were not gathered to repeat the attack on the same directions, the terminal would be lost very quickly.

For the fate of the terminal, January 17 was as desperate and poorly thought out a rescue operation as the attempt to deliver the convoy on October 15 to the 32nd checkpoint.

During the last days of defense, thick fog appeared. This change in weather conditions was predicted by weather forecasters, but Muzhenko did not react to this forecast. The fog meant that either we or the enemy would use it for active actions. The fog made it difficult to adjust artillery fire using ATGMs, and now the maneuver of mechanized units in the airport area could be carried out more covertly. The concentration of well-coordinated and trained troops, equipped with thermal imagers and secure communications, could lead to the occupation of key positions around the airport in the event of an attack. But Muzhenko did not develop such an operation. It became clear that if we were passive, the enemy would take advantage of the fog. Because the fog allowed the enemy to approach the new terminal.

The coincidence with the 32nd checkpoint became even greater when our small unit was sent by order of Muzhenko in complete fog to the new terminal, but was not provided with thermal imagers or even a basic navigator. Having lost orientation in the dense fog, our soldiers drove deeper into
enemy positions. 7 soldiers were killed, 8 were captured.

Starting from January 17, the new terminal held up only thanks to the incredible heroism of the defenders and the enthusiasm of volunteers.

And thanks to Ukrainian artillery, which the enemy is truly afraid of.

Muzhenko was obliged, after the failure of the release of the blockade on January 17, to either evacuate the fighters from the new terminal or immediately organize a new attack. But instead, as always, when the General Staff drove our units into another cauldron, except for the order “Hold on!” Muzhenko made no decisions.

After the enemy blew up the last room at the airport and the fall of the last wall, in the early morning of January 22, the last small group of our fighters left the ruins of the terminal, in which there were no longer any walls left that could be defended. They could not carry 8 seriously wounded with them, and take away the bodies of the dead and those remaining under the rubble.

For Ukraine, the defense of the airport is of the same importance as the Battle of Valmy was for France in 1792. Different countries, different situations, different revolutions. But there is only one meaning - it is proof of the defense capability and vitality of the new free nation.
And all this is not in vain - not a single drop of blood. The war continues. And the fact that we left the ruins of the new terminal does not change anything at all military strategy. The fight continues, and for the sake of the memory of those who fought to the end in the new terminal, we will fight and we will win.
But we must finally work on the mistakes. Because in the spring the steppes of Donbass will be covered with greenery, opportunities for covert movement and maneuver will appear, and hostilities will continue.
We need to build the army - as a system, as an institution, as a mechanism. And when we build an army, the time for victories will come. I’m telling you this not as a journalist, but as an amateur military history- this has happened more than once.
War is a clash of systems. We have many magnificent people bringing victory closer at the front and in the rear, there are millions of us, and every day we fight for freedom more consistently and systematically.
The Ukrainian army has learned to fight - now it’s time for us to learn to win.
But it was soldiers, not generals, who learned to fight, and we pay for this science with a lot of blood and great grief. We must honor the memory of the heroes and never repeat the mistakes. We must make sure that we no longer have to give the lives of our best patriots and wonderful people for these lessons...

I ask all politicians, volunteers, citizens to unite in their demands to President Poroshenko and the Verkhovna Rada - to finally establish a competent system of military command, immediately remove those responsible for the losses of the generals - Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko, as well as other persons responsible for the operation, and immediately conduct an investigation. The tragedies of the new terminal of the Donetsk airport, the 32nd checkpoint, the 31st checkpoint occur only because no one has yet been convicted and the responsibility of the leadership of the General Staff and the ATO command for the death of the Il-76, for sector “D” has not been determined, Ilovaisk. We must force the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to either restore order and responsibility in the command of the ATO and the General Staff, or resign. Mediocrity and incompetence are the main problem of the army. And it is impossible, dear Yuri Biryukov, for volunteers to deal only with supply issues - because now we are losing lives not because of the lack of body armor, fuel and water, but because of the complete inadequacy of primitive bureaucrats for their positions, who bought themselves the shoulder straps of a colonel general with hypocrisy and deception.
The management structure, the entire useless feudal-bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, needs radical restructuring. Those people who spent 23 years making a career, and at the same time did not speak out against the collapse and sale of the army, are not able to think adequately and make decisions. Ordinary volunteers who have never encountered the army solve any issues a thousand times more effectively than the stupid and incompetent bureaucratic mafia in the defense department. We need to promote to command positions in the army those people who are not associated with the Muzhenko clan and who know how to act competently and competently. We need commanders who do not turn bronze and remain human and professional. And who are responsible for people's lives.

UPDATE: on the events of January 15-22 at the airport, Censor.Net is preparing a more detailed publication, we will write more, please clarify the details of the events from the participants in this operation, I will write in detail.