Kuril Islands location. Where are the Kuril Islands and who owns them? Cossack Nechoro and the sedentary Gilyaks

It's simple. Underneath Japanophilia lies the desire to transform the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from an internal Russian one into a sea open to the “world community.” With great consequences for us, both military and economic.

Well, who was the first to develop these lands? Why on earth does Japan consider these islands to be its ancestral territories?
To do this, let's look at the history of the development of the Kuril ridge.

The islands were originally inhabited by the Ainu. In their language, “kuru” meant “a person who came from nowhere,” which is where their second name “Kurilians” came from, and then the name of the archipelago.

In Russia, the Kuril Islands were first mentioned in the reporting document of N. I. Kolobov to Tsar Alexei in 1646 about the peculiarities of the wanderings of I. Yu. Moskvitin. Also, data from chronicles and maps of medieval Holland, Scandinavia and Germany indicate indigenous Russian villages. N.I. Kolobov spoke about the bearded Ainu inhabiting the islands. The Ainu were engaged in gathering, fishing and hunting, living in small settlements throughout the territory Kuril Islands and on Sakhalin.

Founded after the campaign of Semyon Dezhnev in 1649, the cities of Anadyr and Okhotsk became bases for exploring the Kuril Islands, Alaska and California.

The development of new lands by Russia took place in a civilized manner and was not accompanied by the extermination or displacement of the local population from their territory historical homeland, as happened, for example, with the North American Indians. The arrival of the Russians led to the spread of more effective means of hunting and metal products among the local population, and most importantly, it contributed to the cessation of bloody inter-tribal strife. Under the influence of the Russians, these peoples began to engage in agriculture and move to a sedentary lifestyle. Trade revived, Russian merchants flooded Siberia and the Far East with goods the existence of which they had never even imagined local population.

In 1654, the Yakut Cossack foreman M. Stadukhin visited there. In the 60s, part of the northern Kuril Islands was put on the map by the Russians, and in 1700 the Kuril Islands were put on the map of S. Remizov. In 1711, the Cossack ataman D. Antsiferov and captain I. Kozyrevsky visited the Paramushir Shumshu islands. The following year, Kozyrevsky visited the islands of Iturup and Urup and reported that the inhabitants of these islands lived “autocratically.”

I. Evreinov and F. Luzhin, who graduated from the St. Petersburg Academy of Geodesy and Cartography, made a trip to the Kuril Islands in 1721, after which the Evreinovs personally presented Peter I with a report on this voyage and a map.

Russian navigators Captain Shpanberg and Lieutenant Walton in 1739 were the first Europeans to open the route to the eastern shores of Japan, visited the Japanese islands of Hondo (Honshu) and Matsmae (Hokkaido), described the Kuril ridge and mapped all the Kuril Islands and east coast Sakhalin.

The expedition established that only one island of Hokkaido was under the rule of the “Japanese Khan”, the rest of the islands were not subject to him. Since the 60s, interest in the Kuril Islands has noticeably increased, Russian fishing vessels are increasingly landing on their shores, and soon the local population - the Ainu - on the islands of Urup and Iturup were brought into Russian citizenship.

The merchant D. Shebalin was ordered by the office of the port of Okhotsk to “convert the inhabitants of the southern islands into Russian citizenship and start trading with them.” Having brought the Ainu under Russian citizenship, the Russians founded winter quarters and camps on the islands, taught the Ainu to use firearms, raise livestock and grow some vegetables.

Many of the Ainu converted to Orthodoxy and learned to read and write.
Russian missionaries did everything to spread Orthodoxy among the Kuril Ainu and taught them the Russian language. Deservedly first in this line of missionaries is the name of Ivan Petrovich Kozyrevsky (1686-1734), in the monasticism of Ignatius. A.S. Pushkin wrote that “Kozyrevsky in 1713 conquered the two Kuril Islands and brought Kolesov news of the trade of these islands with the merchants of the city of Matmaya.” In the texts of the “Drawing sea ​​islands" Kozyrevsky was written: "On the first and other islands in Kamchatka Nos, the autocratic ones shown smoked on that campaign with affection and greetings, and brought others in military order, again in tribute payment." Back in 1732, the famous historian G.F. Miller noted in the academic calendar: “Before this, the local residents did not have any faith. But in twenty years, by order of His Imperial Majesty, churches and schools were built there, which give us hope, and from time to time this people will be brought out of their delusion.” Monk Ignatius Kozyrevsky in the south of the Kamchatka Peninsula, at his own expense, founded a church with a limit and a monastery, in which he himself later took monastic vows. Kozyrevsky managed to convert “the local people of other faiths” - the Itelmen of Kamchatka and the Kuril Ainu.

The Ainu fished, beat sea animals, baptized Orthodox churches their children, wore Russian clothes, had Russian names, spoke Russian and proudly called themselves Orthodox. In 1747, the “newly baptized” Kurilians from the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, numbering more than two hundred people, through their toen (leader) Storozhev, turned to the Orthodox mission in Kamchatka with a request to send a priest “to confirm them in the new faith.”

By order of Catherine II in 1779, all taxes not established by decrees from St. Petersburg were cancelled. Thus, the fact of the discovery and development of the Kuril Islands by Russians is undeniable.

Over time, the fisheries in the Kuril Islands were depleted, becoming less and less profitable than off the coast of America, and therefore, by the end of the 18th century, the interest of Russian merchants in the Kuril Islands weakened. In Japan, by the end of the same century, interest in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin was just awakening, because before that the Kuril Islands were practically unknown to the Japanese. The island of Hokkaido - according to the testimony of Japanese scientists themselves - was considered a foreign territory and only a small part of it was populated and developed. At the end of the 70s, Russian merchants reached Hokkaido and tried to establish trade with local residents. Russia was interested in purchasing food in Japan for Russian fishing expeditions and settlements in Alaska and the Pacific Islands, but it was never possible to establish trade, since it was prohibited by the law on the isolation of Japan in 1639, which read: “For the future, while the sun shines peace, no one has the right to land on the shores of Japan, even if he were an envoy, and this law can never be repealed by anyone under pain of death."

And in 1788, Catherine II sent a strict order to Russian industrialists in the Kuril Islands so that they “do not touch the islands under the jurisdiction of other powers,” and a year before she issued a decree on equipment round the world expedition For accurate description and mapping the islands from Masmaya to Kamchatka Lopatka, so that they “all formally belong to the possession of the Russian state.” It was ordered not to allow foreign industrialists to “trade and trade in places belonging to Russia and to deal peacefully with local residents.” But the expedition did not take place due to the outbreak of the Russian-Turkish War of 1787-1791.

Taking advantage of the weakening of Russian positions in the southern part of the Kuril Islands, Japanese fish farmers first appeared in Kunashir in 1799, and the next year in Iturup, where they destroyed Russian crosses and illegally erected a pillar with a designation indicating that the islands belonged to Japan. Japanese fishermen often began to arrive on the shores South Sakhalin, carried out fishing, robbed the Ainu, which was the cause of frequent skirmishes between them. In 1805, Russian sailors from the frigate "Juno" and the tender "Avos" placed a pole with the Russian flag on the shore of Aniva Bay, and the Japanese anchorage on Iturup was devastated. The Russians were warmly received by the Ainu.

At the beginning of 1855, in Shimoda, Putyatin signed the first Russian-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, in accordance with which Sakhalin was declared undivided between Russia and Japan, the border was established between the islands of Iturup and Urup, and the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate were opened for Russian ships and Nagasaki.

The Shimoda Treaty of 1855 in Article 2 defines:
“From now on, the border between the Japanese state and Russia will be established between the island of Iturup and the island of Urup. The entire island of Iturup belongs to Japan, the entire island of Urup and the Kuril Islands to the north of it belong to Russia. As for the island of Karafuto (Sakhalin), it is still not divided by the border between Japan and Russia.”

The government of Alexander II made the Middle East the main direction of its policy and Central Asia and, fearing to leave their relations with Japan uncertain in case of a new aggravation of relations with England, they signed the so-called St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875, according to which all the Kuril Islands, in exchange for recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan.

Alexander II, who had previously sold Alaska in 1867 for a symbolic sum at that time - 11 million rubles, and this time made a big mistake by underestimating strategic importance The Kuril Islands, which were later used by Japan for aggression against Russia. The Tsar naively believed that Japan would become a peace-loving and calm neighbor of Russia, and when the Japanese, justifying their claims, refer to the 1875 treaty, for some reason they forget (as G. Kunadze “forgot” today) about its first article: “.. "Eternal peace and friendship will continue to be established between the Russian and Japanese Empires."

Russia has effectively lost access to the Pacific Ocean. Japan, whose imperial ambitions continued to increase, actually had the opportunity at any moment to begin a naval blockade of Sakhalin and the entire Far Eastern Russia.

The population of the Kuril Islands immediately after the establishment of Japanese power was described by the English captain Snow in his notes about the Kuril Islands:
“In 1878, when I first visited the northern islands...all northern residents spoke Russian more or less tolerably. All of them were Christians and professed the religion of the Greek Church. They were visited (and are still visited to this day) by Russian priests, and in the village of Mairuppo in Shumshir a church was built, the boards for which were brought from America. ...The largest settlements in the Northern Kuril Islands were located in the port of Tavano (Urup), Uratman, on the shore of Broughton Bay (Simushir) and the above-described Mairuppo (Shumshir). Each of these villages, in addition to huts and dugouts, had its own church...”

Our famous compatriot, Captain V.M. Golovnin, in the famous “Notes of the Fleet of Captain Golovnin...” mentions the Ainu, “who called himself Alexei Maksimovich.” ...

Then there was 1904, when Japan treacherously attacked Russia.
At the conclusion of the peace treaty in Portsmouth in 1905, the Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Russian side stated then that this was contrary to the 1875 treaty. What did the Japanese respond to this?

War crosses out all treaties, you have suffered defeat and let’s proceed from the current situation.
Only thanks to skillful diplomatic maneuvers did Russia manage to retain the northern part of Sakhalin for itself, and southern Sakhalin went to Japan.

At the Yalta Conference of the Heads of Power, countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition, held in February 1945, it was decided after the end of the Second World War that South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands should be transferred to the Soviet Union, and this was a condition for the USSR to enter the war with Japan - three months after end of the war in Europe.

On September 8, 1951, in San Francisco, 49 countries signed a peace treaty with Japan. The draft treaty was prepared during the Cold War without the participation of the USSR and in violation of the principles of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet side proposed to carry out demilitarization and ensure democratization of the country. Representatives of the USA and Great Britain told our delegation that they came here not to discuss, but to sign an agreement and therefore would not change a single line. The USSR, and along with it Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to sign the treaty. And what’s interesting is that Article 2 of this treaty states that Japan renounces all rights and title to the island of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Thus, Japan itself renounced its territorial claims to our country, confirming this with its signature.

1956, Soviet-Japanese negotiations on normalizing relations between the two countries. The Soviet side agrees to cede the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan and offers to sign a peace treaty. The Japanese side is inclined to accept the Soviet proposal, but in September 1956 the United States sent a note to Japan stating that if Japan renounces its claims to Kunashir and Iturup and is satisfied with only two islands, then in this case the United States will not give up the Ryukyu Islands , where the main island is Okinawa. The Americans confronted Japan with the unexpected and difficult choice- to get the islands from the Americans, you need to take ALL the Kuril Islands from Russia. ...Either neither Kuril nor Ryukyu and Okinawa.
Of course, the Japanese refused to sign a peace treaty on our terms. The subsequent security treaty (1960) between the United States and Japan made the transfer of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan impossible. Our country, of course, could not give up the islands for American bases, nor could it bind itself to any obligations to Japan on the issue of the Kuril Islands.

A.N. Kosygin once gave a worthy answer regarding Japan’s territorial claims to us:
- The borders between the USSR and Japan should be considered as the result of the Second World War.

We could put an end to this, but we would like to remind you that just 6 years ago, M.S. Gorbachev, at a meeting with the SPJ delegation, also resolutely opposed the revision of borders, emphasizing that the borders between the USSR and Japan are “legal and legally justified” .

To the roots of the problem

One of the first documents regulating Russian-Japanese relations was the Treaty of Shimoda, signed on January 26, 1855. According to the second article of the treatise, the border was established between the islands of Urup and Iturup - that is, all four now islands that Japan claims today were recognized as the possession of Japan.

Since 1981, the day of the conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty in Japan has been celebrated as “Northern Territories Day”. Another thing is that, relying on the Shimoda Treaty as one of the fundamental documents, Japan forgets about one important point. In 1904, Japan, having attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and unleashed the Russo-Japanese War, itself violated the terms of the treaty, which provided for friendship and good neighborly relations between states.

The Shimoda Treaty did not determine the ownership of Sakhalin, where both Russian and Japanese settlements were located, and by the mid-70s a solution to this issue was ripe. The St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, which was assessed ambiguously by both sides. Under the terms of the agreement, all the Kuril Islands were now completely transferred to Japan, and Russia received full control over Sakhalin.

Then, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth, the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel went to Japan.

In 1925, a Soviet-Japanese convention was signed in Beijing, which generally confirmed the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty. As you know, the late 30s and early 40s were extremely tense in Soviet-Japanese relations and were associated with a series of military conflicts of varying scales.

The situation began to change by 1945, when the Axis powers began to suffer heavy defeats and the prospect of losing World War II became increasingly clear. Against this background, the question of the post-war world order arose. Thus, according to the terms of the Yalta Conference, the USSR pledged to enter the war against Japan, and Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were transferred to the Soviet Union.

True, at the same time the Japanese leadership was ready to voluntarily cede these territories in exchange for the neutrality of the USSR and the supply of Soviet oil. The USSR did not take such a very slippery step. The defeat of Japan by that time was not a quick matter, but it was still a matter of time. And most importantly, by avoiding decisive action, the Soviet Union would actually be handing over the situation to Far East into the hands of the United States and its allies.

By the way, this also applies to the events of the Soviet-Japanese War and the Kuril Landing Operation itself, which was not initially prepared. When it became known about the preparations for the landing of American troops on the Kuril Islands, the Kuril landing operation was urgently prepared within 24 hours. Fierce fighting in August 1945 ended with the surrender of the Japanese garrisons in the Kuril Islands.

Fortunately, the Japanese command did not know the real number of Soviet paratroopers and, without fully using their overwhelming numerical superiority, capitulated. At the same time, the Yuzhno-Sakhalin offensive operation was carried out. Thus, at the cost of considerable losses, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands became part of the USSR.

Japan to the South Kuril Islands, but not everyone knows in detail the history of the Kuril Islands and their role in Russian-Japanese relations. This is what this article will focus on.

Before moving on to the history of the issue, it is worth telling why the South Kuril Islands are so important for Russia.

1. Strategic location. It is in the ice-free deep-sea straits between the South Kuril islands that submarines can enter the Pacific Ocean underwater at any time of the year.

2. Iturup has the world's largest deposit of the rare metal rhenium, which is used in superalloys for space and aviation technology. World production of rhenium in 2006 amounted to 40 tons, while the Kudryavy volcano releases 20 tons of rhenium every year. This is the only place in the world where rhenium is found in pure form and not in the form of impurities. 1 kg of rhenium, depending on purity, costs from 1000 to 10 thousand dollars. There is no other rhenium deposit in Russia (in Soviet era rhenium was mined in Kazakhstan).

3. Reserves of other mineral resources of the Southern Kuril Islands are: hydrocarbons - about 2 billion tons, gold and silver - 2 thousand tons, titanium - 40 million tons, iron - 270 million tons

4. The Southern Kuril Islands are one of 10 places in the world where, due to water turbulence due to the meeting of warm and cold sea currents, a rise occurs with sea ​​day fish food. This attracts huge schools of fish. The value of seafood produced here exceeds $4 billion a year.

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the island of Hokkaido (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.

The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril (Habomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.

The Great Kuril Ridge is 1,200 km long and stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. On southern islands x - forests, northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.

The Lesser Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.

The Kuril Islands are part of Sakhalin region (Russian Federation). They are divided into three regions: North Kuril, Kuril and South Kuril. The centers of these areas have the corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous and volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The prevailing heights are 500-1000m. An exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by low-mountain terrain formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The most high peak Kuril Islands - Alaid volcano - 2339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10339 meters. High seismicity causes constant threats of earthquakes and tsunamis.

Population – 76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because The main natural wealth is marine bioresources. Agriculture due to unfavorable natural conditions has not received significant development.

On the Kuril Islands, deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements contained in them - indium, helium, thallium - have been discovered, there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a fairly high sulfur content have been discovered.

Transport connections are carried out by sea and air. In winter, regular shipping ceases. Due to difficult weather conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).

Discovery of the Kuril Islands

During the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639, a “policy of self-isolation” was announced. On pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Foreign ships were almost not allowed into the ports.” Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.

V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks, led by Moskvitin, left Yakutsk and made a difficult transition along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya River, to the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk. The first Russian villages (including Okhotsk) were founded here.”

Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin

The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to travel along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643; at the end of the summer of 1644, Poyarkov’s detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. At the beginning of September, the Cossacks saw the Amur estuary for the first time. From here the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they got an idea of ​​as big island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov to be the “discoverer of Sakhalin,” despite the fact that the expedition members did not even visit its shores.

Since then, the Amur has acquired great importance, not only as a “river of grain”, but also as a natural communication. After all, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the fall of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived in the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a large military force.

The development of events steadily led to the fact that already in the second half of the 17th century the Russian people could fully gain a foothold on Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new twist in history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.

Being at war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate required quantity people and means to successfully counteract Qing China. Attempts to extract some benefits for Russia through diplomacy did not bring success. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible to them.

For China, the fact of the “first discovery” of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.

Here, of course, the question arises: why didn’t the Chinese take advantage of such a favorable situation and colonize Primorye, Amur Region, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878, Chinese women were prohibited from crossing the Great Wall of China! And in the absence of “their fair half,” the Chinese could not firmly establish themselves in these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from the local peoples.”

With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk Peace, the sea route remained the most convenient road to Sakhalin for the Russian people. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in Pacific Ocean become regular.

In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky make expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they receive details about most of the Kuril Islands and the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin carried out, by order of Peter I, a survey of the northern part of the Great Kuril Ridge to the island of Simushir and compiled a detailed map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

In the 18th century there was a rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people.

"Thus,– notes V. Shishchenko, – By the middle of the 18th century, an amazing situation had developed. Sailors different countries literally plowed the ocean length and breadth. A Great Wall, the Japanese “policy of self-isolation” and the inhospitable Sea of ​​Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island beyond the reach of both European and Asian explorers.”

At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuril Islands took place. In the first half of the 18th century, Russian people actively developed the Kuril Islands. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and Southern Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing was made on Hokkaido. At that time, the Russian state was not yet able to take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the aborigines, which sometimes amounted to robbery and cruelty.

In 1779, by her highest command, Catherine II freed the “shaggy Kurilians” from all fees and forbade encroaching on their territory. The Cossacks were unable to maintain their power without force, and they abandoned the islands south of Urup. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place with the aim of establishing trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to stall for time and strengthen their position in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

In 1798, a large Japanese expedition to the island of Iturup took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juzo. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars were installed with the inscription: “Dainihon Erotofu” (Iturup - possession of Japan). The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens the sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzo visits Kunashir.

In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they set up their pillars and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, Europeans’ ideas about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.

Kuril Islands in the 19th century

In the 18th - early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian researchers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, I. F. Kruzenshtern.

Japan's attempts to seize the Kuril Islands by force provoked protests from the Russian government. N.P., who arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations. Rezanov, told the Japanese that “...to the north of Matsmaya (Hokkaido) all lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not expand their possessions further.”

However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. At the same time, in addition to the Kuril Islands, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.

In 1853, the representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.

Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin’s mission was supposed to formalize the border between Russia and Japan with an agreement.

Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant expanses of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan.”

After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which established that “the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup,” and Sakhalin was declared “undivided” between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup went to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.

N.I. Tsimbaev characterizes the situation in the Far East in the following way: late XIX century: “Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II for a long time determined Russia’s policy in the Far East, which was cautious and balanced.”

In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)

The fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Shimoda Treaty, which proclaimed “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan.”

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in national economic turnover. “The changing situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, was associated with the construction of the Siberian Railway, the construction of which began in 1891. It was planned to run through the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world."

By the beginning of the 20th century. the main hub of international contradictions for Russia has become the Far East and the most important direction- relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not strive for it. In 1902 and 1903 Intensive negotiations took place between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which led to nothing.

On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28 did Japan declare war on Russia. Japan's treachery caused a storm of indignation in Russia.

A war was forced on Russia that it did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The reasons for general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones included:

• incomplete military-strategic training of the armed forces;
• significant remoteness of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the army and control;
• extremely limited communication network.

The futility of the war was clearly evident by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the Port Arthur fortress on December 20, 1904, few people in Russia believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. The initial patriotic uplift gave way to despondency and irritation.

A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of stupor; no one could have imagined that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas II for a long time did not agree to admit the Far Eastern failure, believing that these were only temporary setbacks and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He undoubtedly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, one that could only be ensured by a strong geopolitical position, and this was seriously shaken by military failures.”

By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation was possible only in the distant future, and in the near future it was necessary to immediately begin a peaceful resolution of the conflict that had arisen. This was forced not only by military-strategic considerations, but, to an even greater extent, by the complications of the internal situation in Russia.

N.I. Tsimbaev states: “Japan’s military victories turned it into a leading Far Eastern power, supported by the governments of England and the United States.”

The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the lack of previously worked out conditions for a possible agreement with Japan.

Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, went to the United States, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation only received instructions not to agree under any circumstances to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to cede “not an inch of Russian land,” although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

Japan initially took a tough position in Portsmouth, demanding in the form of an ultimatum that Russia completely withdraw from Korea and Manchuria, transfer the Russian Far Eastern fleet, pay indemnity and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.

The negotiations were on the verge of breakdown several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation it was possible to achieve a positive result: on August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.

In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in Southern Manchuria, parts of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov speaks about the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements became an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. They looked in many ways like an agreement between equal partners, rather than a treaty concluded after an unsuccessful war.”

Thus, after the defeat of Russia, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in 1905. The Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the 1875 exchange agreement and also stated that all Japanese trade agreements with Russia would be nullified as a result of the war.

This treaty annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed back in the 20s. Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created - a temporary revolutionary democratic state, a “buffer” between the RSFSR and Japan. People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Far Eastern Republic under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, NRA units entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the “buffer” republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from where the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR.”

By the time of the conclusion of the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan on January 20, 1925, there was in fact no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Beijing Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government granted Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular for the exploitation of 50% of the area of ​​oil fields.

War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference

Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “... a special period of the Great Patriotic War became the war between the USSR and militaristic Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations assumed at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan...During the 24-day military campaign there was The million-strong Kwantung Army, which was located in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army became the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.

It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to their heaviest losses. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand prisoners. Japan lost its largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and its most powerful army. Soviet troops expelled the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea, from Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all the military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was unable to conduct an armed struggle.”

At the Yalta Conference, the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands, which were part of the Japanese “northern territories” (the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Habomai).

In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan did not make territorial claims to the Soviet Union. Putting forward such demands was excluded then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to implement all decisions made by the Allied Powers, including decisions concerning its borders. It was during that period that new borders between Japan and the USSR were formed.

The transformation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to changes made to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuril Islands were included in the South Sakhalin region of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document recording Japan's renunciation of rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.

In the text of this document, summing up the results of the Second World War, in paragraph “C” in Article 2 it was clearly written: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."

However, already during the San Francisco Conference, the desire of Japanese government circles to question the legitimacy of the borders established between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism was revealed. At the conference itself, this desire did not find open support from other participants and, above all, from the Soviet delegation, as is clear from the text of the agreement given above.

However, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago to Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai actually consists of five small islands adjacent to one another). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes and then open support for the mentioned territorial claims to our country that US government circles began to provide to Japan - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.

Such an obvious refusal of US government circles from their obligations enshrined in the Yalta agreements, according to I.A. Latyshev, explained simply: “... in the context of the further intensification of the Cold War, in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to consider Japan as its main military bridgehead in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to tie this new ally more tightly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in acquiring the southern Kuril Islands, although such support represented a departure of the United States from the above-mentioned international agreements designed to consolidate the borders established as a result of the Second World War.”

The Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union received many benefits from the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty along with other allied countries participating in the conference. This refusal was motivated by Moscow’s disagreement with the United States’ intention to use the treaty to maintain American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it began to be used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union’s signature on the peace treaty exempted Japan from complying with it.

In subsequent years, the leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry resorted to reasoning in their statements, the essence of which was that since representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, then the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the international community should not give consent to the ownership Soviet Union, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan renounced these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.

At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the agreement of a mention of who would henceforth own these islands.

Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... Japan's refusal of the Kuril Islands, recorded in the agreement, does not mean its refusal of the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan... does not consider these islands to be Kuril Islands. And that, when signing the agreement, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuril Islands, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.”

However, at the first glance at Japanese pre-war maps and directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost ones, were one administrative unit called “Chishima”.

I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of a peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very unfortunate political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to contradict the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco Conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other to find ways to formally resolve their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as it initially seemed, by both sides in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that began in London in June 1955 at the level of ambassadors of both countries.

However, as it turned out during the negotiations that began, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the Soviet Union's interest in normalizing relations with Japan in order to achieve territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was about the open refusal of the Japanese government from the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the part where the northern borders of Japan were determined.

From this moment, as I.A. writes. Latyshev, the most ill-fated territorial dispute between the two countries, detrimental to Soviet-Japanese good neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles took the path of illegal territorial claims against the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders established between both countries as a result of World War II.

What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.

One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control of the sea waters washing the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest fisheries resources, like other seafood, comes from the Pacific Ocean. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide Japanese fishing and other companies with fabulous profits, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest marine fishing areas entirely for themselves.

Another motivating reason for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuril Islands under its control was the Japanese understanding of the exceptional strategic importance Kuril Islands: whoever owns the islands actually holds in his hands the keys to the gates leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

Thirdly, by putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments among broad sections of the Japanese population and use nationalist slogans to unite these sections under their ideological control.

And finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the Japanese ruling circles to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fit well into the belligerent course of the US government, which was directed sharply against the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, as well as other influential US political figures, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.

As for the Soviet side, Japan’s advance of territorial demands was viewed by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders established between both countries as a result of the Second World War. Therefore, Japanese demands could not but meet with resistance from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years sought to establish good neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.

Territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956, these negotiations were moved from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having encountered a firm rebuff to their claims to South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, began to quickly moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese came down to the demand for the transfer to Japan only of the southern Kuril Islands, namely the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, which represented the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.

On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, the short-sightedness in the approach to Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which sought to speed up the normalization of relations with Japan at any cost, was revealed. Without a clear idea of ​​the southern Kuril Islands, much less their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them as small bargaining chips. Only this can explain the naive judgment among the Soviet leader that negotiations with Japan could be successfully completed if only the Soviet side made a “small concession” to Japanese demands. In those days N.S. Khrushchev imagined that, imbued with gratitude for the “gentlemanly” gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same “gentlemanly” compliance, namely: it would withdraw its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end with an “amicable agreement” to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet delegation at the negotiations, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede to Japan the two southern islands of the Kuril chain: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Having willingly accepted this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to persistently seek the transfer of all four South Kuril islands to it. But she was unable to negotiate big concessions then.

Khrushchev’s irresponsible “gesture of friendship” was recorded in the text of the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations,” signed by the heads of government of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “...agreed to continue after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan negotiate a peace treaty. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan." .

The future transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's readiness to give up part of its territory in the name of good ties with Japan. It is no coincidence, as it was emphasized more than once later, that the article dealt with the “transfer” of these islands to Japan, and not about their “return,” as the Japanese side was then inclined to interpret the essence of the matter.

The word “transfer” was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede part of its territory to Japan, and not Japanese territory.

However, the inclusion in the declaration of Khrushchev’s reckless promise to present Japan with an advance “gift” in the form of part of Soviet territory was an example of the political thoughtlessness of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither the legal nor the moral right to turn the country’s territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The short-sightedness of this promise became obvious over the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy set a course for strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan’s independent role in the Japanese-American “security treaty”, the spearhead of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.

The hopes of the Soviet leadership that its willingness to “hand over” two islands to Japan would prompt Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country were also not justified.

The very first months that passed after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.

Soon Japan had a new “argument” in territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the contents of the said declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this “argument” was that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations does not end, but, on the contrary, presupposes further negotiations on the “territorial issue” and that the recording in the ninth article of the declaration of the Soviet Union’s readiness to transfer to Japan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty the islands of Habomai and Shikotan still does not draw an end to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, suggests the continuation of this dispute over two other islands of the southern Kuril Islands: Kunashir and Iturup.

Moreover, at the end of the 50s, the Japanese government became more active than before in using the so-called “territorial issue” to fan unkind sentiments towards Russia among the Japanese population.

All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to make adjustments to his assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not meet the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Shortly after the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the anti-Soviet “security treaty” on January 19, 1960 in Washington, namely on January 27, 1960, the USSR government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.

The note stated that as a result of Japan’s conclusion of a military treaty, weakening the foundations of peace in the Far East, “... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan”; “By agreeing to transfer the indicated islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty,” the note further stated, “the Soviet government met the wishes of Japan, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peace-loving intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.”

As was then indicated in the cited note, given the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot help ensure that by transferring to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which belong to the USSR, the territory used by foreign troops is expanded. By foreign troops, the note meant the US armed forces, whose indefinite presence on the Japanese islands was secured by a new “security treaty” signed by Japan in January 1960.

In the subsequent months of 1960, other notes and statements by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, indicating the reluctance of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations regarding Japanese territorial claims. From that time on, for a long time, or more precisely, for more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding the territorial claims of Japan became extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in the relations between the two countries” because this issue has “already been resolved” by previous international agreements.

Japanese claims in 1960-1980

The firm and clear position of the Soviet side regarding Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60-80s, none of the Japanese statesmen and diplomats managed to draw the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders into any extensive discussion about Japanese territorial claims .

But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side accepted the Soviet Union’s refusal to continue discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of Japanese government circles were aimed at developing the so-called “movement for the return of the northern territories” in the country through various administrative measures.

It is noteworthy that the words “northern territories” acquired a very loose content during the development of this “movement”.

Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by “northern territories” the four southern islands of the Kuril chain; others, including the socialist and communist parties of Japan - all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of far-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.

Beginning in 1969, the government map office and the Ministry of Education began publicly “correcting” maps and textbooks that began to color the southern Kuril Islands as Japanese territory, causing the Japanese territory to “grow” on these new maps, as the press reported. , 5 thousand square kilometers.

More and more efforts were used to process the country's public opinion and draw as many Japanese as possible into the “movement for the return of the northern territories.” For example, trips to the island of Hokkaido in the area of ​​the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands are clearly visible, began to be widely practiced by specialized groups of tourists from other parts of the country. The programs of stay of these groups in the city of Nemuro included “walks” on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril chain with the aim of “sad contemplation” of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the early 1980s, a significant proportion of the participants in these “nostalgic walks” were schoolchildren, for whom such voyages were counted as “study trips” provided for in school curricula. At Cape Nosapu, closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, with funds from the government and a number of public organizations a whole complex of buildings intended for “pilgrims” was built, including a 90-meter observation tower and the “Archival Museum” with a tendentiously selected exhibition designed to convince uninformed visitors of the imaginary historical “validity” of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.

A new development in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to drag the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, in the 70-80s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made repeatedly.

Since 1980, on the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called “Northern Territories Days” began to be celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 that a Russian-Japanese treaty was signed in the Japanese city of Shimoda, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands was in the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.

The choice of this date as the “day of the northern territories” was meant to emphasize that the Treaty of Shimoda (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) allegedly still retains its significance.

Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose its former firmness during the period that M.S. was in power. Gorbachev. In public statements, there were calls for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that emerged as a result of World War II and for the immediate completion of the territorial dispute with Japan through a “fair compromise,” which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the lips of the people's deputy, rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev, who, during his stay in Tokyo, declared the need to break the Yalta system and speedily transfer to Japan the four southern islands of the Kuril chain.

Following Yu. Afanasyev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. In particular, the “Program for a Five-Stage Resolution of the Territorial Issue,” put forward by the then leader of the interregional group, Yeltsin, during his visit to Japan in January 1990, was nothing more than a course toward gradual, time-stretched concessions to Japanese territorial demands.

As I.A. Latyshev writes: “The result of long and intense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was the “Joint Statement” signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected Gorbachev’s characteristic inconsistency in his views and in protecting the national interests of the state.

On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the “Joint Statement” of any language that openly confirmed the readiness of the Soviet side to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. He also did not refuse the notes from the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.

However, on the other hand, the text of the “Joint Statement” nevertheless included rather ambiguous wording, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor.”

Evidence of Gorbachev's inconsistency and instability in protecting the national interests of the USSR was his statement about the intention of the Soviet leadership to begin reducing the ten thousand military contingent located on the disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen Japanese divisions were stationed "self-defense forces"

Democratic time of the 90s

The August 1991 events in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal of the three Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya agreements, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening the ability of our country to resist the claims of Japan.

In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin's arrival in Japan was finally agreed upon - October 11, 1993, the Tokyo press also began to orient the Japanese public to abandon excessive hopes for a quick resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia.

Events associated with Yeltsin's continued tenure at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the inconsistency of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and Russian Foreign Ministry leaders for the possibility of a quick resolution of the protracted dispute between the two countries through a “compromise” involving concessions of our country to the Japanese. territorial harassment.

Followed in 1994-1999. The discussions between Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, introduce anything new into the situation that arose at the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.

In other words, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep impasse in 1994-1999, and neither side could see a way out of this impasse. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to give up its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, which was fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became even less likely in the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and beyond its walls than in previous years.

A clear confirmation of this is the increasing frequency of conflicts in sea ​​waters, washing the southern Kuril Islands - conflicts during which, during 1994-1955, repeated unceremonious incursions of Japanese poachers into Russian territorial waters were met with severe rebuff by Russian border guards, who opened fire on border violators.

I.A. speaks about the possibilities of resolving these relations. Latyshev: “Firstly, the Russian leadership should have immediately abandoned the illusion that as soon as Russia ceded the southern Kuril Islands to Japan, ... the Japanese side would immediately benefit our country with large investments, preferential loans, and scientific and technical information. It was precisely this misconception that prevailed in Yeltsin’s circle.”

“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, “our diplomats and politicians both in Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s times should have abandoned the false assumption that Japanese leaders could in the near future moderate their claims to the southern Kuril Islands and come to some kind of “reasonable compromise” in the territorial dispute with our country.

For many years, as discussed above, the Japanese side never showed, and was unable to show in the future, a desire to renounce its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands.” The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demand not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Habomai and Shikotan), and then, after some time, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).

“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats for the possibility of persuading the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, based on the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations” signed in 1956, were self-deception. It was a good delusion and nothing more.” The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and clear confirmation of the obligation written down in Article 9 of the said declaration to transfer to it the islands of Shikotan and Habomai upon the conclusion of a peace treaty. But this did not at all mean that the Japanese side was ready to end its territorial harassment of our country after such confirmation. Japanese diplomats considered establishing control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to taking possession of all four South Kuril islands.

Russia's national interests required in the second half of the 90s that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and, on the contrary, instill in the Japanese side the idea of ​​​​the inviolability of Russia's post-war borders.

In the fall of 1996, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forward a proposal for “joint economic development” by Russia and Japan of those very four islands of the Kuril archipelago that Japan so persistently claimed, which was nothing more than another concession to pressure from the Japanese side.

The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the southern Kuril Islands to a certain special zone available for business activities of Japanese citizens was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the “validity” of Japanese claims to these islands.

I.A. Latyshev writes: “Another thing is also annoying: in the Russian proposals, which envisaged wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kuril Islands, there was not even an attempt to condition this access on Japan’s consent to the corresponding benefits and free access Russian entrepreneurs to the territory of areas close to the southern Kuril Islands of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. And this demonstrated the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve, in negotiations with the Japanese side, equal rights for the two countries in their business activities in each other’s territories. In other words, the idea of ​​“joint economic development” of the southern Kuril Islands turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to master these islands.”

The Japanese were allowed to conduct private fishing in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands that Japan claimed and claims. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant Russian fishing vessels similar rights to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations to ensure that its citizens and vessels comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in Russian waters.

Thus, ten years of attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a “mutually acceptable basis” and sign a bilateral peace treaty between both countries did not lead to any tangible results.

To be continued, stay tuned...

The authorities of Russia and Japan have not been able to sign a peace treaty since 1945 due to a dispute over the ownership of the southern part of the Kuril Islands.

The Northern Territories Problem (北方領土問題 Hoppo ryo do mondai) is a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia that Japan considers unresolved since the end of World War II. After the war, all the Kuril Islands came under the administrative control of the USSR, but a number of the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir and the Lesser Kuril Ridge - are disputed by Japan.

In Russia disputed territories are part of the Kuril and South Kuril urban districts of the Sakhalin region. Japan claims four islands in the southern part of the Kuril ridge - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai, citing the bilateral Treaty on Trade and Borders of 1855. Moscow's position is that the southern Kuril Islands became part of the USSR (which Russia became the successor of) results of the Second World War, and Russian sovereignty over them, which has the appropriate international legal registration, is beyond doubt.

The problem of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands is the main obstacle to the complete settlement of Russian-Japanese relations.

Iturup(Japanese: 択捉島 Etorofu) is an island in the southern group of the Great Kuril Islands, the most large island archipelago.

Kunashir(Ainu Black Island, Japanese 国後島 Kunashiri-to:) is the southernmost island of the Great Kuril Islands.

Shikotan(Japanese 色丹島 Sikotan-to:?, in early sources Sikotan; name from the Ainu language: “shi” - large, significant; “kotan” - village, city) is the largest island of the Lesser Ridge of the Kuril Islands.

Habomai(Japanese: 歯舞群島 Habomai-gunto?, Suisho, “Flat Islands”) - Japanese name a group of islands in the northwest Pacific Ocean, together with the island of Shikotan in Soviet and Russian cartography, considered as the Lesser Kuril Ridge. The Habomai group includes the islands of Polonsky, Oskolki, Zeleny, Tanfilyeva, Yuri, Demina, Anuchina and a number of small ones. Separated by the Soviet Strait from the island of Hokkaido.

History of the Kuril Islands

17th century
Before the arrival of the Russians and Japanese, the islands were inhabited by the Ainu. In their language, “kuru” meant “a person who came from nowhere,” which is where their second name “Kurilians” came from, and then the name of the archipelago.

In Russia, the first mention of the Kuril Islands dates back to 1646, when N.I. Kolobov spoke about the bearded people inhabiting the islands ainah.

The Japanese received the first information about the islands during an expedition [source not specified 238 days] to Hokkaido in 1635. It is not known whether she actually got to the Kuril Islands or learned about them indirectly, but in 1644 a map was drawn up on which they were designated under the collective name “thousand islands.” Candidate of Geographical Sciences T. Adashova notes that the map of 1635 “is considered by many scientists to be very approximate and even incorrect.” Then, in 1643, the islands were explored by the Dutch led by Martin Friese. This expedition amounted to more than detailed maps and described the lands.

XVIII century
In 1711, Ivan Kozyrevsky went to the Kuril Islands. He visited only 2 northern islands: Shumshu and Paramushire, - but he questioned in detail the Ainu who inhabited them and the Japanese who were brought there by the storm. In 1719, Peter I sent an expedition to Kamchatka under the leadership of Ivan Evreinov and Fyodor Luzhin, which reached the island of Simushir in the south.

In 1738-1739, Martyn Shpanberg walked along the entire ridge, plotting the islands he encountered on the map. Subsequently, the Russians, avoiding dangerous voyages to the southern islands, developed the northern ones and imposed tribute on the local population. From those who did not want to pay it and went to distant islands, they took amanats - hostages from among their close relatives. But soon, in 1766, centurion Ivan Cherny from Kamchatka was sent to the southern islands. He was ordered to attract the Ainu into citizenship without the use of violence or threats. However, he did not follow this decree, mocked them, and poached. All this led to a revolt of the indigenous population in 1771, during which many Russians were killed.

The Siberian nobleman Antipov achieved great success with the Irkutsk translator Shabalin. They managed to win the favor of the Kurils, and in 1778-1779 they managed to bring into citizenship more than 1,500 people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Matsumaya (now Japanese Hokkaido). In the same 1779, Catherine II, by decree, freed those who had accepted Russian citizenship from all taxes. But relations with the Japanese were not built: they forbade the Russians from going to these three islands.

In the “Extensive Land Description of the Russian State...” of 1787, a list of 21 islands belonging to Russia was given. It included islands as far as Matsumaya (Hokkaido), the status of which was not clearly defined, since Japan had a city in its southern part. At the same time, the Russians had no real control even over the islands south of Urup. There, the Japanese considered the Kurilians their subjects and actively used violence against them, which caused discontent. In May 1788, a Japanese merchant ship arriving at Matsumai was attacked. In 1799, by order of the central government of Japan, two outposts were founded in Kunashir and Iturup, and security began to be maintained constantly.

19th century
Representative of the Russian-American Company Nikolai Rezanov, who arrived in Nagasaki as the first Russian envoy, tried to resume negotiations on trade with Japan in 1805. But he too failed. However, Japanese officials, who were not satisfied with the despotic policy of the supreme power, hinted to him that it would be nice to carry out a forceful action in these lands, which could push the situation from a dead point. This was carried out on behalf of Rezanov in 1806-1807 by an expedition of two ships led by Lieutenant Khvostov and Midshipman Davydov. Ships were looted, a number of trading posts were destroyed, and a Japanese village on Iturup was burned. They were later tried, but the attack led to a serious deterioration in Russian-Japanese relations for some time. In particular, this was the reason for the arrest of Vasily Golovnin’s expedition.

In exchange for ownership of southern Sakhalin, Russia transferred all of the Kuril Islands to Japan in 1875.

XX century
After defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Russia transferred the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan.
In February 1945, the Soviet Union promised the United States and Great Britain to start a war with Japan, subject to the return of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.
February 2, 1946. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the inclusion of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into the RSFSR.
1947. Deportation of Japanese and Ainu from the islands to Japan. 17,000 Japanese and an unknown number of Ainu were evicted.
November 5, 1952. A powerful tsunami hit the entire coast of the Kuril Islands, Paramushir was hit the hardest. A giant wave washed away the city of Severo-Kurilsk (formerly Kashiwabara). It was forbidden to mention this disaster in the press.
In 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan adopted the Joint Treaty, officially ending the war between the two countries and handing over Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. However, it was not possible to sign the agreement: the United States threatened not to give Japan the island of Okinawa if Tokyo renounced its claims to Iturup and Kunashir.

Maps of the Kuril Islands

Kuril Islands on English map 1893. Plans of the Kuril Islands, from sketches chiefly mand by Mr. H. J. Snow, 1893. (London, Royal Geographical Society, 1897, 54×74 cm)

Fragment of the map Japan and Korea - Location of Japan in the Western Pacific (1:30 000 000), 1945

Photo map of the Kuril Islands based on a NASA satellite image, April 2010.

List of all islands

View of Habomai from Hokkaido
Green Island (Japanese: Shibotsu-to)
Polonsky Island (Japanese: 多楽島 Taraku-to)
Tanfilyev Island (Japanese: 水晶島 Suisho-jima)
Yuri Island (Japanese: 勇留島 Yuri-to)
Anuchina Island (秋勇留島 Akiyuri-to)
Demina Islands (Japanese: 春苅島 Harukari-to)
Shard Islands
Rock Kira
Cave Rock (Kanakuso) - sea lion rookery on the rock.
Sail Rock (Hokoki)
Rock Candle (Rosoku)
Fox Islands (Todo)
Cone Islands (Kabuto)
Jar Dangerous
Watchman Island (Khomosiri or Muika)

Drying Rock (Odoke)
Reef Island (Amagi-sho)
Signal Island (Japanese: 貝殻島 Kaigara-jima)
Amazing Rock (Hanare)
Rock Seagull

History of the Kuril Islands

Background

Briefly, the history of “belonging” to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island is as follows.

1.During the period 1639-1649. Russian Cossack detachments led by Moskovitinov, Kolobov, Popov explored and began to develop Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. At the same time, Russian pioneers repeatedly sailed to the island of Hokkaido, where they were peacefully greeted by the local Ainu aborigines. The Japanese appeared on this island a century later, after which they exterminated and partially assimilated the Ainu.

2.B 1701 Cossack sergeant Vladimir Atlasov reported to Peter I about the “subordination” of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, leading to the “wonderful kingdom of Nipon”, to the Russian crown.

3.B 1786. By order of Catherine II, a register of Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean was made, with the register being brought to the attention of all European states as a declaration of Russia's rights to these possessions, including Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

4.B 1792. By decree of Catherine II, the entire chain of the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as the island of Sakhalin officially included in the Russian Empire.

5. As a result of Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War 1854-1855 gg. under pressure England and France Russia forced was concluded with Japan on February 7, 1855. Treaty of Shimoda, according to which four southern islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to Japan: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Sakhalin remained undivided between Russia and Japan. At the same time, however, the right of Russian ships to enter Japanese ports was recognized, and “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia” were proclaimed.

6.May 7, 1875 according to the Treaty of St. Petersburg, the tsarist government as a very strange act of “goodwill” makes incomprehensible further territorial concessions to Japan and transfers to it another 18 small islands of the archipelago. In return, Japan finally recognized Russia's right to all of Sakhalin. It is for this agreement the Japanese refer most of all today, slyly keeping silent, that the first article of this treaty reads: “... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between Russia and Japan” ( the Japanese themselves violated this treaty several times in the 20th century). Many Russian statesmen of those years sharply condemned this “exchange” agreement as short-sighted and harmful to the future of Russia, comparing it with the same short-sightedness as the sale of Alaska to the United States of America in 1867 for next to nothing ($7 billion 200 million). ), - saying that “now we are biting our own elbows.”

7.After the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 gg. followed another stage in the humiliation of Russia. By Portsmouth peace treaty concluded on September 5, 1905, Japan received the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, and also took away from Russia the lease right to naval bases Port Arthur and Dalniy. When did Russian diplomats remind the Japanese that all these provisions contradict the treaty of 1875 g., - those answered arrogantly and impudently : « War crosses out all agreements. You have been defeated and let's proceed from the current situation " Reader, Let us remember this boastful declaration of the invader!

8.Next comes the time to punish the aggressor for his eternal greed and territorial expansion. Signed by Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference February 10, 1945 G. " Agreement on the Far East" provided: "... 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan subject to the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, as well as the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny(these built and equipped by the hands of Russian workers, soldiers and sailors back in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. naval bases were very convenient in their geographical location donated free of charge to “brotherly” China. But these bases were so necessary for our fleet in the 60-80s of the raging Cold War and the intense combat service of the fleet in remote areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. We had to equip the Cam Ranh forward base in Vietnam from scratch for the fleet).

9.B July 1945 in accordance with Potsdam Declaration heads of victorious countries the following verdict was adopted regarding the future of Japan: “The sovereignty of Japan will be limited to four islands: Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu and those that WE SPECIFY.” August 14, 1945 The Japanese government has publicly confirmed its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and September 2 Japan unconditionally surrendered. Article 6 of the Instrument of Surrender states: “...the Japanese government and its successors will honestly implement the terms of the Potsdam Declaration , give such orders and take such actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers requires in order to implement this declaration...” January 29, 1946 The Commander-in-Chief, General MacArthur, in his Directive No. 677 DEMANDED: “The Kuril Islands, including Habomai and Shikotan, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Japan.” AND only after that Legal action was issued by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 2, 1946, which read: “All lands, subsoil and waters of Sakhalin and the Kul Islands are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Thus, the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as about. Sakhalin, legally And in accordance with international law were returned to Russia . At this point it would be possible to put an end to the “problem” of the Southern Kuril Islands and stop all further disputes. But the story with the Kuril Islands continues.

10.After the end of the Second World War US occupied Japan and turned it into their military base in the Far East. In September 1951 The USA, Great Britain and a number of other states (49 in total) signed Treaty of San Francisco with Japan, prepared in violation of the Potsdam Agreements without the participation of the Soviet Union . Therefore, our government did not join the agreement. However, in Art. 2, Chapter II of this treaty is stated in black and white: “ Japan renounces all rights and claims... to the Kuril Islands and that part of Sakhalin and the adjacent islands , over which Japan acquired sovereignty by the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.” However, even after this, the story with the Kuril Islands does not end.

11.19 October 1956 g. the government of the Soviet Union, following the principles of friendship with neighboring states, signed with the Japanese government joint declaration, according to which the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended and peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations were restored between them. When signing the Declaration as a gesture of goodwill and nothing more it was promised to transfer to Japan the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and Habomai, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries.

12.However The United States imposed a number of military agreements on Japan after 1956, replaced in 1960 by a single “Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security”, according to which US troops remained on its territory, and thereby japanese islands turned into a springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union. Due to this situation, the Soviet government told Japan that it was impossible to transfer the promised two islands to it.. And the same statement emphasized that, according to the declaration of October 19, 1956, “peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations” were established between the countries. Therefore, an additional peace treaty may not be required.
Thus, the problem of the South Kuril Islands does not exist. It was decided a long time ago. AND de jure and de facto the islands belong to Russia . In this regard, it might be appropriate remind the Japanese of their arrogant statement in 1905 g., and also indicate that Japan was defeated in World War II and therefore has no rights to any territories, even to her ancestral lands, except those that were given to her by the victors.
AND to our Foreign Ministry just as harshly, or in a softer diplomatic form you should have stated this to the Japanese and put an end to it, PERMANENTLY stopping all negotiations and even conversations on this non-existent problem that degrades the dignity and authority of Russia.
And again the “territorial issue”

However, starting from 1991 city, meetings of the President are held repeatedly Yeltsin and members of the Russian government, diplomats with Japanese government circles, during which The Japanese side every time persistently raises the issue of “northern Japanese territories.”
Thus, in the Tokyo Declaration 1993 g., signed by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan, was again the “presence of a territorial issue” was recognized, and both sides promised to “make efforts” to resolve it. The question arises: could our diplomats really not know that such declarations should not be signed, because recognizing the existence of a “territorial issue” is contrary to the national interests of Russia (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “High Treason”)??

As for the peace treaty with Japan, it is de facto and de jure in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956. not really needed. The Japanese do not want to conclude an additional official peace treaty, and there is no need. He more needed in Japan, as the side that was defeated in the Second World War, rather than Russia.

A Russian citizens should know that the “problem” of the Southern Kuril Islands is just a fake , her exaggeration, periodic media hype around her and the litigiousness of the Japanese - there is consequence illegal Japan's claims in violation of its obligations to strictly comply with its recognized and signed international obligations. And Japan’s constant desire to reconsider the ownership of many territories in the Asia-Pacific region permeates Japanese politics throughout the twentieth century.

Why The Japanese, one might say, have their teeth in the Southern Kuril Islands and are trying to illegally take possession of them again? But because the economic and military-strategic importance of this region is extremely great for Japan, and even more so for Russia. This region of colossal seafood wealth(fish, living creatures, sea animals, vegetation, etc.), deposits of useful, including rare earth minerals, energy sources, mineral raw materials.

For example, January 29 this year. in the Vesti (RTR) program, short information slipped through: it was discovered on the island of Iturup large deposit of the rare earth metal Rhenium(the 75th element in the periodic table, and the only one in the world ).
Scientists allegedly calculated that to develop this deposit it would be enough to invest only 35 thousand dollars, but the profit from the extraction of this metal will allow us to bring all of Russia out of the crisis in 3-4 years. Apparently the Japanese know about this and that is why they are so persistently attacking the Russian government demanding that they give them the islands.

I must say that During the 50 years of ownership of the islands, the Japanese did not build or create anything major on them, except for light temporary buildings. Our border guards had to rebuild barracks and other buildings at outposts. The entire economic “development” of the islands, which the Japanese are shouting about to the whole world today, consisted in the predatory robbery of the islands' wealth . During the Japanese "development" from the islands seal rookeries and sea otter habitats have disappeared . Part of the livestock of these animals our Kuril residents have already restored .

Today, the economic situation of this entire island zone, as well as the whole of Russia, is difficult. Of course, significant measures are needed to support this region and care for Kuril residents. According to calculations by a group of State Duma deputies, it is possible to produce on the islands, as reported in the program “Parliamentary Hour” (RTR) on January 31 of this year, only fish products up to 2000 tons per year, with a net profit of about 3 billion dollars.
Militarily, the ridge of the Northern and Southern Kuril Islands with Sakhalin constitutes a complete closed infrastructure for the strategic defense of the Far East and the Pacific Fleet. They protect the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and turn it into an inland one. This is the area deployment and combat positions of our strategic submarines.

Without the Southern Kuril Islands we will have a hole in this defense. Control over the Kuril Islands ensures free access of the fleet to the ocean, - after all, until 1945, our Pacific Fleet, starting in 1905, was practically locked in its bases in Primorye. Detection equipment on the islands provides long-range detection of air and surface enemies and the organization of anti-submarine defense of the approaches to the passages between the islands.

In conclusion, it is worth noting this feature in the relationship between the Russia-Japan-US triangle. It is the United States that confirms the “legality” of the islands’ ownership of Japan, against all odds international treaties signed by them .
If so, then our Foreign Ministry has every right, in response to the claims of the Japanese, to invite them to demand the return of Japan to its “southern territories” - the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands.
These archipelagos former colonies Germany, captured by Japan in 1914. Japanese rule over these islands was sanctioned by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After the defeat of Japan, all these archipelagos came under US control. So Why shouldn't Japan demand that the United States return the islands to it? Or do you lack the spirit?
As you can see, there is clear double standard in Japanese foreign policy.

And one more fact that clarifies the overall picture of the return of our Far Eastern territories in September 1945 and the military significance of this region. The Kuril operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet (August 18 - September 1, 1945) provided for the liberation of all the Kuril Islands and the capture of Hokkaido.

The annexation of this island to Russia would have important operational-strategic significance, since it would ensure complete closure of the “fence” of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk by our island territories: Kuril Islands - Hokkaido - Sakhalin. But Stalin canceled this part of the operation, saying that with the liberation of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, we had resolved all our territorial issues in the Far East. A we don't need someone else's land . In addition, the capture of Hokkaido will cost us a lot of blood, unnecessary losses of sailors and paratroopers in the most last days war.

Stalin here showed himself to be a real statesman, caring for the country and its soldiers, and not an invader who coveted foreign territories that were very accessible in that situation for seizure.
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